Mutual recognition in criminal matters and state sovereignty: the case of the European arrest warrant. by Defteras, Dora-Maria
Mutual recognition in criminal matters and state sovereignty: the case of
the European arrest warrant.
Defteras, Dora-Maria
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information
derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/jspui/handle/123456789/3168
 
 
 
Information about this research object was correct at the time of download; we occasionally
make corrections to records, please therefore check the published record when citing. For
more information contact scholarlycommunications@qmul.ac.uk
  
MUTUAL RECOGNITION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS AND 
STATE SOVEREIGNTY: 
THE CASE OF THE EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT 
  
 
Dora-Maria Defteras  
Barrister-at-Law (Lincoln’s Inn and Cyprus Bar Association), LLM, LLB 
 
Supervised By:   
Valsamis Mitsilegas, Prof. European Criminal Law and Director of the Criminal Justice Centre  
             
 
 
 
Master of Philosophy (M.Phil) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To,  
my loving family. 
Thank you for all your support.  
 1 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Judicial cooperation is in the fore of European Union (hereinafter referred 
to as EU) integration in criminal matters. In the past decade we have 
witnessed revolutionary efforts to introduce new mechanisms in this field 
that have reshaped EU criminal cooperation and have promisingly 
declared to develop the EU into an area of freedom, security and justice. 
The pioneer initiative in this area has, without doubt, been the principle 
of Mutual Recognition, which has been famously pronounced as the 
cornerstone of judicial cooperation1 and has become the centerpiece of 
EU judicial cooperation in criminal matters.  The adoption of the 
Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant2 signified the 
introduction of the first concrete measure in the field of EU criminal law 
implementing the principle of Mutual Recognition.3 To date, it has been 
implemented by all Member States and has had more than seven years 
of testing ground. In the context therefore of exploring the impact of the 
application of the principle of Mutual Recognition in criminal matters on 
State Sovereignty this thesis takes the European Arrest Warrant as a 
case study.  
 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that the European Arrest Warrant, in 
theory and practice, challenges essential functions and prerogatives of 
                                         
1 See for example COM (2004) 401 final, 02.06.2004 p.12, where it is stated that “the principle of 
mutual recognition must remain as a cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal matters”. The 
reference to mutual recognition as the "cornerstone" of judicial cooperation” in criminal matters in 
the EU was reiterated 5 years later, in the Hague Program extending the EU Justice and Home Affairs 
agenda to 2009 (See 2005/C 53/01 Para. 3.3.1.) and in the Stockholm Program extending the EU 
Justice and Home Affairs agenda to 2014 (see COM (2009) 262 final p.10).  
2 Council Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and surrender procedures between 
Member States of the European Union, of 13 June 2002, OJ L 190, of 18 July 2002 (hereinafter 
referred to as Framework Decision). 
3 Ibid Recital 6, Preamble. 
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Member States that are defining features of their State Sovereignty. The 
discussion that follows is dedicated to exploring whether State 
Sovereignty is challenged. To do so, it focuses on three axons around the 
European Arrest Warrant a) the double criminality requirement and its 
partial abolition b) the removal of the bar to surrender of own nationals 
and c) the “depoliticisation” of the surrender procedure.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
More than two hundred years ago, the Marcquis of Beccaria refused to 
decide on the issue of whether or not to extradite nationals commenting: 
“Whether it be useful that nations should mutually deliver up their 
criminals? Although the certainty of there being no part of the earth 
where crimes are not punished, may be means of preventing them, I 
shall not pretend to determine this question, until laws more conformable 
to the necessities, and rights of humanity, and until milder punishments, 
and their abolition of arbitrary power of opinion, shall afford security to 
virtue and innocence when oppressed; until tyranny shall be confined to 
the plans of Asia, and Europe acknowledge the universal empire of 
reason by which the interests of sovereigns and subjects are best 
united.”4 
 
The European Union has attempted in the last decade to create a system 
of surrender close to the one aspired by the Marcquis of Beccaria and to 
develop into an area of freedom, security and justice. The pioneer 
initiative in this area has, without doubt, been the principle of Mutual 
Recognition, which has been famously pronounced as the cornerstone of 
judicial cooperation5 and has become the centerpiece of EU judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. In this setting, the research question 
this thesis sets out to answer is: Are there challenges to State 
                                         
4 Beccaria C., An Essay on Crimes and Punishment, Nicklin H. P., Philadelphia 1819 at p.p.135-136 
quoted in Kuhn Z., The European Arrest Warrant, Third Pillar Law and National Constitutional 
Resistance/Acceptance. The EAW Saga as Narrated by the Constitutional Judiciary in Poland, 
Germany, and the Czech Republic, CYELP 3 [2007], 108. 
5 Supra note 1. 
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Sovereignty from the application of Mutual Recognition in EU criminal 
matters?   
 
Methodologically, so as to examine this, the European Arrest Warrant is 
taken as a case study as the adoption of the Framework Decision on the 
European Arrest Warrant was the first concrete measure in the field of 
criminal law implementing the principle of Mutual Recognition.6 To date, 
it has been implemented by all Member States and has had more than 
seven years of testing ground. The research question of this thesis 
therefore narrowed down to: Are there challenges to State Sovereignty 
from the application of the European Arrest Warrant?  
 
In examining this research question, a methodological challenge that 
developed was the interpretation of the concept of “Sovereignty”, as it is 
a contested concept and could be described as one of the most 
ambiguous terms in use today.7 The term is used concurrently by 
politicians8, scholars, jurists, journalists and laymen to refer to different 
notions. Within literature numerous definitions of Sovereignty were 
identified9, some of these include: state sovereignty; legal sovereignty; 
                                         
6 Supra note 2. 
7 As a starting point, the concept of a sovereignty can be traced to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 
where, as noted by Rajan, “[f]or the first time in history, it was formally recognized in a multilateral 
treaty that each state had supreme authority within its territorial jurisdiction, and that states were 
equal with reference to each other”. See, Rajan M.S., UN and Domestic Jurisdiction, Orient 
Longmans, Bombay, 1958, 6. It is accepted that not all scholars agree that the Peace of Westphalia 
deserves this status. For a discussion see Krasner S. D., Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999.  
8 From the primary stages of research, it was realised that Sovereignty is not only a contested 
concept but that those that are involved in political action manipulate its interpretation so as to 
promote certain beliefs amongst those they seek to influence; it is arguably easier to generate 
opposition or support by suggesting that “Sovereignty” is threatened or protected. From this 
realisation, it is clear that the conceptual meaning of Sovereignty is further distorted. 
9 See Merriam C., History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1900; Anderson P., Lineages of the Absolute State. London: New Left Books, 1974; 
Bartelson J., A Genealogy of Sovereignty, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995; 
Stankiewicz W.J., (Ed), In Defense of Sovereignty, London: Oxford University Press, 1969; Camillieri 
J. and Falk J. The End of Sovereignty?, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1992;Chayes, A.H., The New 
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popular sovereignty; popular state sovereignty in combination with 
various forms of “totalitarian” claims; national sovereignty; divided 
sovereignty; shared sovereignty; international sovereignty; domestic 
sovereignty; interdependence sovereignty; internal sovereignty; external 
sovereignty. 
 
 In this context, before setting out to examine whether there are 
challenges to State Sovereignty from the application of the European 
Arrest Warrant, it is clear that the concept of State Sovereignty has to be 
identified to the extent that it will be used within the analysis of this 
thesis.10  Putting it simply, State Sovereignty, as examined in this thesis, 
includes a State having political and legal authority over all the 
individuals in respect to any affairs within its territory11 and furthermore, 
that a State is not obliged to adhere to any demands from other States 
as it is equal to and independent of other sovereign states.12  
 
In the realms of the limited space provided in this thesis a hypothesis 
was made about which areas, in the application of the European Arrest 
Warrant, pose the most inherent challenges to State Sovereignty and 
should therefore be examined. Within the space constraints, it is 
accepted that not all elements of the European Arrest Warrant that may 
challenge State Sovereignty are examined in this thesis. Focus is given to 
three axons a) the double criminality requirement and its partial abolition 
                                                                                                                   
Sovereignty, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995; Biersteker T.J. and Weber C., State 
Sovereignty as Social Construct, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
10 There is a need to define the ‘conception of the concept’ see Dworkin R., Law's Empire, Fontana, 
1986, p.p.90-101. 
11 Also referred to in literature as Internal Sovereignty, see Bartelson J. Supra note 9. 
12 Also referred to in literature as External Sovereignty, see Bartelson J., Ibid.  
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b) the removal of the bar of surrender of a State’s own nationals and, c) 
the “depolitisation” of the surrender procedure. Their subsequent 
research questions, that channeled the discussion in this thesis, are as 
follows:  
 
a) Does the partial abolishment of the double criminality requirement 
challenge State Sovereignty? 
 
b) Does the removal of the bar of surrender of own nationals 
challenge State Sovereignty? 
 
c) Does the “depoliticisation” of the surrender procedure challenge 
State Sovereignty? 
 
The discussion is divided into four main chapters. The first chapter 
introduces the principle of Mutual Recognition and its emergence as a 
method of EU integration in criminal matters. It further touches on the 
notion of State Sovereignty and its relationship with criminal law. The 
three subsequent chapters deal respectively with examining the three 
abovementioned research questions. The Conclusion overviews the 
findings and addresses the research question. 
 
The research approach that is used throughout this thesis is based on 
examining relevant literature, EU instruments and EU reports. It is 
accepted that in the wave of increase of resources in this area and the 
space constraints of this thesis, it has not been possible, neither 
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attempted, to include them exhaustively in this thesis. The material that 
is used and the discussion that follows was selected and weaved around 
the branches of the above research questions so as to examine whether 
the application of the principle of Mutual Recognition in EU criminal law 
poses challenges on State Sovereignty, by using the European Arrest 
Warrant as a case study.  
 
The law is stated as it was on 29 April 2011. 
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CHAPTER 1:  THE EMERGENCE OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION 
AS A METHOD OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN CRIMINAL 
MATTERS AT EU LEVEL 
 
The application of the principle of Mutual Recognition in criminal 
cooperation replaced the method of traditional cooperation in EU criminal 
matters, also known as Mutual Legal Assistance. Traditionally criminal 
cooperation was founded on a variety of international legal instruments, 
the majority of which were based on the request principle which in simple 
terms, is the procedure by which a State makes a request to another 
State which then decides whether or not to comply with it.13 Extradition 
formed the core of criminal cooperation in which one state requested and 
obtained from another state the surrender of a suspected or convicted 
criminal. The notion however of a State handing over individuals residing 
in its territory touches on the heart of Sovereignty as it is a sovereign 
prerogative of a State to have political and legal authority over all the 
individuals in respect to any affairs within its territory and furthermore, a 
State  is not obliged to adhere to any demands from other States as it is 
equal to and independent of other sovereign states. In this respect, a 
number of extradition treaties and agreements evolved so as to 
overcome Sovereign concerns of States and to set agreed parameters in 
which cooperation can take place.14 
                                         
13 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Mutual 
Recognition of Final Decisions in Criminal Matters, COM (2000) 495 final, Brussels, 26 July 2000 at 
p.2 
14 On a historical analysis on the traditional extradition procedure see Keijzer N., The European 
Arrest Warrant Framework Decision between Past and Future, (Ed.) Guild E., Constitutional 
Challenges to the European Arrest Warrant. Netherlands: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006, 13-74. 
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The first single multilateral convention that came into force and produced 
international uniformity for Extradition was the European Convention on 
Extradition (ECE) in 1957. This Convention was welcomed after the 
Second World War, as in the war’s recent aftermath, the above 
mentioned agreements were replace by one single arrangement, which 
epitomized cooperation of Member States on the basis of confidence and 
trust; for example, requesting states were not to be required to submit 
evidence of probable cause, and further it introduced a dual incrimination 
requirement, replacing the formerly used list method of indicating for 
which offences extradition could be granted.15 In this ambitious 
enterprise however, since then, there developed a “very complicated web 
of extradition treaties and agreements”16 – and the declarations and 
reservations attached to them – to the extent that the traditional 
extradition system had different rules applicable each time and it was a 
problem of its own to figure them out.17 Moreover, the extradition 
procedure was particularly slow with often bureaucratic and 
administrative reasons responsible for extremely long delays.18  
 
In the shadow of this, during the 1980s, the then EU Member States 
started exploring the meaning of freedom of movement of persons. 
Opinions were polarized; on the one hand it was interpreted as the 
removal of internal border checks (i.e. free movement for anyone within 
EU territory) and on the other hand as maintaining internal border checks 
                                         
15 For a discussion see Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
16 Supra note 14 at p.15. 
17 Ibid. 
18 For example the Report from the Commission based on Art. 34 SEC (2005) 267, 23 February 
2005 at p.5 reports an average time of nine months needed for reaching a final decision in case the 
request was contested by the requested person.  
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so as to distinguish EU nationals (i.e. free movement only for EU 
nationals within EU territory). Discussions came to a halt and France, 
Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, supporters of the 
former interpretation to the removal of internal border checks, proceeded 
in 1985 to sign the Schengen Agreement on the gradual abolition of 
checks at common borders which, was then supplemented by the signing 
of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement in 1990, that 
took practical effect in 1995.19  
 
The establishment of the Schengen area, however, by encapsulating the 
principle of free movement of persons, gave criminals wider geographic 
horizons and easier mechanisms to commit transnational crimes in the 
backdrop of the then problematic traditional extradition system.  The 
attempts to address such challenges are arguably reflected in the 
arrangements and safeguards provided, amongst Schengen states, in the 
Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement, also referred to as 
“compensatory” measures, which set a lot of the ideological and practical 
groundwork for EU judicial and police cooperation as we know it today. 
Although police cooperation and judicial cooperation cannot be seen in 
complete isolation, for the purposes of examining the research question 
of this thesis in the limited space provided, judicial cooperation will be 
viewed in isolation, with its focus being on the developments for 
extradition. In this respect, the Convention implementing the Schengen 
Agreement of 1985, included several Articles containing facilitating 
provisions in relation to the ECE; for example it provided that 
                                         
19[2000] OJ 2000 L239/19. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), the Convention works between 
all Member States of the EU, as well as Iceland and Norway.  
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interruption of the statutory limitation periods is governed only by the 
law of the requesting state and that provisional arrest can be ordered on 
the basis of an alert concerning the requested person in the Schengen 
Information System.   
 
As highlighted above, the problems with extradition continued to prevail 
and  in an attempt to try to overcome these problems, with the further 
developments of a Schengen area, that arguably would have exacerbated 
transnational crime and introduced new challenges to extradition, the 
Justice and Home Affairs Council of the EU concluded two conventions; 
The Convention on Simplified Extradition Procedure Between Member 
States of the European Union20, hereinafter referred to as 1995 
Convention, and the Convention Relating to Extradition Between the 
Member States of the European Union, hereinafter referred to as 1996 
Convention.21 What is surprising with these Conventions is that although 
the initial proposal of the Council was to introduce the Conventions so as 
to simplify and improve the extradition procedure, the final text of the 
Conventions and their proposed restructures in the extradition system 
are far more extreme and introduce a fairly novel status quo on 
extradition, that, as we will see, could be described as an embryonic 
form of the European Arrest Warrant procedure. In a nutshell some of 
these proposals include but are not limited to: the abolition of the double 
criminality requirement, the abolishment of the political offence, the 
removal of the bar of surrender of own nationals, the removal of the 
exception that extradition can be refused on the grounds that the 
                                         
20 Adopted on 10 March 1995, 1995 OJ C78/1.   
21 Adopted on 27 September 1996, 1996 OJ C313/11. 
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prosecution or punishment of the person sought would be statute-barred 
according to the law of the requested Member State, the introduction of 
the concept of a designated authority in each Member State that is 
responsible for centralising the transmission and the receipt of 
extradition requests and further, the option for Member States to be able 
to declare that they allow other Member States – having made the same 
declaration – to enter into direct contact with their judicial authorities to 
request supplementary information concerning extradition requests.  
 
With the proposed reforms, the 1995 and 1996 Conventions were viewed 
as sliding too far towards enforcing extradition at the expense of 
fundamental rights22 and also to expound too closely the cooperation of 
Member States. The response towards their ratification was therefore not 
particularly positive. The extradition procedure however was burdened 
into a complex and slow venture and to that effect the European 
Parliament in 1997 called on the Member States to make practical efforts 
to minimise the delays and facilitate the operation of the then existing EU 
criminal cooperation.  At the time, the EU also envisioned to open its 
doors to twelve new Member States and this would have arguably 
exacerbate the abovementioned difficulties, as the introduction of twelve  
different legal systems would endorse further complication on the already 
strained traditional criminal cooperation system. It therefore became an 
evident concern that the traditional method of criminal cooperation had 
intrinsic difficulties and could not easily facilitate cooperation within 
Europe.  
                                         
22 See Mackarel M. and Nash S., Extradition and the European Union, 46 ICLQ (1997), 948. 
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The Treaty of Amsterdam paved the path for the Council to be able to 
promote cooperation through the adoption of Framework Decisions23 and 
the notion of the principle of Mutual Recognition was officially launched in 
March 1998, during the UK presidency, by the then Home Secretary, Mr. 
Jack Straw.24  Prior to this announcement no minister had been informed 
of the launching of the principle and most were probably not aware of the 
concept and the potential it could have to further the creation of a 
European area of freedom, security and justice.25  Indeed, in reaction to 
the proposal most specialists in the context of the Council where of the 
opinion that it was sufficient for Member States to ratify the Council of 
Europe Convention of 1970 concerning the International Validity of 
Criminal Judgments or the Council of Europe Convention of 1972 
concerning the Transfer of Proceedings.26  These conventions contained 
several provisions which could arguably be seen as parallel to the 
concept of mutual recognition of criminal judgments.27  
 
The British presidency however in its conclusions of Cardiff of 1998 went 
forward and introduced to the forefront of EU criminal cooperation the 
principle of Mutual Recognition.28 It stated that it recognised the “need to 
enhance the ability of national legal systems to work closely together” 
and it asked the Council “to identify the scope for greater mutual 
                                         
23 Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 Article K.6 (2)(b). 
24 See Husabø E. J., and Strandbakken A., Harmonization of criminal law in Europe, Intersentia 
(2005) at p.26.  
25 See Nilsson H.G., "Mutual Trust or Mutual Mistrust?", in de Kerchove and Weyembergh A. (Eds.), 
La Confiance Mutuelle dans I'Espace Penal Europeen/Mutual Trust in the European Criminal Area, 
Editions de I'Universite de Bruxelles, 2005, 29. 
26 In particular the Multidisciplinary Group on Organised Crime and the K 4 Committee on the basis 
of Presidency document 10600/98 CRIMORG 121 CK 4 39 JUSTPEN 78, Supra note 14.  
27 For example, Article 42 of the International Validity Convention provides that the statement of 
facts in a foreign judgment has to be taken for granted. On this point see Ibid at p.30. 
28 Doc. SN 150/1/98 REV 1 
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recognition of court decisions”29.  The inspiration of the UK to make this 
initiation was arguably three-fold: Primarily, it was influenced by its 
positive experience with “backed warrants” that were used as a method 
of cooperation between the UK and Ireland30 and saw that similarly 
extradition could be replaced by arrest warrants based on the principle of 
Mutual Recognition.31 In this context it also may have been inspired by 
the simple US surrender procedure that was based on the principle of full 
faith and credit in the US Constitution32 and the very simplified Nordic 
extradition system.33 Secondly, it could have taken into consideration the 
politically turbulent climate amongst Member States that arose with the 
proposal in 1996 for a Corpus Juris to unify criminal laws and procedures 
of the Member States with regards to offences affecting the EC budget.  
The strong reactions to this proposal illustrated that Member States were 
not akin to the idea of ceding Sovereignty by cooperating in criminal 
matters through harmonisation. Indeed, some commentators suggest 
that the UK proposed to further cooperation through the principle of 
Mutual Recognition as a means of particularly avoiding the constant 
discussions at the time on harmonisation of the common law towards the 
continental law.34 Reflective of the UK’s concern was the then UK 
delegation’s suggestion in a working paper that emphasised that the 
                                         
29 Ibid at Para. 3. 
30 See Spencer J. R., The Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies. 2003, 201-217. Vol. 6. 
31 In particular, the UK presidency envisioned that extradition should be replaced by arrest warrants 
based on Mutual Recognition with the abolishment of the dual criminality requirement. See Supra 
note 14 at p.30. 
32 See for example Nilson H. G., Sussex Institute Working Paper 57, 2001 who argues that the 
principle of mutual recognition should be recognised in the TEU. He proposes that this could be done 
by inserting a “full faith and credit clause” as has been done in the US Constitution, for instance in 
connection with Article 10 TEU. For an analysis of the extradition system in the United States see 
Abramson L. W., “Extradition in the United States, in Keijzer N., and Siledregt E. van, The European 
Arrest Warrant in Practice, T. M. C. Asser Press,  2009, 377-398. 
33 For an analysis on the Nordic extradition system see Strandbakken A., “Extradition between 
Nordic countries, and the new Nordic Arrest Warrant” in in Keijzer N., and Siledregt E. van, The 
European Arrest Warrant in Practice, T. M. C. Asser Press,  2009, 363-376.  
34 Supra note 14 at p.32. 
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optimal way to proceed in criminal cooperation was Mutual Recognition 
as the differences in legal systems limited the possible progress by 
alternative means and in effect made the possible harmonisation of 
criminal law time consuming, difficult to negotiate and unrealistic.35  The 
third inspiration to further criminal cooperation through the principle of 
Mutual Recognition arguably came from the way the principle of Mutual 
Recognition was successfully used in the 1980s in the internal market36 
to vitalise the then stagnated cooperation without having to opt for 
harmonisation.37  
 
The response to the British Presidency’s proposal to introduce the 
principle of Mutual Recognition was not at first particularly positive and 
some Council working groups began to examine as an alternative the 
possibility of the EU Member States ratifying the 1995 and 1996 
Conventions or even the possibility of “bringing new life” into 
Conventions that concerned the same questions and which were 
elaborated within the context of the European political area in the mid-
1980s.38  It is submitted, that the focus on the ratification of the Council 
of Europe and the political Conventions and not on the principle of Mutual 
Recognition was reflective of the Member States’ concerns on the 
sovereign challenges inherent in applying the principle of Mutual 
                                         
35 Doc 7090/99, Brussels, 29 March 1999, Para. 7 and 8. 
36 For a critical evaluation of the problems that have arisen from the application of the principle of 
Mutual Recognition in the Internal Market see Nicolaıdis K. and Schmidt S.K., (2007) ‘Mutual 
recognition “on trial”: the long road to services liberalization’, Journal of European Public Policy 
14(5), 717–734; Nicolaıdis K., (2007) ‘Trusting the Poles? Constructing Europe through mutual 
recognition’, Journal of European Public Policy 14(5), 682–98; Maduro M.P., ‘So close and yet so far: 
the paradoxes of Mutual Recognition’, Journal of European Public Policy 14:5 August 2007, 814–825 
37 However, in hindsight the successful transposition of a concept that was useful in integrating the 
Single Market to another area conceded challenges, as there are central differences in the two areas 
that are obstacles to this institutional isomorphism. For an analysis see Lavenex S., (2007) ‘Mutual 
recognition and the monopoly of force: limits of the single market analogy’, Journal of European 
Public Policy 14(5), 762–79. 
38  See in particular the Multidisciplinary Group on Organised Crime and the K4 Committee Supra 
note 24. See also Supra note 14 at p.29. 
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Recognition to cooperate in criminal matters and using the European 
Arrest Warrant as a case study, these will be highlighted in the next 
Chapters. To put it briefly, the system of cooperation as it stood in 
traditional extradition was based on sovereign nations agreeing to create 
international law, i.e. Conventions, between them to govern their 
relations with regards to extradition matters. In contrast however, 
cooperation based on the principle of Mutual Recognition does not create 
international law, but rather transnational or European law39 as it 
replaces all the measures based on international law between the 
Member States with a legal instrument of the EU40, e.g. the European 
Arrest Warrant. 
 
Although the climate was not positive towards applying the principle of 
Mutual Recognition to criminal matters and it was considered somewhat 
of a revolution in Europe41, in the discussions that followed the difficulties 
of progressing through traditional extradition were evident; the Council 
of Europe Convention, the ECE, had not been ratified by many Member 
States because it was considered too complicated and although the 
Conventions, drafted within the framework of the European political 
cooperation, were considered less complicated they contained clauses of 
bilateral entry into force and had never been ratified by all of the EU 
Member States.42 In the shadow of this, with all the intrinsic difficulties 
highlighted above that strained traditional cooperation and with the need 
                                         
39 See Wagner W., (2003a), ‘Building an Internal Security Community: The Democratic Peace and 
the Politics of Extradition in Western Europe’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 40, no. 6, 2003, 695–
712. 
40 See Kaunert C., (2007), ‘Without the Power of Purse or Sword’: The European Arrest Warrant and 
the Role of the Commission, Journal of European Integration, vol. 29, no.4, 387-404 at p.395. 
41 See Vogel J., (2001), Abschaffung der Auslieferung? Kritische Anmerkungen zur Reform des 
Auslieferungsrechts in der Europäischen Union, Juristenzeitung, vol. 56, no. 19, 937-943  at p.937. 
42 Supra note 14 at p.29. 
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of Member States to effectively cooperate to fight transnational crime, 
the principle of Mutual Recognition was given fruitful grounds. The 
Council Secretariat in the preparation for the European Council special 
meeting at Tampere in October 199943 started to consider in depth the 
potential impact of applying the principle of Mutual Recognition to 
criminal matters in the EU and to this effect set up inside the Secretariat 
informal working groups to test the principle. Following, the European 
Council endorsed the principle of Mutual Recognition in the Tampere 
Conclusions.44  It famously pronounced that in its view, the principle of 
Mutual Recognition should become the cornerstone of judicial co-
operation45 in both civil and criminal matters within the EU. It was also 
stressed that the principle of Mutual Recognition should even apply to 
pre-trial orders, in particular to those which would enable competent 
authorities quickly to secure evidence and to seize assets which are 
easily movable.46 In order to accomplish the above, the European Council 
asked the Council and the Commission to adopt a program of measures 
to implement the principle of Mutual Recognition.47  
 
The EU’s approach, so as to further integration through the principle of 
Mutual Recognition, could be described as an orchestrated endeavour to 
present the principle as a lifeboat that would drag EU cooperation in 
criminal matters from the murky waters of the inert traditional 
cooperation system. This is illuminated in the Commission’s 
                                         
43 Political policy program that set up a five year agenda (1999-2004) for EU Justice and Home 
Affairs. 
44 Supra note 1. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Supra note 35 at Para. 36. 
47 Ibid at Para 37. 
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Communication to the Council and the European Parliament where it 
states that the “traditional system is not only slow, but also 
cumbersome, and sometimes it is quite uncertain what results a judge or 
prosecutor who makes a request will get. Thus, borrowing from concepts 
that have worked very well in the creation of the Single Market, the idea 
was born that judicial cooperation might also benefit from the concept of 
Mutual Recognition”48. In understanding how the Commission understood 
the principle, and therefore its applicable transition from the Single 
Market, helpful is a definition of Mutual Recognition found in the same 
Communication. In the Commission’s view, Mutual Recognition “means 
that once a certain measure, such as a decision taken by a judge in 
exercising his or her official powers in one Member State, has been 
taken, that measure – in so far as it has extranational implications – 
would automatically be accepted in all other Member States, and have 
the same or at least similar effects there.” It is submitted that Mutual 
Recognition was presented as a solution to the bureaucratic complexities 
that burdened the traditional cooperation system as it was associated 
with automaticity and speed in building a system of cooperation between 
the judicial authorities of each Member State.  
 
Τhe attempts to further the principle of Mutual Recognition in the 
informal discussions began during the Portuguese presidency in the first 
half of 2000 and were crystallised by the French Presidency by the 
                                         
48 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Mutual 
Recognition of Final Decisions in Criminal Matters, COM (2000) 495 final, Brussels, 26 July 2000 at p. 
2. 
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preparation of a draft Program of measures.49 A very detailed program of 
measures to implement the principle of Mutual Recognition of decisions in 
criminal matters was finally produced in a meeting of the Article 36 
Committee in Troyes in 2001, which called on the Council to adopt 24 
measures in the field.50 In the middle of that year negotiations on the 
first instruments, the Framework Decision on the execution of orders 
freezing property or evidence and the Framework Decision on the mutual 
recognition of financial penalties, began. The Commission had almost 
finished working on the proposal of another instrument, the Framework 
Decision on the European Arrest Warrant, by September of 2001 when at 
around that time the 9/11 attacks happened in New York and Washington 
D.C.. The attacks resulted in European pandemonium and public fear of 
terrorism pushed the EU to come up with an effective way to deal with 
the security crisis. Emphasis was given on security, and as Guild and 
Geyer argue, this was promulgated “in the form of state capacity to 
deploy effectively coercive forces, against which freedom, in the form of 
freedom of movement of persons, was viewed as an impediment”51.  
 
It should however be illuminated that, although the European Arrest 
Warrant is at large associated with the 9/11 attacks, it is imprecise to 
associate its adoption solemnly as the result of them. As has already 
been pointed out, the proposal by the Commission concerning the 
European Arrest Warrant had been planned a long time before 9/11. The 
                                         
49 Draft program of measures for implementation of the principle of mutual recognition of decisions 
in civil and commercial matters, 2001/C 12/01. 
50 Program of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal 
matters, OJ, no C 12, 15 January 2001 at p.10. 
51 See Guild E. and Geyer F., Security versus Justice?: Police and Judicial Cooperation in the 
European Union, Ashgate Publishing, 2008.  
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most prominent events leading to it were notably the case of Papon52 and 
the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan in Italy53. What the 9/11 attacks did 
however, was to create a political impetus that pressured Member States 
to adopt the European Arrest Warrant and negotiations on the context of 
the European Arrest Warrant were facilitated in the name of the war on 
terror. Faced with this strong political impetus to join the war on terror 
the motions towards the adoption of the European Arrest Warrant, 
especially in correlation to State Sovereignty, can, as Kaurent describes, 
in simple be mapped out in four options of European momentum in the 
area of freedom, security and justice.54 The below diagram illustrates 
these four crossroads.55 
               
 
Figure 1: The aftermath of 9/11 for EU Integration 
                                         
52  Mautice Papon, who was sentenced to imprisonment in France, had escaped to Switzerland. The 
Swiss police arrested him in 10 days and surrendered him within 24 hours after his arrest. The time 
frames were impressive compared to the time that would on average be necessary for extradition 
between European Member States. It should however be noted that his surrender was not based on 
extradition procedures but on the basis of a readmission agreement of 1965 between France and 
Switzerland. See Supra note 8. 
53 Although Turkey had requested the extradition of Ocalan from Italy, Italy faced serious problems 
in its judicial system when it arrested him as a result of a Schengen alert under Article 95 of the  
Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement. Italy rejected Turkey’s request for extradition as 
Italian law prohibited the extradition of prisoners to countries that have the death penalty. The 
problems Italy faced were transferred by Italian Prime Minister Amato who asked in Tampere that 
they were reflected in the draft conclusions. This arguably led to the European Commission being 
tasked with the drafting of the proposal setting the European Arrest Warrant. Reflected in the 
Conclusions in Para. 35 of Tampere “consideration should also be given to fast track extradition 
procedures”. On this point see Supra note 14 at p.34. 
54 The discussion that follows on the four crossroads is largely based on Kaunert’s analysis in Supra 
note 40. 
55 Ibid at p.10 Titled “Figure 1: September 11 – The EU at a normative crossroads”. 
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The first option, represented in the first quadrant of the matrix, would 
have been to not join the United States in the war on terror and continue 
to operate as before, maintaining State Sovereignty. However, this would 
have come against the political tide, especially against the pressure wave 
coming from the United States to fight the war on terror, and predictably 
could have brought conflict in international relations. Similarly, the 
second option, represented in the second quadrant of the matrix, for 
Europe to not join in the war on terror and to integrate, through Member 
State’s ceding sovereignty so as to form a counterweight against 
America, could also rupture the positive state of transatlantic relations 
and result in Europe being considered as an opposing force to the United 
States. The third option represented in the third quadrant of the matrix 
and referred to as “Option A: The traditional nation State”, was for 
Member States to support the United States while at the same time 
maintain their Sovereignty in the area of freedom, security and justice. 
This represents what Member States traditionally practiced.56 Finally, the 
fourth option represented in the fourth quadrant of the matrix and 
referred to as “Option B: Deeper Integration”, implied full support to the 
war on terror while restructuring the foundations of internal security in 
the EU. As highlighted, the strong political momentum of the United 
States for the world to join the war on terror politically pressed the EU 
towards the third and fourth option. It is further contended, that this, as 
will be discussed below, was also strategically used by the Commission 
and the Council to promote and facilitate the adoption of the European 
                                         
56 For an analysis of the EU’s external relations see Mitsilegas V., (2007), “The External Dimension 
of EU Action in Criminal Matters”, European Foreign Affairs Review 12, 457-497. 
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Arrest Warrant.57 To this effect, although it was originally planned to be 
launched under the Spanish Presidency58 in the first half of 2002, the war 
on terror campaign gave fruitful grounds to accelerate the adoption of 
the European Arrest Warrant and it was decided that the text of the 
Framework Decision should be agreed by the end of 2001.59  
 
In the political arena that followed the European Arrest Warrant was 
equated and promoted by the Commission as being a necessary weapon 
to fight the global threat of terrorism. With the political pressure from the 
United States and the potential diplomatic repercussions in being 
associated as an opposing force in the international arena to fight 
terrorism, a position that was reiterated and inflamed by the Commission 
and the Council, Member States were partly puppetries in the 
negotiations that followed on the European Arrest Warrant.60 Although 
the European Arrest Warrant was only given priority rating 2 in the 
Program on Mutual Recognition, compared to the abovementioned 
instruments that received priority rating 1, it was decided that the text of 
the Framework Decision should be agreed by the end of 2001. The 
negotiations took only two months and six days and within six months, 
following a rather limited debate among national Parliaments and within 
the European one61, the Commission’s proposal achieved political 
                                         
57 For an analysis of how this was pursued by the European Commission and approved by the 
Council, see Supra note 40. 
58 Arguably because of Spain’s strong support on the issue in order to solve its own problems with 
ETA terrorists, see Supra note 14. 
59 Ibid at p.13. 
60 Kaunert argues that this is reflected in the interviews (The European Commission: 25 Interviews 
from 01.04.04 until 01.08.04 (COM1 to COM25)) of the relevant officials involved see Supra note 40. 
61 Mitsilegas V., EU Criminal Law, Hart Publishing, 2009 at p.120. 
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approval within six months62 and was formally adopted by the Council on 
13 June 200263.                         
 
The adoption of the European Arrest Warrant was a European landmark 
as it restructured the foundations of internal security in the EU and the 
level of European integration but also because politically it implied full 
support of the EU towards the United States on the war on terror. The 
speed and the conditions in which the European Arrest Warrant was 
adopted and the revolutionary concepts it introduced have been the 
subject of analysis and criticism. In brief it has been argued that the way 
it was adopted did not allow “for anything approaching serious 
consideration of the proposal for a Framework Decision on the European 
Arrest Warrant, nor for a measured assessment of its particularly wide-
ranging implications for the rules of Criminal procedure”64. This is 
particularly significant as although the European Arrest Warrant was 
pushed through as an antiterrorist measure it is not limited to terrorist 
offences and numerous criminal acts which were not related to anti-
terrorist measures were included in the proposal that was hastily 
adopted. Furthermore, with the issuing of a European Arrest Warrant the 
issuing State may request from the executing State the surrender of a 
person whose return is sought for an offence which the penalty is at least 
over a year in prison or if he or she has been sentenced to a prison term 
                                         
62 JHA Council meeting on 6 and 7 December, Council Framework Decision on the European Arrest 
Warrant and Surrender Procedures between Member States, COPEN 79 CATS 50, Brussels, 10 
December 2001. 
63 Supra note 2.  
64 The Minority Opinion of the European Parliament on the Commission Proposal for a Council 
Framework Decision, A5—0397/2001. 
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of at least four months;65 evidently, there is a plethora of offences that 
could fall within this ambit.  
 
Even more, for a list of 32 serious offences, that carry at least three 
years imprisonment in the issuing State, the double criminality 
requirement that has been an underlying prerequisite in traditional 
extradition, was abolished. The list includes offences for which 
harmonising measures have already been adopted, such as terrorism, 
drug trafficking, money laundering, counterfeiting of Euros, human 
trafficking, fraud against the European Communities and organised 
crime.66  However, the rest of the offences are decided by national law 
and include serious offences for which there is no consensus in Member 
States as to their definition, for example murder, rape, swindling, 
racketing and extortion. Furthermore, the adoption of the Framework 
Decision, in a nutshell, lead to a European compromise in regards to 
traditional cooperation in extradition as it introduced the abolition of the 
political offence, the depoliticisation of the extradition procedure, the 
introduction of strict limits and the abolition of obstacles to surrender of 
nationals.  
 
It has now been more than seven years since the Framework Decision 
entered into operation and available statistics compiled for the years 
between 2005 and 2009 show that there were up to 53,689 European 
Arrest Warrants issued and out of those 11,630 European Arrest 
                                         
65 Article 2(1). 
66 For and analysis see Keijzer N. and Sliedregt E., The Dual Criminality Requirement in EAW 
practice in Blekxtoon (Ed.), Handbook on the European Arrest, T.M.C. Asser Press: The Hague, 2005. 
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Warrants executed.67 The below Chart provides analytically the number 
of European Arrest Warrants issued/executed for each Member State 
during 2005 -2009.68  
 
 
 
Figure 2: European Arrest Warrants in Member States  
 
It is fair to say, that the European Arrest Warrant, has been an 
operational success. Indeed, statistics suggest that for the European 
Arrest Warrants executed during the same period a 51% - 62% of 
requested persons consented to their surrender on average within 14 to 
17 days whilst, the average time of surrender for those who did not 
consent was 48 days. Evidently, its success transcends the automaticity 
and speed aspired during the roots of its introduction to EU criminal 
cooperation. However, reports69 also show that there are shadows 
superseding the success of the European Arrest Warrant. Prominent are 
the latest report from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
                                         
67 COM (2011) 175 final, 11.04.2011 87 7551/7/10 COPEN 64.  
68 Taken from Ibid p.13. 
69 For a list of reports see Supra note 67.   
 28 
 
the Council on the Implementation since 2007 of the Framework Decision 
and the accompanying Staff Working Document that draw on a number 
of sources and previous reports on the current position of practice and 
implementation of European Arrest Warrants in Member States.   From 
this report it can be adduced that there are inherent problems with the 
implementation of the European Arrest Warrant. Only fourteen Member 
States made amendments to their implementing legislation70 (some 
following the recommendations of the Council and the Commission 
however in a variable level of conformity amongst Member States and 
with not all of the recommendations made reflected in the legal 
framework of the Member States); one Member State71 amended one 
article of its transposing legislation in 2010 and a legislative proposal 
addressing a number of recommendations is currently going through the 
parliamentary procedure; whilst twelve Member States have not made 
amendments to their respective legislations although they were 
recommended to do so in previous Council and Commission reports.72 
Furthermore, the recommendations of the Commission towards practical 
measures that should have also been implemented, such as training, 
information and/or contact points in each Member States are to date also 
not complied with by all Member States. The current inadequacies and 
the overall position of each Member State, with the amendments made 
and the current shortcomings for each Member State, is presented 
analytically in the Staff Working Document and space precludes an 
analysis of it in this thesis.  
 
                                         
70 AT, BG, CZ, EE, FR, HU, IE, LV, LT, PL PT, RO, SK and SI. 
71 LU. 
72  BE, CY, DK, DE, EL, ES, FI, IT, MT, NL, SE and UK. 
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Another matter that was highlighted and criticised in the report was the 
issue of proportionality as there is a notable proliferation of issuing 
European Arrest Warrants in respect of very minor offences.73 This in 
turn undermines the confidence of Member States and results in general 
agreement amongst Member States that a proportionality check is 
necessary prior to execution to prevent the execution of European Arrest 
Warrants that, although fall in the ambit of offences for which a European 
Arrest Warrant can be issued, are not serious enough to justify the 
measures and cooperation through the European Arrest Warrant 
procedure.  The Commission called for several aspects to be taken into 
consideration before issuing a European Arrest Warrant such as the 
seriousness and length of sentence of the offence, a cost-benefit analysis 
of the execution and the existence of another way that would be less 
onerous for the person sought and the executing authority. It especially 
highlighted that the execution of a European Arrest Warrant in such 
cases, may have a disproportionate effect on the liberty and freedom of 
requested persons when the European Arrest Warrants are in regards to 
offences for which pre-trial detention would be disproportionate and also, 
of the high costs for the executing Member States. It further raised the 
red flag as the need of the executing Member State to apply the 
proportionality test may introduce a ground of refusal that is not present 
in the Framework Decision, or indeed reflective of the principle of Mutual 
Recognition, through the back door.  
 
                                         
73 For a discussion on the issue of proportionality see Maior M. S., The Principle of Proportionality: 
Alternative measures to the European Arrest Warrant in The European Arrest Warrant in Practice, 
The Hague, 2009, 213-229. 
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It is contended, however, that the Commission failed to refer to the 
underlying stance of Member State’s institutional approach towards 
protecting their State Sovereignty.  This is arguably affiliated with the 
lack of Member States momentum to adhere to the implementation of 
the Framework Decision spherically and in their legislation, and is also 
hidden in the protection of risks caused by the exacerbated use of 
European Arrest Warrants and included in the veil of reasons for the pre-
checks Member States perform before a European Arrest Warrant is 
issued.  Furthermore, the emphasis of the Commission in its report 
admittedly surrounds the application of the European Arrest Warrant vis-
a-vis the effect of its application on fundamental rights. This has 
arguably been elevated as, since December 2009 with the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights has 
been made legally binding and also, in light of the future signing by the 
EU as an entity to the European Convention of Human Rights. The 
Commission has henceforth endorsed a new approach that will encore 
the protection of fundamental rights to the implementation of the 
Framework Decision and the application of the European Arrest Warrant 
in Member States. However, it is submitted, that in the aura of this 
movement, not enough attention has been given to viewing the European 
Arrest Warrant under the lens of State Sovereignty. This is surprising in 
light of recent case law regarding the compliance of the Lisbon Treaty 
with national Constitutions that at large reiterates Member States’ 
allegiance in protecting State Sovereignty.74 The recent ruling of the 
                                         
74 See cases in Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht, Case 2 be 2/08, Re Ratification of the Treaty 
of Lisbon, judgment of 30 June 2009, [2010] 3 CMLR 13), Poland (Polish Constitutional Tribunal, 11 
May 2005, Case K 18/04 (re Conformity of the Accession Treaty 2003 with the Polish Constitution) 
OTK Z.U. 2005/5A/49), Latvia (Constitutional Court of Latvia, Case 2008-35-01, Re Ratification of 
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German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) on the Treaty 
of Lisbon75, for example, stressed that the Treaties have not established 
a State but a Community Sui Generis, a confederation (Verbund) of 
Sovereign States that is supported by those States and should respect 
their Sovereignty. In the words of the German Constitutional Court the 
EU is “a close long-term association of states, which remain sovereign, 
an association that exercises public authority on the basis of a treaty and 
whose fundamental order is subject to the disposal of the member states 
alone and in which the peoples of the states, i.e. the citizens of the 
states, remain the subjects of democratic legitimisation”76. Sovereignty, 
the German Constitutional Court clarifies, was not transferred to the 
European Community but only a number of powers (Hoheitsrechte) were 
and these are not capable by themselves to turn the EU into a sovereign 
entity. Further, the German Constitutional Courts explains that Member 
State’s powers come under the Kompetenz-Kompetenz, which cannot be 
transferred to the European Community; Member States decide which 
powers they want to transfer to the Community and not vice versa as the 
Member States are “The Masters of the Treaties”77.    
 
Prominent inferences of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal visa vie State 
Sovereignty are also illuminating;  it stated that “[w]ithin the framework 
of Article 90, competences belonging to the legislative, executive and 
                                                                                                                   
the Lisbon Treaty judgment of 7 April. 2009, [2010] 1 CMLR 42), Hungary (Constitutional Court of 
Hungary, Case 143/2010, Re Constituniality of the Act of promulgation of the Lisbon Treaty, 
judgment of 12 July 2010 available in English only in summary as Press Release at 
http://www.mkab.hu/admin/data/file/797_143_2010.pdf) and France (Conseil constitutionnel, Case 
2007-560, Re Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, judgment of 20 Dec. 2007, [2010] 2 CMLR 25).   
75Judgment of the  Second Senate of 30 June 2009 available at 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html.  
76 Para 229. 
77 Para 239. 
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judicial power may be transferred. Nevertheless, no such transfer of 
competences is allowed in any of these areas where the transfer would 
undermine the sense of the existence and functioning of State organs, 
leading to a situation where an international organisation would become 
the sovereign. The transfer of competences under the procedure 
contained in Article 90 of the Constitution may not deprive the State of 
the ability to act as a sovereign, since this would amount to an 
infringement of the principles expressed in Article 4 (“Supreme power in 
the Republic of Poland shall be vested in the Nation”) and Article 5 (“The 
Republic of Poland shall safeguard its independence”). Accordingly, the 
Constitution prevents the transfer of competences insofar as it would 
lead to the Republic’s loss of a status as a sovereign State.”.78 
 
The Constitutional Tribunal further goes on to clarify that “following 
Poland’s accession to the European Union, there exist two autonomous 
legal systems (i.e. those of Poland and the European Union) which are 
simultaneously in force. This does not preclude, on the one hand, their 
mutual interaction nor, on the other hand, the possibility of a conflict 
between European law and the Constitution. In the event of any such 
conflict occurring, it is for a sovereign decision of the Republic of Poland 
whether to introduce an appropriate constitutional amendment, or to 
initiate amending the Community legal regulations, or, ultimately, to 
withdraw from the European Union.”.79 
 
                                         
78 Polish Constitutional Tribunal, 11 May 2005, Case K 18/04 (re Conformity of the Accession Treaty 
2003 with the Polish Constitution) OTK Z.U. 2005/5A/49). 
79 Supra note 76. 
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From the above references, Sovereignty is arguably equilibrated to 
Member States’ control in which power(s) they wish to transfer. The 
concept of State Sovereignty has arguably faded. As already described 
State Sovereignty can be said to be based on two pillars namely (a) the 
absence of a role of external agents in a State’s internal affairs and (b) 
territoriality. Of course, the Treaty of Lisbon does not create an “EU 
territorial Sovereignty”81 or “Union-specific territory”82 nor does the 
German Constitutional Court or other Member States thus far discount on 
the territoriality aspect of their Sovereignty which remains an intrinsic 
part of their identity as States. However, Sovereignty perceived on the 
previously mentioned pillar (a) has arguably faded83 in the current status 
of international and European law, and testing State Sovereignty on that 
ground would mean that Member States’ Sovereignty would be 
relinquished with the giving up of but one power.84 However, with the 
development of the international and the European legal arena it is 
accepted that State Sovereignty now has a form of “open statehood”85. 
Indeed, scholars have shown that once the concept of Sovereignty is 
understood away from the absolutist conception of Sovereignty, then 
there is no incompatibility of State Sovereignty with international law.86 
Reflective of this is German Constitutional Court’s reference that 
                                         
81 Grimm D., Comments on the German Constitutional Court’s Decision on the Lisbon Treaty; 
Defending Sovereign Statehood against Transforming the European Union into a State, European 
Constitutional Law Review, 5: 353-373, 2009 at p.363. 
82 Supra note 76. 
83 However not all scholars accept this. For example Hart, in his The Concept of Law, prominently 
defends that a State that is limited by rules of international law, can still maintain its State 
Sovereignty (at p.223) as Hart equated the State to a form of ordering according to law of a 
population inhabiting a territory with a vaguely defined degree of independence (p.221) see Hart 
H.L.A, The Concept of Law, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 1994. 
84 Supra note 81 at p.366. 
85 Thym D., In the name of the Sovereign Statehood: A critical Introduction to the Lisbon Judgment 
of the German Constitutional Court, Common Market Law Review 46: 1795-1822, 2009 at p.1797. 
86 For an analysis see Endicott T., The Logic of Freedom and Power, in The Philosophy of 
International Law, in (eds) Besson S., and Tasioulas J., 1st edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2010, 245–259. 
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Sovereignty is not “tantamount to submission to alien power87 [...] The 
Basic Law abandons a high-handed concept of sovereign statehood that 
is sufficient unto itself”88.   
 
However, it is contended that the European Arrest Warrant procedure is 
different; it does not create international law, but rather transnational or 
European law89 as it replaces all the measures based on international law 
between the Member States with a legal instrument of the European 
Union,90 i.e. the European Arrest Warrant. It therefore can be seen, as 
noted by Cohen, as a “Supranational legal order that has constitutional 
quality and claim[s] supremacy and jurisdictional reach that penetrates 
the black box of the territorial state”91. It is submitted that, it is in this 
context that the European Arrest Warrant should be examined to see 
whether challenges are posed to the Sovereignty of Member States, 
taking in mind that the supremacy and autonomy of a legal order cannot 
be shared, pooled or divided.92 As explained further by Cohen, 
“sovereignty is a legal as well as a political concept, but it is not reducible 
to bundles of rights or prerogatives. Instead, Sovereignty is the unifying 
and self-identifying claim of a polity regarding the supremacy and 
autonomy of its legal order, the self determination of its political system, 
and its status as the ultimate authority in its respective domain of 
jurisdiction and as an equal under international law.”      
                                         
87 Para 220. 
88 Para 223. 
89 See Wagner W., ‘Building an Internal Security Community: The Democratic Peace and the Politics 
of Extradition in Western Europe’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 40, no. 6, 2003, 695–712. 
90 See Kaunert C. at Supra note 40. 
91 Cohen J. L., Sovereignty in the Context of Globalisation: A Constitutional Plurarist Perspective” in 
Besson S. and Tasioulas J., (eds), 1st edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010 at p.p.261-262. 
92 Walker N., Late Sovereignty in the European Union, in Walker N., (ed), Sovereignty in Transition, 
Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2003 at p.15.     
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This point is arguably also reflected by the German Constitutional Court; 
having acknowledged that State Sovereignty cannot be exclusive, the 
German Constitutional Court nonetheless emphasises that alongside 
other features that characterise its conceptualization, important are the 
areas that it deduces as core areas where State responsibility must be 
exercised at a national level and which require the State’s authorisation 
for the transfer of further powers. Of particular interest is that the 
German Constitutional Court identifies as one of the areas of competence 
which at present does not allow for an extensive transfer of Sovereignty, 
the area of criminal law.93 As Thym puts it the judgment sends “thinly 
veiled warnings to the European institution [...] warnings about the 
European approach to criminal matters, including the scope of the 
supranational annex competence and the future harmonisation option 
within the area of freedom, security and justice [...] the Court indicates 
most clearly that the constitutional limits for further integration are 
within sight.”94  
   
It is submitted that, the possible underlying reasons of the German 
Constitutional Court’s concerns about ceding State Sovereignty in 
criminal matters can arguably be illuminated when looking at the intrinsic 
nature of criminal law. In this respect, it is examined in the next section.  
 
 
 
 
                                         
93 Para 252. 
94 Supra note 85 at p.1808. 
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CRIMINAL LAW AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
 
 To begin with the criminal law of a State has a trilogy of defining 
characteristics that associate it closely with the expression of Sovereignty 
within a State: (1) it is a series of rules that lay down a set of standards 
of what is permissible and what is not, (2) it has its own set of sanction, 
that of stigmatic punishment95, to support the rules, and (3) it has a 
criminal justice system, such as the Police, Courts and Judges, 
designated to interpret and enforce the rules.96 This trilogy of 
characteristics encapsulates it as a method of formal social control97 
within the State’s territory and in such a way criminal law provides 
States with a social control mechanism through which they can regulate 
human behaviour and thus far exercise Sovereignty.98  
 
A State’s power to decide which conduct to criminalise and to then make, 
interpret and enforce laws to that effect is the ultimate expression of its 
Sovereignty within its territory. In practice, this is the result of 
democratic negotiations of what behaviour is acceptable or unacceptable 
on a national level. These democratic negotiations mirror the social 
norms that are particular to each State and criminal law becomes “a 
product of culture in that it is rooted in the history of a State and exhibits 
                                         
95 Stigmatic punishment is arguably the distinguishing characteristic of criminal Law from other 
forms of social control and from other branches of law see Clarkson C. M. V., Keating H.M., and 
Cunnigham S. R., Clarkson and Keating Criminal Law: Text and Materials. 6th ed., London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2007 at p.1.  
96 For further examples in other areas of law see Ibid.  
97 Formal Social Control is a form of social control that is based on rules of behavior that are written 
down to regulate individuals and there is usually a formal and regulated means of sanction for non 
compliance with those rules of behavior see Quinney R. and Trevino A. J., The Social Reality of 
Crime. 2nd ed., New York: Transaction Puplishers, 2001 at p.6. 
98 See for example Pound R., Social Control Through Law, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942 
at p.20 where he argues that law has “become the paramount agent of social control”.  
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a nation’s deepest convictions and values”99. This conceptualisation of 
criminal law is reflected by the European Court of Justice. In A.G. Mazák 
words “[i]n many respects, criminal law stands out from other areas of 
law. Availing itself of the most severe and most dissuasive tool of social 
control – punishments – it delineates the outer limits of acceptable 
behaviour and in that way protects the values held dearest by the 
community at large. As an expression essentially of the common will, 
criminal penalties reflect particular social disapproval and are in that 
respect of a qualitatively different nature as compared with other 
punishments […] [t]hus, more so than other fields of law, criminal law 
largely mirrors the particular cultural, moral, financial and other attitudes 
of a community and is especially sensitive to societal developments”100. 
 
It is contended that criminal law is a manifestation of State 
Sovereignty101  and therefore, judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
through the principle of Mutual Recognition, in theory and practice, 
challenges essential functions and prerogatives of Member States that 
are defining features of their State Sovereignty. In the above context, 
the affiliation of State Sovereignty in criminal law within a State is 
absolute and the discussion that follows in the next Chapters is 
dedicated to examining whether there are challenges to State 
Sovereignty from the application of the European Arrest Warrant.  
                                         
99 Wilt H., “Some critical reflections on the process of harmonisation of criminal law within the 
European Union”, in Klip A. and Wilt H. van der (eds), Harmonisation and Harmonising Measures in 
Criminal Law, Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2002, 77. 
100 Commission v Council (C-176/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-7879 at Para. 67, 68 and 72 of the Opinion of 
the Advocate General. 
101 See for example Perron W., Perspectives of the Harmonisation of Criminal Law and Criminal 
Procedure in the European Union, in Husabø E. J. and Strandbakken A., Harmonization of Criminal 
Law in Europe: Series Supranational Criminal Law: Capita Selecta. s.l.: Intersentia, 2005 at p.p.5-6; 
Kapardis A. and Stefanou E.A., The First Two Years of Fiddling around with the Implementation of 
the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) in Cyprus, in Guild E. (eds), Constitutional Challenges to the 
European Arrest Warrant. s.l.: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006 at p.75. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE DOUBLE CRIMINALITY REQUIREMENT 
AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In a growing EU of four freedoms it is within the common interest of 
Member States to cooperate in combating crime. However, this 
cooperation, in law and in practice, is characterised by a struggling 
balance requiring on the one hand trust in the legal systems of other 
Member States and on the other hand the need to maintain one of the 
underlying theoretical justifications of the presence of European States, 
that of  State Sovereignty. This balancing struggle is notable in criminal 
cooperation through traditional extradition and under the new system 
under which Member States have brought their mutual extradition 
relations with the implementation of the European Arrest Warrant 
Framework Decision. It is maintained that, in traditional extradition one 
of the mechanisms by which cooperation was facilitated, in light of this 
balancing struggle, was the verification of the double criminality 
requirement.102 However, the Framework Decision introduced the 
relaxation or partial abolition of the requirement of double or dual 
criminality. This Chapter will examine what challenges may arise for 
State Sovereignty under this new status quo of the double criminality 
requirement in the system of mutual extradition relations in the EU. To 
                                         
102 See Van Den Wyngert C., Double Criminality as a requirement to extradition, in: Nils Jareborg 
(ed.), Double Criminality, Studies in International Criminal Law, Uppsala, 1989, 43-56. 
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do so, the discussion will begin by identifying the correlation between the 
double criminality requirement and State Sovereignty. The next section 
will discuss the scope of the double criminality requirement in the 
European Arrest Warrant, making particular reference to the legislative 
history of the list of offences for which the requirement of double 
criminality has been abolished.  The next section will then provide an  
examination of how the State Sovereignty of Member States is 
challenged by the abolition of the double criminality requirement for the 
list offences and the following section will look at the judgment of the 
European Court of Justice in Advocateen voor de Wereld, in terms of its 
ruling on the double criminality requirement, and will then look at the 
recent case of Julian Paul Assange.  Concluding, the final section will look 
into some final observations regarding the challenges for State 
Sovereignty from the abolition of the double criminality requirement for 
the list of categories of offences. 
 
 
DOUBLE CRIMINALITY AND SOVEREIGNTY  
 
The double criminality requirement emerged in the 19th century, in the 
dawn of most of the extradition treaties, and was incorporated mainly as 
a protective barrier to the ceding of Sovereignty and on the basis of the 
principle of reciprocity, that was conceived in a very strict sense at the 
time.103 Namely, if the underlying crime, which formed the basis of the 
extradition request, was not punishable in the requested State it was 
                                         
103 Sliedregt E. van., The Dual Criminality Requirment, in Keijzer N. and Sliedregt E. van (eds.), The 
European Arrest Warrant in Practice, The Hague, 2009, p.52. 
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thought to challenge the Sovereignty of the requested State as the 
requested State would not be able to make a request in a comparable 
situation and “it was against the dignity of a State to grant more than he 
could receive”104.  Further, as seen in the previous Chapter, there are 
intrinsic qualities of criminal law that encapsulate it as a manifestation of 
state power.105 It is contended that criminal cooperation through 
extradition and in particular through the execution of a European Arrest 
Warrant, facilitates the crossborder movement of sovereign acts. The 
sovereign act is the judicial decision in the form of a European Arrest 
Warrant that is exercised by Member State’s executives and judicial 
organs. The recognition of this sovereign act by another Member State 
creates extraterritoriality107 or a horizontal transfer of sovereignty108, as 
the relative state executives and judicial organs of the executing Member 
State must recognize and execute the sovereign act of another Member 
State. However, discrepancies in the criminal laws of Member States 
mean that Member States have to recognize a sovereign act and apply 
their sovereign powers for its enforcement, although it may reflect norms 
that are contrary to their own conceptions of law.109 The verification of 
the double criminality of the underlying criminal act (or omission) in the 
requesting or issuing State and requested or executing State, as Shearer 
notes, ensures that “the social conscience of a state is not embarrassed 
                                         
104 Lagodny O., Expert Opinion for the Council of Europe on Questions concerning double 
criminality, PC-OC/WP, Strasbourg 24 June 2004 at p.3. 
105 See Supra note 89.   
107 Nicolaidis K., and Shaffer G., Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance without 
Global Government, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol 68, 2005, 267. 
108 See Lavenex S., Mutual recognition and the monopoly of force: limits of the single market 
analogy, Journal of European Public Policy 14:5 August 2007, 767. 
109 See Keijzer N., The Double Criminality Requirement, in: Blekxtoon R. and Ballegooij W. van, 
(eds.) Handbook on the European Arrest Warrant, The Hague, 2005, 138. 
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by an obligation to extradite a person who would not, according to its 
own standards, be guilty of acts deserving punishment”.110  
 
In summary therefore, the recognition and execution of a European 
Arrest Warrant creates extraterritoriality or the horizontal transfer of 
Sovereignty. The verification of the double criminality requirement 
ensures accordance with the set of standards reflected in the criminal law 
of the executing and issuing State and this confines the loss of 
Sovereignty when the executing State comes to use its Criminal Justice 
System to execute the sovereign act of the issuing State within its 
territory.  Hence, when looking at the roots of extradition in international 
and European law, that will follow in the next section, it is not surprising 
that the majority of extradition treaties and national extradition law, 
enshrined the double criminality principle.  
 
 
SCOPE 
 
TRADITIONAL EXTRADITION 
 
Based on the principle nulla poena sine lege and the principle of 
reciprocity, it has been traditionally common for extradition to be granted 
if a fugitive had committed an offence that was a crime in both the 
requesting and requested State. Methodologically, this evolved in the 
international arena as a list of specific extradition crimes, whereby most 
                                         
110 See Shearer I.A., Extradition in International Law, Manchester, Manchester University Press 
1971 at p. 137, quotation taken from Supra note 91. 
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treaties adopted the practice of defining extradition offences by reference 
to a minimum level of punishment and the requested State determined 
whether the double criminality requirement is satisfied only by 
considering the seriousness of the penalty, and thus not needing to 
examine whether the conduct is criminal in both jurisdictions.111  This 
method developed drawbacks (e.g. the treaties needed constant 
updating to keep up with new offences). In traditional extradition the 
minimum level of punishment in both States and the double criminality 
requirement as a mandatory ground for refusing the requested 
extradition, were introduced by the European Convention on Extradition 
(ECE). Under Article 2(1) of the ECE, extradition is only granted for 
offences that are punishable under the laws of the requesting Party and 
of the requested Party by deprivation of liberty or under a detention 
order for a maximum period of at least one year or by a more severe 
penalty. Where a conviction and a prison sentence occurred or a 
detention order had been made in the territory of the requesting Party, 
the punishment awarded must have been for a period of at least four 
months. The UN Model Treaty on Extradition112 that was adopted by the 
General Assembly of the UN in 1990 and was supplemented by the 
Complementary Provisions for the Model Treaty on Extradition is very 
similar, as extradition offences are set in terms of the minimum level of 
punishment.113 The two subsequent 1995 and 1996 Conventions seeking 
to improve judicial cooperation, as seen in the previous Chapter, 
introduced a different status quo on extradition as they signified as not 
                                         
111 See for example the usual practice in UK and US extradition treaties, for a discussion and 
analysis of examples see Bantekas I. and Nash S., International Criminal Law, Routledege-Cavendish 
Press, 2003, 3rd edition at p.p.293-341.  
112 Resolution 45/116, 30 ILM (1990), 1410. 
113 Ibid Article 3. 
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necessary to include as a possible ground of refusal that the acts of the 
requested person would amount to an offence in the requested State. In 
Article 3 of the 1996 Convention it is stated that extradition applies to 
offences which are considered by the requesting State to be offences of 
conspiracy or an association to commit offences with the requirement 
that the offence is punishable by a term of detention of at least 12 
months and that they are offences referred to in Article 1 and Article 2 of 
the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism of 1976114 or 
that they are offences in the field of drug trafficking  and other forms of 
organised crime or other acts of violence against the life, physical 
integrity or liberty of a person, or creating a collective danger for 
persons.115 Conferring, the double criminality requirement was abolished. 
The Convention however, was only ratified by twelve Member States and, 
as discussed, although it attempted to facilitate extradition, it can been 
viewed as sliding too far towards enforcing extradition at the expense of 
fundamental rights116 and State Sovereignty; it is fair to say that Member 
States were not warm towards the idea of abolishing double criminality 
and ratifying the Convention. The fact that only twelve Member States 
ratified it, and the expressed need of the European Justice and Home 
Affairs Council to propose in September 2001, that all Member States 
would ratify the treaties by 1 January 2002, is reflective of this. 
 
 
 
 
                                         
114 Article 3 (1)(a). 
115 Article 3 (1)(b). 
116 Mackarel M. and Nash S., Extradition and the European Union, 46 ICLQ, 1997, 948. 
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THE EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT 
 
The Framework Decision distinguishes between two kinds of acts; 1) 
those acts to which Article 2(1) and Article 2(4) apply and 2) those that 
amount to offences coming under one or more of the 32 categories listed 
in Article 2(2).  The primary, is the general rule under which a European 
Arrest Warrant may be issued if the underlying criminal act(s) is 
punishable by the law of the issuing Member State by a custodial 
sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least 12 
months or, where a sentence has been passed or a detention order has 
been made, for sentences of at least four months. Surrender however 
may be subject to the condition that the act(s) for which the European 
Arrest Warrant has been issued constitutes an offence under the law of 
the executing Member State, whatever the constituent elements or 
however it is described. 
 
The Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant has therefore 
made the requirement of double criminality mandatory on the part of the 
issuing State and optional on the part of the requested state.117 The 
latter, is the exception to the general rule and if two conditions apply 
then the European Arrest Warrant gives rise to surrender without 
verification of the double criminality of the act. The two conditions are 1) 
that the underlying criminal act(s) is punishable in the state of issue by a 
custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least 
                                         
117 For example the Netherlands that has in its implementation law laid down the requirement that 
the act must be punishable under Dutch law (Overleveringswet Art. 7(1) (a) (2)) see Ballegooij W. 
van, The Netherlands and mutual recognition: between proportionality and the rule of law, in 
Tiggelen G. van, Weyembergh A. and Surano L. (eds), The future of mutual recognition in criminal 
matters in the European Union, Belgium, IEE, 2009, 401–416.  
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three years and, 2) that the act as defined by the law of the issuing 
Member State falls under one or more of the 32 categories of offences 
mentioned in Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision.     
 
 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY – LIST OFFENCES 
 
The sensitivity in introducing the double criminality relaxation in the 
Framework Decision is evident from the outset of the proposal of the 
European Arrest Warrant as the primary discussions at the extraordinary 
summit on 20–21 September 2001 were characterised by a large debate 
on which crimes should be included in the European Arrest Warrant and 
would adhere to the relaxation of the double criminality requirement.118 
The main issue was whether to establish a “negative list” of offences to 
be exempt from the European Arrest Warrant or whether to have a 
“positive list” of crimes to be covered by the European Arrest Warrant. 
These discussions were greatly influenced by the negotiations that had 
already proceeded in relation to the two proposals for the Framework 
Decisions on freezing orders and on mutual recognition of financial 
penalties that, as seen in the first Chapter, were tabled before the 
Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant.  
 
When the original proposal for a Framework Decision on freezing orders 
was drafted, the idea of a list was based on the need of both the issuing 
and executing State to be able to access without too much textual 
                                         
118 See Supra note 40 at p.p.17-18.  
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analysis whether the underlying criminal offence was the subject matter 
of the Framework Decision.119 The initial list comprised of six offences120, 
as defined under the issuing State’s law, all of which were listed in the 
Annex to the Europol Convention121 or would be listed once a Protocol 
amending the Annex regarding the offence of money laundering came 
into force.122 The validation given by the drafters for the inclusion of 
some of the offences is set out in the preamble where it is asserted that, 
the Framework Decision should, initially, apply to a limited number of 
offences which have already been the subject of a common action within 
the European Union. The idea of a list for which the instrument would 
apply was accepted during the negotiations of the Framework Decision 
and there was a movement towards adding even more offences to the 
list. In the months that preceded the proposal of the European Arrest 
Warrant twelve more offences were added123 and offences were also 
clarified.124  
  
When the negotiations, under the shadow of the 9/11 attacks, turned the 
focus towards the European Arrest Warrant there was already a wave of 
preference from the negotiations of the previous measures towards 
establishing a positive list of offences for which the double criminality 
requirement would be abolished. The Commission however, in its draft 
                                         
119 Council doc. 13896/00 add 1, 22 Dec. 2000. 
120 Drug trafficking, fraud against the EC’s interest as defined in the relevant measures, money 
laundering, euro counterfeiting, corruption and trafficking in persons. 
121O.J. 1995, C316/1 (Europol Convention). 
122O.J. 2000, C 358/1 (Protocol). 
123 Terrorism, trafficking in firearms, sexual exploitation, environmental crime (Council doc. 109 
12/01, 26 July 2001); Member of a criminal organisation (Council doc. 11947/01, 19 Sep. 2001); 
Murder, theft, blackmail, kidnapping, forgery, facilitation of illegal immigration and other types of 
fraud (Council doc. 12445/01, 5 Oct. 2001). 
124 “Other psychotropic substances” was added to the offence of drug trafficking and the limitation 
of the “sexual exploitation” offence to offences involving children and child pornography (Council 
doc. 11947/01, 19 Sep. 2001). 
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Framework Decision proposed a negative list of crimes for which the 
double criminality requirement would be retained and Member States 
could refuse to execute a European Arrest Warrant.125 The idea of having 
a list of crimes only for which a European Arrest Warrant could be 
refused was met with serious opposition from Member States and was 
quickly abandoned.126 In response, the Commission proposed a positive 
list of offences for which the double criminality requirement was 
removed. The list contained twelve crimes taken from the Annex to the 
Europol Convention (murder, grievous bodily injury; illicit trade in human 
organs and tissue; kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking; 
racism and xenophobia; organized robbery; illicit trafficking in cultural 
goods including antiques and works of art; swindling and fraud; 
racketeering and extortion; counterfeiting and product piracy; forgery of 
administrative documents and trafficking in them; forgery of means of 
payment; and illicit trafficking in hormonal substances and other growth 
promoters), one offence taken from the Tampere Conclusions (high-tech 
crime, particularly computer crime) and eleven crimes considered during 
discussions of the proposal for the Framework Decision on freezing 
orders (membership of a criminal organization; terrorism; trafficking in 
human beings; sexual exploitation of children and child pornography; 
illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotrophic substances; illicit 
trafficking in weapons, munitions and explosives; corruption; fraud, 
including that affecting the financial interests of the European 
Communities; laundering of the proceeds of crime; counterfeiting of the 
                                         
125 Art 27 COM (2001) 522 of 19 Sept. 2001. The negative list included possession of drugs for 
personal use, pornography, adultery, homosexuality and blasphemy. This was later amended to 
include lawful abortion and euthanasia, and offences against public decency and sexuality.   
126 On this point and for a general analysis see Peers S., Mutual Recognition and Criminal Law in the 
European Union: Has the Council Got it Wrong? ,Common Market Law Review, Vol 41, 2004, 5-36. 
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euro; environmental crime).127 In two weeks’ time four more items joined 
the positive list; one offence was proposed by France (rape), one was 
included because the Council had recently adopted a Framework Decision 
(facilitation of unauthorized entry or residence) and two offences because 
Europol could or did deal with them (motor vehicle crime, illicit trafficking 
in nuclear or radioactive materials).128 At that time, it was also decided 
that the scope of the Framework Decision on the execution in the 
European Union of orders freezing property or evidence should be 
defined in the same way as in the draft Framework Decision on the 
European Arrest Warrant.129  By the end of November four final crimes 
were added to the positive list without, however, any explanation as to 
why they were added (arson, crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court, seizure of aircraft or ships and sabotage).130  
 
 The final list of categories of offences, that if they are punishable in the 
issuing Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a 
maximum period of at least three years as they are defined by the law of 
the issuing Member State, shall, under the terms of the Framework 
Decision and without verification of the double criminality of the act, give 
rise to surrender pursuant to a European Arrest Warrant 131 contained  32 
categories of offences in total (sexual exploitation of children and child 
pornography; illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
                                         
127 Council doc. 13425/01, 31 Oct. 2001. 
128 Council doc. 13999/01, 14 Nov. 2001. Furthermore, “high-tech crime” was amended to 
“computer-related crime” and “organized robbery was expanded to “organized or armed robbery”. 
129 Council doc. 14208/01, 21 Nov. 2001. The list of Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision of the 
European Arrest Warrant was copied in the Council Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA of 22 July 
2003 on the execution in the European Union of orders freezing property or evidence (Article 3). 
130 Council doc. 14338/01, 21 Nov. 2001. Furthermore, “motor vehicle crime” was specified to 
“trafficking in stolen vehicles” and “counterfeiting the euro” was expanded to include “counterfeiting 
all currency”.  
131 Article 2 of Framework Decision. 
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substances; illicit trafficking in weapons, munitions and explosives; 
corruption; fraud, including that affecting the financial interests of the 
European Communities within the meaning of the Convention of 26 July 
1995 on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests; 
laundering of the proceeds of crime; counterfeiting currency, including of 
the euro; computer-related crime; environmental crime, including illicit 
trafficking in endangered animal species and in endangered plant species 
and varieties;  facilitation of unauthorised entry and residence; murder, 
grievous bodily injury; illicit trade in human organs and tissue; 
kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking; racism and xenophobia; 
organised or armed robbery; illicit trafficking in cultural goods, including 
antiques and works of art; swindling, racketeering and extortion; 
counterfeiting and piracy of products; forgery of administrative 
documents and trafficking therein, forgery of means of payment; illicit 
trafficking in hormonal substances and other growth promoters; illicit 
trafficking in nuclear or radioactive materials; trafficking in stolen 
vehicles; rape; arson; crimes within the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court; unlawful seizure of aircraft/ships; sabotage). 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE LIST 
 
As discussed previously in the above section, “Double Criminality and 
Sovereignty”, the recognition and execution of a European Arrest 
Warrant creates extraterritoriality or the horizontal transfer of 
Sovereignty. The verification of the double criminality requirement 
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ensures accordance with the set of standards reflected in the criminal law 
of the executing and issuing State and this confines the loss of 
Sovereignty when the executing State comes to use its criminal justice 
system to execute the sovereign act of the issuing State within its 
territory. For the list of the 32 categories of offences, provided certain 
conditions are met, the verification of the double criminality requirement 
and subsequently the Sovereign protection it provides, is abolished. 
Taking this into account, it is submitted that the description of some of 
the 32 categories of crime is very vague and it is notable that the list 
contains categories of offences instead of actual definitions of crimes. 
Arguably, there is a utility for this, as Sliedregt mentions,  it allows for a 
certain laxity in the definition of offences which  prevents the list from 
being outdated and in need of constant amendment and also 
accommodates the crime definitions of 27 Member States by not being 
that narrow.132 However, in light of there being more than 27 different 
criminal legal systems and 23 official languages in which the definitions 
of offences are expressed,  the broad, vague categories of crime and the 
lack of definition of crimes creates lacunas and inconsistencies in the 
chain of horizontal transfer of Sovereignty as, it not clear which offences 
fall in each category of offences for which double criminality can be 
abolished. Evidently, although an offence may fall within a certain 
category of offences, the definition of that offence in various Member 
States may vary as to the substantial elements of that offence; 
additionally, the existence of 23 official languages in the EU further 
exacerbates the interpretation of the substantial elements of an offence 
                                         
132 Supra note 103 at p.58. 
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and therefore, the partial abolition of double criminality gives rise to 
further challenges in the horizontal transfer of Sovereignty. There are of 
course several international and European instruments that can be 
helpful in determining the scope for some of the categories of offences.133 
However, the inconsistencies remain as there are important variations 
among Member States with respect to the definition of listed offences. 
For example in regards to the offence of “racism and xenophobia” 
Holocaust denial is an offence in France, Germany and Austria but not 
elsewhere;134 facilitation of unauthorized entry is not an offence in 
Belgium when it does not aim at pecuniary gain, however, under French 
or UK law, such facilitation is proscribed even when there are 
humanitarian motives.135 Furthermore, offences have a discrepancy in 
wording or translation or in the meaning of the offence amongst the 
Member States. Illustrative examples of the discrepancies in Member 
States are the category of “computer related crime” and of “rape”136 and 
to this respect they are discussed below.  
 
The “computer-related crime” is labeled “computer-related crime” in the 
English version which is a larger concept than the French version of 
cybercriminalité, the German version Cyberkriminalität and the Dutch 
version informaticacriminaliteit. When looking at the international and 
                                         
133 For a list and discussion of the international and European measures relevant to the categories 
see Peers S., Mutual Recognition and Criminal Law in the European Union: Has the Council Got it 
Wrong?, Common Market Law Review, vol 41, 2004, 5-36. For an update to this see Mitsilegas V., 
The third wave of third pillar law. Which direction for EU criminal justice?, European Law Review, Rev 
E. L.. 2009, 34(4), 523–560. 
134 Gallagher P., Future developments in judicial cooperation in criminal matters, ERA Forum 
(2009), 495–517 at p. 499.  
135 Weyembergh A., The functions of approximation of penal legislation within the European Union, 
Maastricht J. Vol. 12(2), 149 (2005), 158. 
136 These examples have been taken from Keijzer N., The Fate of the Dual Incrimination 
Requirement in Guild E. and Martin L. (ed.), Still not resolved? Constitutional Issues of the European 
Arrest Warrant,Nijmegen, WLP 2009 at p.p.67–68.  
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European instruments as a guidance to determine the scope of this 
category we are guided towards the Council Framework Decision on 
attack against information systems137 that obliges Member States to 
make punishable the illegal access to an information system, illegal 
interference with the functioning of such a system, and illegal 
interference with computer data in such a system.  However, as Keijzer 
notes, the Convention on Cybercrimes obliges states not only to make 
punishable acts that have computers and computer data as their object, 
but also the use of computer systems for the production or possession of 
child pornography, and the infringement of a copyright by means of a 
computer system and for these latter kinds of acts, computers are not 
the object but the means.138 This therefore blurs the boundaries of 
whether these acts come under the category of computer related crimes 
or Cybercriminalité, CyberKriminalität or Informaticacriminaliteit.  
 
Similarly, according to Keijzer differences apply, in regards to the 
category of “rape”; in France, England and Wales one or more genital 
organs (of the victim and/or of the perpetrator) or the anus must be 
involved in order for the penetration to amount to rape, in Germany 
there is no such requirement and in the Netherlands any sexually 
penetration can be punishable.139 Furthermore, the European Court of 
Human Rights in its judgment in the case M. C. v Bulgaria140 pointed out 
that, according to some legal systems compulsion or even the use or 
threat of physical force is an element of rape and in some legal systems 
                                         
137 Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24 February 2005 on attacks against information 
systems; Official Journal L 069, 16/03/2005, 67–71. 
138 Supra note 41 at p.67. 
139 Ibid at p.68. 
140 Ibid.  
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the lack of consent of the victim suffices for the sexual penetration to 
amount to a punishable offence.141  Indeed, the complications arising out 
of the different definitions of rape in England and Sweden have recently 
been illuminated by the case of Julian Paul Assange, who is better known 
as the founder and editor-in-chief of Wikileaks, and are looked at further 
on in this Chapter.  
 
This lack of clarity in the definition of offences and the discrepancy in the 
wording or translation or meaning of offences in Member States 
encapsulates even greater constitutional constraints with the abolishment 
of the double criminality requirement; firstly, in light of the fact that 
Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision states that the offences should be 
punishable in the issuing Member State by a custodial sentence or a 
detention order for a maximum period of at least three years and 
secondly, as they are defined by the law of the issuing Member State and 
not the executing Member State. This paradoxically seems to make the 
legal definition of the act in the law of the issuing state decisive for 
whether the underlying act comes in one or more categories of the list 
contained in the Implementation Act of the executing state. However, as 
the horizontal transfer of Sovereignty is from the issuing to the executing 
State, it would make more sense, as a shield to the ceding of 
Sovereignty of the executing State, for the executing State to determine 
whether according to its own laws the act described in the European 
Arrest Warrant falls in one of the thirty-two categories listed in its 
Implementation Act. As currently dictated though in Article 2(2), there is 
                                         
141 Ibid. 
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a possibility that the underlying act does not fall in one of the categories 
as it is defined by the law of the executing State, and this consequently 
brings challenges to the Sovereignty of the executing Member State, as it 
will have to utilize its criminal justice system to execute a judicial 
decision that could not according to its own law fall in the category of 
offences for which the double criminality requirement is abolished and 
could even possibly, as discussed below, in some cases not even be 
considered an offence under its own law.  
 
Even more problematic is that according to Article 2(2) of the Framework 
Decision, provided an underlying criminal offence is included in the list of 
offences and is punishable in the issuing Member State by a custodial 
sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three 
years, as it is defined by the law of the issuing Member State, then the 
executing State should proceed without verification of the double 
criminality of the act. By introducing this clause the horizontal transfer of 
Sovereignty from the issuing Member State to the executing Member 
State becomes absolute or authoritative as it restrains the role of the 
executing State in asserting that the underlying offence indeed falls in 
the category of list offences and in the case that it does not, to then 
proceed to apply the double criminality requirement to decide whether to 
execute a European Arrest Warrant. This may trigger Sovereign 
challenges particularly when seen in parallel to the lack of clarity in the 
definition of the categories of crimes and discrepancies in wording or 
translation or in meaning of offences in Member States that have been 
highlighted above. But furthermore, as there are offences like abortion 
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and euthanasia that, provided the statutory provisions are met, are 
lawful under the law of some States like Belgium and the Netherlands142 
whilst, in other Member States are a criminal act and fall in the category 
of “murder, grievous bodily injury”. Indeed, Belgium and Netherlands 
have emphasized concerns to protect persons carrying out abortions 
and/or euthanasia and pushed during the negotiations for the 
introduction of a territoriality clause143 that could arguably shield the 
ceding of the territoriality aspect of Sovereignty, balancing the 
extraterritoriality that takes place with the recognition and execution of a 
European Arrest Warrant. 
 
The territoriality clause is reflected in the Framework Decision in Article 
4(7)144 which allows the executing judicial authority to refuse to execute 
a European Arrest Warrant when it relates to offences which “(a) are 
regarded by the law of the executing Member State as having been 
committed in whole or in part in the territory of the executing Member 
State or in a place treated as such; or (b) have been committed outside 
the territory of the issuing Member State and the law of the executing 
Member State does not allow prosecution for the same offences when 
committed outside its territory”.  In simple terms,  this therefore means, 
that even if a European Arrest Warrant regards an underlying criminal 
                                         
142 In practice, this absolute or authoritative horizontal transfer of Sovereignty has been watered 
down. The Belgian Implementation Act for example declares that abortion and euthanasia are not 
considered to be covered by the category “murder, grievous bodily injury” and as Belgium has 
turned the optional requirement of the act constituting an offence under the law of the requested 
State (Art. 2(4)) into a mandatory one, this declaration brought abortion and euthanasia under the 
regime of the dual criminality requirement. Therefore Belgium as a requesting State will verify 
whether the statutory conditions for justification have been met under the Belgian law. See Supra 
note p.66. 
143 See Keijzer N., Locus Delicti Exceptions, Keijzer N. and Sliedregt E. van (eds.), The European 
Arrest Warrant in Practice, The Hague, 2009, 89–109 at p.93. 
144 For a detailed discussion on the territoriality clause and historical analysis of territoriality and 
extradition see Ibid at p.p.89–109.   
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act(s) that falls in the list of the categories of offences of Article 2 (2) for 
which the verification of the double criminality is abolished, allowing the 
horizontal transfer of Sovereignty from the issuing State to the executing 
State for offences that are not punishable in the executing State, the 
territoriality clause still gives the option to the executing State to refuse 
to execute a European Arrest Warrant where the underlying criminal 
act(s) has not occurred on the territory of the issuing State and/or the 
underlying criminal act(s) has occurred in whole or in part in the territory 
of the executing State. Notably, the rationale behind the territoriality 
clause is to limit the horizontal transfer of Sovereignty or in other words 
the extraterritoriality of the issuing State as it “prevents [the issuing] 
State to ‘fish’ in the jurisdictional waters of the other [Member] States 
and ‘export’ its criminal law principles”145 horizontally to the other 
Member States. 
 
So, in the example for the offence of euthanasia given above, where 
subject to various statutory conditions euthanasia is justified under the 
laws of Belgium and Netherlands, a person, notably a medical 
practitioner, carrying out euthanasia, in whole or in part in the territory 
of Belgium and Netherlands146 has committed an underlying criminal act 
falling within one of the categories of offences of Article 2(2), namely 
“murder, grevious bodily injury”, for which the verification of double 
criminality is abolished; however under Article 4(7) Belgium and the 
                                         
145 See Slosarcik I., Criminal law and Mutual Recognition in the Czech Republic, in Tiggelen G. van, 
Weyembergh A. and Surano L. (eds), The future of mutual recognition in criminal matters in the 
European Union, Belgium, IEE, 2009, 99–114  at p.109. 
146 Whether or not the act was committed, in whole or in part, in the territory of the executing 
Member State is to be determined on the basis of the law of the executing State, so in this example 
by the law of Belgium and Netherlands.  
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Netherlands may refuse to surrender him/her.  This is commonly referred 
to as the virtual function of Article 4(7) as an exception to the exception 
laid down in Article 2(2)147 and notably shields the ceding of jurisdictional 
Sovereignty as a Member State can refuse to execute a European Arrest 
Warrant where the underlying criminal act is lawful under its own law 
provided, it has been committed in whole or in part in its territory.  
 
However, the aftermath of the implementation of the Framework 
Decision has revealed that the territoriality clause, and particularly Article 
4(7)(a), has been transposed, and is applied in practice, in surprisingly 
numerous different ways148 with, for instance, some Member States 
protecting their jurisdictional Sovereignty to the absolute by raising it to 
a mandatory ground for refusal149, other Member States making it a 
ground provided some other factors are met (such as nationality150 and 
the lack of the double criminality requirement151) and some Member 
States not having sealed the protection of the jurisdictional aspect of 
their Sovereignty by not specifically implementing it at all.152 Evidently, 
this non-uniform implementation of the territoriality clause raises 
inherent Sovereign inequalities between Member States. 
 
                                         
147 With some minor reservations as a medical practitioner who for example practiced euthanasia in 
another Member State would normally have to be surrender, bar the very exceptional circumstance 
that the person eventually died in Belgium or the Netherlands; see Supra note 116 at p.161. 
148  For an analysis of the implementation of the Article 4(7) see Supra note 142 at p.p.94–96 and 
p.p.98–99; Tiggelen G. and Surano L., Study: Analysis of the future of mutual recognition in criminal 
matters in the European Union - Final Report, Institute for European Studies, Université Libre de 
Bruxelles, 20 November 2008 at p.p.13–14.   
149 For example Finland, Hungary, Greece and Austria See Tiggelen G. and Surano L., at Ibid. 
150 For example Netherlands. For a discussion see Keijzer N. in Supra note 142 at p.95.  
151 For example Finland and the United Kingdom. Arguably the inclusion of such a factor highlights 
that Article 4(7) (a) was adopted as compensation for the partial abolition of the double criminality 
requirement. On this point see Keijzer at Ibid. 
152  For example Estonia and Lithuania. 
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Furthermore, Sovereign inequalities have arguably been reflected in the 
implementation and practice of the execution of the European Arrest 
Warrant, as according to a study done by ECLAN, for the thirty-two 
categories of offences it is considered by most Member States necessary 
to check the facts against the selected category before proceeding to 
execute a European Arrest Warrant in their territory.153 The scope of the 
judicial check, as Stubbs and Gorkic note, differs greatly as some 
Member States “place complete trust in the issuing authorities, but some 
of them go even so far as to check whether the grounds of suspicion are 
reasonable, and thus taking on for themselves their own assessment of 
the evidence”154. Arguably, this intense judicial check, or the “process of 
subsumation”, that occurs when deciding whether an issuing State 
reasonable decided that the offence is a list offence could be compared to 
a marginal double criminality requirement verification155 which it is 
submitted, further reflects Member State’s reluctance to cede 
Sovereignty. In practice, however, the ECLAN study highlights that the 
Sovereign challenges reflected in the above discussion may be confined, 
as in most Member States there have been few obvious cases of 
problems linked to differences between the substantive law of the issuing 
Member State and that of the executing Member State.156   
 
                                         
153 For example in Belgium, Italy, Lithuania, Denmark, Portugal, Ireland, Malta, Sweden.  See 
Tiggelen G. and Surano L. at Supra note 147 at p.9 
154 Stubbs K. S. and Gorkiz P., Abuse of the European Arrest Warrant System in Keijzer N. and 
Sliedregt E. van (eds.), The European Arrest Warrant in Practice, The Hague, 2009. 
155 On the process of subsumation and its correlation with a marginal double criminality 
requirement see Ibid at p.64. 
156 Supra note 154. 
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Indeed, it has been asserted by the same study by some Member States, 
that their practitioners would call it “purely a theoretical problem”157. An 
explanation that can been given to this, is that the list of thirty-two 
offences for which the double criminality requirement is abolished, 
contains offences that are considered to be punishable throughout the EU 
and this means that the abolition of the dual criminality requirement for 
such offences did not lead to a substantive change.158 However, even if 
the categories of crimes reflect offences that are punishable in all 
Member States, the above analysis has highlighted that there are 
Sovereign challenges arising from the lack of clarity in the definition of 
offences and the discrepancy in wording and/or translation and/or in the 
meaning of offences in Member States. For example, how can crimes 
which do not have a cross-border dimension, such as rape, be included in 
the list?  This is particularly problematic as the execution of a European 
Arrest Warrant by the executing State requires active intervention by its 
criminal justice system in the form of coercive power on individuals in its 
territory (e.g. to arrest, detain or remove persons) and it is therefore 
obliged to justify the use of those powers to its population, even if those 
powers are exercised horizontally for the issuing State.159 Further, in light 
of the abolishment of the verification of the double criminality 
requirement for the list offences, which ensured accordance with the set 
of standards reflected in the criminal law of the executing and issuing 
                                         
157 See for example Kert R., The implementation and application of mutual recognition instruments 
in Austria, in Tiggelen G. V., Surrano L. and Weyemberch A. (eds.), The future of mutual recognition 
in criminal matters in the European Union, Belgium, IEE, 2009 at p.40  and Suominen A., The 
Finnish approach to mutual recognition in criminal matter and its implementation, in Tiggelen G. V., 
Surrano L. and Weyemberch A. (eds.), The future of mutual recognition in criminal matters in the 
European Union, Belgium, IEE, 2009 at p.234. 
158 Supra note 91 at p.3. 
159 Peers S., Mutual Recognition and Criminal Law in the European Union: Has the Council got it 
wrong?, 41 CML Rev. (2004) at p.71. 
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State, and the abovementioned problems in regards to the list offences, 
it is evident that that the executing State cedes Sovereignty on shaky 
ground as, as discussed above, such a justification may not be possible. 
Additionally, the lack of such a justification may also infringe the human 
rights of the individual that is surrendered through a European Arrest 
Warrant160, especially their right to liberty and security (Art. 5 ECHR), 
and this raises further Sovereign challenges as the protection of civil 
liberties is a principle underlying the constitutional traditions of all 
Member States. These points will be further elaborated in the next 
sections in light of the developments in the European Court of Justice and 
the recent case of Julian Paul Assange.  
 
 
ADVOCATEEN VOOR DE WERELD 
 
Advocaten voor de Wereld161 is a milestone for the European Arrest 
Warrant as it was the first case for which the European Court of Justice 
gave a preliminary ruling regarding the validity of the Framework 
Decision on the European Arrest Warrant. The reference arose as a result 
of an action brought in 2004 by the association ‘Advocaten voor de 
Wereld’ before the Arbitragehof (Court of Arbitration of Belgium) in which 
it sought the annulment, in whole or in part, of the Belgian Law 
transposing the provisions of the Framework Decision into national law. 
                                         
160  See Supra note 6 at p.67. 
161 Case C-303/05, 3 May 2007. For commentary to the case see Geyer F., European Arrest 
Warrant, Court of Justice of the European Communities, 4 EUConst (2008), 149-161, Borgers M.J., 
Commentary to Case C-303/05, 3 May 2007, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (2007), no. 619, 1458-
1462. 
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The Arbitragehof, in line with Article 35(1) TEU, referred for a preliminary 
ruling to the Court of Justice several questions concerning the validity of 
the Framework Decision and the relaxation of the double criminality 
requirement. The main grounds162 relevant to the double criminality 
requirement on which annulment was sought were: Firstly, that the 
Belgian Law failed to satisfy the conditions of the principle of legality in 
criminal matters as it did not list offences “having a sufficiently clear and 
precise legal content, but only vague categories of undesirable 
behaviour”163. This it was argued lead to a disparate application of that 
Law by the various authorities responsible for the enforcement of a 
European Arrest Warrant as when they are called to decide on its 
enforcement they would have insufficient information to determine 
effectively whether the offences for which the person sought is being 
charged, or in respect of which a penalty has been imposed on him, 
comes within one of the categories mentioned in Article 5(2) of that Law. 
Subsequently, it was argued the provision of the Belgian law infringed 
the principle of equality and non-discrimination.164  The second ground 
was that the provision in the Belgian Law165 which transposed Article 2(2) 
                                         
162 A further ground brought forward, that is not discussed in this section, was “that the subject-
matter of the European arrest warrant ought to have been implemented by way of a convention and 
not by way of a framework decision since, under Article 34(2) (b) EU, framework decisions may be 
adopted only ‘for the purpose of approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States’” 
(Para. 11 and Para 16(1)). Although the European Court of Justice accepted that the European Arrest 
Warrant could equally have been the subject of a Convention, it took the view that it is within the 
Council’s discretion to give preference to the legal instrument of the Framework Decision in cases 
where the conditions governing the adoption of such a measure are satisfied (Para. 41). The Court 
confirmed that there is no distinction in the third pillar as “to the type of measures which may be 
adopted on the basis of the subject-matter to which the joint action in the field of criminal 
cooperation relates” (Para. 36) and that there is no priority between the different instruments 
mentioned in Article 34(2) TEU (Para. 37). Moreover, it was rejected that the adoption of Framework 
Decisions must relate only to areas mentioned in Article 31 (1) (e) which provides the basis for 
criminal law approximation. The Court also rejected that the European Arrest Warrant should have 
been adopted by a Convention, as it replaced earlier EU extradition Conventions, as this would “risk 
depriving of its essential effectiveness the Council’s recognised power to adopt framework decisions 
in fields previously governed by international conventions”(Para. 42).  
163 Para. 13. 
164 Ibid and Para. 16 (2). 
165 Article 5(2). 
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of the Framework Decision that abolishes the double criminality 
requirement for several offences, infringed the principle of equality and 
non-discrimination as there is a derogation, without objective and 
reasonable justifications, amongst offences for which a double criminality 
requirement is abolished and offences for which dual criminality is 
retained.166 
 
 The European Court of Justice refused these grounds of refusal and ruled 
that an examination of the above questions revealed no factor capable of 
affecting the validity of the Framework Decision.167 The arguments of the 
Court are respectively discussed below. 
 
 
FIRST GROUND 
 
The European Court of Justice begins its reasoning on addressing this 
first ground by acknowledging that the principle of legality of criminal 
offences and penalties is one of the general legal principles underlying 
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and that it 
has also been enshrined in various international treaties (in particular in 
Article 7(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms).168 According to the court, the 
Framework Decision is compatible with the principle of legality because it 
does not seek to harmonise the criminal offences in question in respect 
                                         
166 Para. 12 and Para. 16(2). 
167 Para. 62. 
168 Para. 49. 
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of their constituent elements or of the penalties which they attract.169 
Consequently, the Court reasons that while the Framework Decision 
dispenses with the verification of double criminality for certain categories 
of offences, the definition of those offences and of the penalties 
applicable continues to be determined by the law of the issuing Member 
State, which must respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal 
principles, including the principle of legality170 of criminal offences and 
penalties.171 It therefore concluded that the removal of the double 
criminality requirement for certain offences is in conformity with the 
principle of legality172 of criminal offences and penalties. 
 
 
SECOND GROUND 
 
The European Court of Justice dismissed the argument that the 
Framework Decision infringed the principle of equality and non-
discrimination on two main considerations. Firstly, the Court decided that 
in regards to the choice of the 32 categories of offences, listed in the 
Framework Decision for which the double criminality requirement was 
abolished,  “the Council was able to form the view, on the basis of the 
principle of mutual recognition and in the light of the high degree of trust 
and solidarity between the Member States, that, whether by reason of 
                                         
169 Para. 52. 
170 At Para. 50 the European Court of Justice provided a definition for the principle of legality based 
on case law from the European Court of Human Rights (European Court of Human Rights judgment 
of 22 June 2000 in Coëme and Others v Belgium, Reports 2000-VII, Para. 145). The principle of 
legality “implies that legislation must define clearly offences and the penalties which they attract. 
That condition is met in the case where the individual concerned is in a position, on the basis of the 
wording of the relevant provision and with the help of the interpretative assistance given by the 
courts, to know which acts or omissions will make him criminally liable.”.  
171 Para. 52. 
172 Para. 54. 
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their inherent nature or by reason of the punishment incurred of a 
maximum of at least three years, the categories of offences in question 
feature among those the seriousness of which in terms of adversely 
affecting public order and public safety justifies dispensing with the 
verification of double criminality”173.  In addition, the Court added that 
“even if one were to assume that the situation of persons suspected of 
having committed offences featuring on the list set out in Article 2(2) of 
the Framework Decision or convicted of having committed such offences 
is comparable to the situation of persons suspected of having committed, 
or convicted of having committed, offences other than those listed in that 
provision, the distinction is, in any event, objectively justified”174.    
 
Secondly, with regard to the fact that the lack of precision in the 
definition of the categories of offences in question risks giving rise to 
disparate implementation of the Framework Decision within the various 
national legal orders, the European Court of Justice pointed out that it is 
not the objective of the Framework Decision to harmonise the 
substantive criminal law of the Member States and that nothing in the 
third pillar makes the application of the European Arrest Warrant 
conditional on harmonisation of the criminal laws of the Member 
States.175 
 
 
 
 
                                         
173 Para. 57. 
174 Para. 58. 
175 Para. 59. 
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ANALYSIS OF COURT DECISION IN REGARDS TO STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
 
It is submitted that the reasoning given by the Court does not really 
address the inherent problems that are caused by the abolition of the 
double criminality requirement and the concerns of the breach of the 
principle of legality because of: the lack of clarity in the definition of the 
categories of offences, the lack of certainty in criminal law, and 
discrepancies in wording and/or translation and/or in meaning of offences 
in Member States. The Court’s argument is very weak as it is silent on 
how the principle of legality is complied with and asserts that it is 
solemnly by its inclusion in the constitutional foundations of the issuing 
State that are supervised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU. However, the principle of legality is met in the case where the 
individual concerned is in a position, on the basis of the wording of the 
relevant provisions and with the help of the interpretative assistance 
given by the courts, to know which acts or omissions will make him/her 
criminally liable.  Evidently, foreseeability may be problematic when it 
comes to the foreign law and in this respect, the double criminality 
requirement serves to ensure that only conduct which is foreseeable as 
criminal by an individual may amount to arrest and surrender.176 In the 
absence therefore of the double criminality requirement and the guidance 
of only vague categories of crimes, there is an ever present damoclean 
                                         
176 See Geyer F., European Arrest Warrant, Court of Justice of the European Communities, 4 
EUConst, 2008 at p.159. 
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sword for the legal security of citizens and the violation of the principle of 
legality.177   
 
Furthermore, the Courts ruling of a non-uniform interpretation of the list 
offences but of reliance on the law of the issuing Member State was 
arguably an attempt to keep the European Arrest Warrant based 
surrender as a procedural measure, facilitating international cooperation, 
and not genuinely on criminal prosecution and punishment.178 However, 
this approach is silent on who is responsible for compliance with the 
principle of legality and further bypasses the constitutional challenges 
that arise from the horizontal transfer of Sovereignty from the issuing to 
the executing State. The Court prefers to base its reasoning in 
accordance with the  ne bis in idem cases179, on a high level of mutual 
trust between the Member States. However, referring to mutual trust in 
this context is submitted to be a very vague proposition as it does not 
provide any assurance that the principle of legality is not violated and 
further, it is not a solution for the inherent constitutional problems that 
are caused in the application of the European Arrest Warrant from the 
absence of a uniform interpretation of the list of categories of offences 
and from the reliance on the law of the issuing State.   
 
                                         
177 See Peers S., EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, Oxford University Press, 2006 at p.442,  Herlin-
Karnell E., In the wake of Pupino: Advocaten voor der Wereld and Dell’Orto, German Law Journal, 
Vol. 08, No. 12, 1153-1157.  
178 See Case C-303/05, Advocateen voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad, 
Constitutional Law Review, 4, 2008, p.155-156, p.159; This approach was also adopted by the Czech 
Constitutional Court (Constitutional Court, 3 May 2006, Decision no. PL. US. 66/04, Para. 101). For  
a discussion see Supra note 144 at p.p.99–114.  
179 See cases C-187/01 and C-385/01 Gözütok and Brugge ECR [2003] I-1354. 
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Reflective of the above problems have been the negotiations towards the 
adoption of the European Evidence Warrant.180 Like the European Arrest 
Warrant, the European Evidence Warrant abolished the dual criminality 
requirement whilst holding the same exception for the list of the 32 
categories of offences. Germany, however, pushed to retain the right to 
verify the dual criminality requirement, when executing a European 
Evidence Warrant, with regard to terrorism, computer related crime, 
racism and xenophobia, racketeering, and extortion or swindling.181 Even 
for offences such as racism and xenophobia, sabotage, racketing and 
extortion, which were the subject matter of definitions provided by EU 
instruments182; the basis of the German argument at the time of the 
negotiations was that the abovementioned offences needed further 
definition as they were lacking in specificity.  
 
Indeed, in its most recent ruling in Kozlowoski183 the European Court of 
Justice, contrasting itself, acknowledges the importance of a uniform 
approach to the interpretation of the list offences. The Court upon a 
request to clarify the meaning of the optional refusal ground of Article 
4(6) of the Framework Decision, that relates to the execution of 
sentences of nationals and/or residents, held that “since the objective of 
the Framework Decision […] is to put in place a system of surrender, as 
                                         
180 Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA on the European Evidence Warrant for obtaining objects, 
documents and data for use in proceedings in criminal matters [2008] OJ L350/72. 
181 See Council of the European Union, Press Release, 2732nd Council Meeting, Justice and Home 
Affairs, 1-2 June 2006, Document 9409/06 (Presse 144) at p.11. 
182 Member States were requested to be guided by the definitions of the Offences given by the 
Council of Ministers. For a definition of the offences see Revised Addendum to the Draft Minutes, 
2436th meeting of the Council (Justice and Home Affairs and Civil Protection) held in Luxembourg on 
13 June 2002, 9958/02, Add 1/Rev 1, 16 July 2002, 6 . These definitions should be read in light of 
the recently adopted measures for racism and xenophobia (Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on 
combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law [2008] 
OJ L328/55). 
183 C – 66/08, 17 July 2008. 
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between judicial authorities, of convicted persons or suspects for the 
purpose of enforcing judgment or of criminal proceedings, based on the 
principle of mutual recognition – a surrender which the executing judicial 
authority can oppose only on one of the grounds for refusal provided for 
by the Framework Decision – the terms “staying” and “resident”, which 
determine the scope of Article 4(6), must be defined uniformly, since 
they concern autonomous concepts of Union law”184.   
 
Illuminative of the weakness of the European Court of Justice’s 
arguments and further of the inherent problems arising out of the partial 
abolition of the double criminality requirement is a recent case that 
caught negative media coverage in respect to the European Arrest 
Warrant procedure, the case of Julian Paul Assange, better known as the 
founder and editor-in-chief of Wikileaks, and to this respect it is 
discussed in the next section.  
 
 
JULIAN PAUL ASSANGE 
 
In December 2010 the Swedish judicial authority issued a European 
Arrest Warrant for Assange to be surrendered from the United Kingdom 
to Sweden for questioning on the basis that he was sought in regards to 
charges of sexual assault and rape stemming from sexual relations he 
had with two women in Sweden in August of 2009.185 Prior to this time,   
Assange had become aware of the allegations made against him whilst 
                                         
184 Ibid at Para. 43. 
185 See Para. 21 and 22 of Swedish Judicial Authority V Julian Assange [2010] EWHC 3473 (Admin). 
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he was in Sweden and had made himself available to the Swedish police 
for interview and had also remained in Sweden until he was told by the 
Swedish authorities that he could leave the country. Shortly after his 
arrival in the United Kingdom, aware that the allegations against him 
were still live, Assange put in place arrangements between his solicitors 
and the police in the event that a European Arrest Warrant was issued. 
Following, in December 2010, whilst in the United Kingdom Assange 
found out that the Swedish judicial authorities had indeed issued a 
European Arrest Warrant to extradite him to Sweden. Although Assange 
appealed the European Arrest Warrant the District Judge ruled that he 
should be extradited. In response, Assange appealed and the extradition 
decision is scheduled to be heard in July 2011.  
 
Cooperation through the European Arrest Warrant was highlighted 
throughout the proceedings and broadcasted through the media was 
Assange’s criticism that procedure “dragged him to and uncertain 
destiny”186 to the extent that he described the procedure as 
“nonsense”187. Outside the Court on the day of the ruling in contempt of 
the procedure he stated that “[i]t cannot be the case that simply filling 
out two pages with someone’s name and a suspicion, not a charge, can 
lead to their extradition without any consideration of the charges against 
them. To take someone from the United Kingdom, from their supporters, 
from their relatives and thrust them into a foreign land where they do 
not speak the language […] is a very grave trend and such matters 
deserve more than a two-page form filled out by a member of the 
                                         
186 Ramgage S., The inadequacies of the European Arrest Warrant: its application to Assange, C.C. 
Law 2011, 3(3) at p.p.7-8. 
187 Ibid. 
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bureaucracy. Because European nations co-operate with each other and 
are trying to form a batter union does not mean that they are all the 
same. It does not mean that police, prosecutors or bureaucrats can be or 
could be the coercive power to drag people off to an uncertain 
destiny”188.  
 
Assange’s contemplations are arguably gravitated in light of the fact that 
Swedish law is harsher and broader in regards to sexual offences as 
Sweden can be said to have one of the toughest laws on sexual crime. 
Moreover, this further reiterates the contemplations to State Sovereignty 
that were discussed in the previous sections, regarding the disparities in 
Member States on the legal definitions of the offences in the list of 
categories of offences for which the double criminality requirement is 
abolished. In particular, Assange was requested to be surrendered in 
regards to four allegations made by two women190: the first charge was 
for unlawful coercion, as it was allegated that he held Miss A, as she was 
identified, using his own body weight, to hold her down in a sexual 
manner; the second allegation was that Assange “sexually molested” 
Miss A by having sex with her without a condom when it was her 
“express wish” one should be used; the third charge claimed Assange 
“deliberately molested” Miss A “in a way designed to violate her sexual 
integrity”; the fourth charge accused Assange of having sex with a 
second woman, Miss W, as she was identified,  without a condom while 
she was asleep at her Stockholm home.  Evidently, the definition of rape 
in Sweden is broad, with the most eye-catching example the inclusion of 
                                         
188 Supra note 186. 
190 The Swedish Law giving rise to these allegations are section 1-6 of Chapter 6 of the Criminal 
Code of the Kingdom of Sweden.  
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the performance of sexual intercourse without a condom. This is arguable 
not reflected in the legal systems of other Member States, as has been 
seen in the discussion on the definition of the category of rape in the first 
Chapter in the section “Analysis of List”. However, this is particularly 
problematic as the execution of a European Arrest Warrant by the United 
Kingdom requires active intervention from its criminal justice system, in 
the form of coercive power on Assange, within United Kingdom territory 
(e.g. to arrest, detain, remove and surrender Assange to Swedish 
officials) and it is therefore obliged to justify such power, even if such 
power is exercised horizontally for Sweden.191 In light of the abolishment 
of the verification of the double criminality requirement for rape, which 
could have ensured execution of a European Arrest Warrant only if the 
set of standards reflected in the criminal law of the issuing and executing 
State were satisfied and in that way steered away from abovementioned 
problems, it is evident as highlighted by the Assange case that, the 
executing State cedes Sovereignty in the European Arrest Warrant 
procedure on shaky ground. Additionally, the lack of the verification of 
the double criminality requirement, as also highlighted by Assange, may 
infringe the human rights of the individual that is surrender192 (in 
particular their right to liberty and security (Art. 5 ECHR)) and this raises 
further Sovereign challenges as the protection of civil liberties is a 
principle underlying the constitutional traditions of all Member States. 
 
 
 
                                         
191 Peers S., at Supra note 158 at p.71. 
192  See Supra note 66 at p.67. 
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
 
As discussed in this Chapter, the verification of the double criminality 
requirement in the execution of the European Arrest Warrant ensures 
accordance with the set of standards reflected in the criminal law of the 
executing and issuing State and this confines the loss of Sovereignty 
when the executing State comes to use its Criminal Justice System to 
execute it within its territory. As has been highlighted in this Chapter, the 
lack of clarity in the definition of the categories of crimes, the lack of 
certainty in criminal law, and discrepancies in wording and/or translation 
and/or in the meaning of offences in Member States all contribute 
towards making the abolishment of the verification of the double 
criminality requirement challenging for State Sovereignty. In reflect of 
this, although the majority of Member States have implemented the list 
of thirty-two offences in conformity with the wording of Article 2(2), 
there have nonetheless been Member States that have omitted some 
categories of offences194 and others that have transposed the list using 
different wording that sometimes widened or narrowed the meaning of 
offences.195 Even more so, there have been Member States that have 
minimized the scope of the abolition of the double criminality 
requirement.196 For example, the new German Implementing Act of 2006 
states that in cases where there “is no clear national or foreign reference, 
                                         
194 Mainly on the argument that offences were thought to be covered by other categories. Offences 
concerned include: “racketing and extortion” (Greece, Estonia, and France), bribery and corruption 
(Finland) See Annex to the Report from the Commission on Art. 34 SEC 979 final, 11 November 
2007 at p.4. 
195 For example instead of the offence of “illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances” the Greek Implementation Act transposed “illicit trading and trafficking in drugs”; see 
Ibid. 
196 See Annex to the Report from the Commission on Art. 34 SEC 979 final, 11 November 2007. 
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a double criminality check should be carried out” and the Italian 
Implementation Act maintains the double criminality check as a 
principle.197 Similarly, as will be seen in the next Chapter, the double 
criminality requirement has been constitutionally enshrined in Poland198, 
it is also partially checked in Belgium, Slovenia and the UK, where part of 
the offence is committed on its national territory.199  Therefore it is seen 
that, in implementing the Framework Decision, the verification of the 
double criminality requirement for the list offences has to some extent 
been reintroduced by some Member States. 
 
Furthermore, as discussed some Member States go through vigorous 
judicial checks, when deciding whether an issuing State reasonably 
decided that the offence is a list offence and this could also be seen as a 
comparable reintroduction of the verification of the double criminality 
requirement for list offences. It is submitted therefore, that in practice 
the inherent Constitutional problems that have been highlighted in this 
Chapter reflecting the risk of ceding State Sovereignty, have been 
“addressed” by some Member States by the reintroduction of the double 
criminality requirement through the back door.  
 
However, the non-uniform way in which the double criminality 
requirement has been reintroduced through the back door is problematic 
                                         
197 See Ibid. 
198 For discussion see Lazowski A.,“From EU with trust: the potential and limits of the mutual 
recognition in the Third Pillar from the Polish perspective” in Tiggelen G. V., Surrano L. and 
Weyemberch A. (eds.), The future of mutual recognition in criminal matters in the European Union, 
Belgium, IEE, 2009. 
199 Moreover, the compatibility of the abolition of the dual criminality requirement with 
constitutional law has been questioned in the Czech Republic (for a discussion see Slosarcik I., 
Criminal law and Mutual Recognition in the Czech Republic, in Supra note 144 at p.108), in Hungary 
(for a discussion see Ligeti K., The principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters in Hungary in 
Supra note 144 at p.p.259-281) and abolition as a matter of principle is still debated elsewhere (see 
Supra note 116).  
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in itself as it places Member States, who rely on mutual trust and have 
not minimized the scope of the abolition of the double criminality 
requirement and/or refrain from going into vigorous judicial checks, at an 
unfair Sovereign disadvantage. Indeed, one of the arguments given by 
the Commission for abolishing the double  criminality requirement was 
that, the need to verify it considered lengthy validation procedures.200 In 
hindsight however, for the Member States that go through rigorous 
judicial checks, it has transpired that the decision in borderline cases, on 
whether the underlying criminal act falls in one of the list offences, is a 
lot more complicate.201 On the balance therefore of the “limitations” that 
have been introduced for State Sovereignty the necessity of the abolition 
of the verification requirement on this point is contested.  
 
The most prominent solution towards addressing the problems in regards 
to the list offences has been the proposition to introduce a list of agreed 
definitions of crimes in one single authentic language.202 To this respect, 
the Stockholm Program outlining the strategy for the European Union in 
the area of freedom, security and justice for the period 2010 to 2014,  
invites the Commission to consider approximating or defining offences for 
which double criminality does not apply.  However, although this 
suggestion would address some of the Constitutional problems identified 
in this Chapter, as Member States will have already agreed in more 
clarity in which circumstances they accept the automatic horizontal 
transfer of Sovereignty, the harmonization of the list offences that 
                                         
200 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Mutual 
Recognition of Final Decision in Criminal Matters, COM (2000) 495 final, of 26 July 2000, Para. 8. 
201 See Supra note 66 at p.64. 
202 Ibid. 
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include offences that reflect core national norms, such as murder and 
rape, is ambitious. Of course, in light of existing EU and international 
instruments and especially with the recent proliferation of framework 
decisions and directives that harmonize substantive law (e.g. in regards 
to terrorism, racism and xenophobia, organized crime) for certain crimes 
such a definition will be easier to achieve.  
 
In the absence however of such a list, the abolition of the dual criminality 
requirement for the listed offences may, as seen from the above 
discussion result to a violation of human rights of individuals in the 
executing State and furthermore as discussed throughout this Chapter 
challenge the Sovereignty of the executing State. Although the Mutual 
Recognition principle has been helpful in de stagnating cooperation in the 
common market without the need for harmonization, the main 
differences of the common market and cooperation in criminal law have 
to be taken into consideration.203 Criminal law is qualitatively different 
from the regulation of trade and markets and “regulates the relationship 
between the individual and the State, and guarantees not only State 
interests but also individual freedoms and rights in limiting State 
intervention”204. In light of this, the abolition of the verification of the 
double criminality requirement for certain offences cannot be transcribed 
from the single market to criminal law without a set system in place that 
can facilitate cooperation whilst protecting the intrinsic relationship 
between criminal law and Sovereignty.  This set system may take the 
form of the creation of a list of agreed definitions of crimes in one single 
                                         
203 For a detailed discussion see Supra note 107. 
204 Supra note 61 at p.118. 
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authentic language for which the dual criminality requirement is 
abolished. In light of the absence of such a set system the execution of 
the horizontal transfer of Sovereign power from one State to another 
without the verification of the double criminality requirement challenges 
traditional concepts of Sovereignty.  
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CHAPTER 3: REMOVAL OF THE BAR OF SURRENDER OF 
OWN NATIONALS AND SOVEREIGNTY 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF THE SURRENDER OF OWN 
NATIONALS IN THE EU 
 
 
The non-extradition of nationals in Europe can be dated to at least the 
18–19th century205 and is a principle commonly based on or confirmed in 
national legislation, where it is constitutionally enshrined by many 
States.206  It has its origins in the sovereign authority of the ruler to 
control his subjects, the bond of allegiance between them, and the lack 
of trust in other legal systems207; it has been justified to “largely derive 
from a jealously guarded conception of national sovereignty”208.  
 
 
EUROPEAN CONVENTIONS ON EXTRADITION 
 
Prior to the implementation of the Framework Decision the status quo on 
the extradition of nationals can be traced in Article 6(1) (a) of the 
                                         
205  See Kuhn Z., at Supra note 4 at p.107. 
206 For a review of such legislative provisions, see Deen-Racsmány Z., “A New Passport to 
Impunity? Non-Extradition of Naturalized Citizens versus Criminal Justice”, 2 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2004), 761. 
207 Williams A. S., “Nationality, Double Jeopardy, Prescription and the Death Sentence As Bases for 
Refusing Extradition”, 62 International Review of Penal Law (1991) 259 at p.260, citing the findings 
of a 1878 British Royal Commission chaired by Lord Cockburn. 
208 Plachta M., (Non-) Extradition of Nationals: A Neverending Story? (1999) 13 Emory Intl L Rev 
77 at p.4. 
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European Convention on Extradition (ECE) that gives the Contracting 
Parties a right to refuse to extradite their own nationals.209 Furthermore, 
Article 6(1)(b) ECE gives the Contracting Parties the right, by a 
declaration made at the time of signature or by deposit of an instrument 
of ratification or accession, to define as far as they are concerned the 
term "nationals" within the meaning of the ECE. Indeed various 
Contracting Parties exercised the right to interpret the definition of the 
term “nationals” in a way that it includes persons that do not have the 
nationality of the requested State but who lawfully reside in the 
requested State, even if they only reside for a short term.210 In simple 
terms therefore, the term “nationals” in traditional extradition was 
extended by various Contracting Parties to include also “residents” of 
those States. A vivid example are the declarations made by Iceland, 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland through which they identify as 
their own nationals any persons residing in the territory of any other 
Scandinavian state.211  
 
The later EU Conventions, as discussed in Chapter 1, introduced a 
different proposition on the surrender of nationals. Article 7 of the 1996 
Convention introduced that extradition cannot be refused on the ground 
that the requested person is a national within Article 6 of the ECE, giving 
however the right to declare, for any Member State that wishes to do so, 
that it will not grant extradition of its nationals, and further to authorize 
                                         
209 Prior to this, bilateral extradition conventions that applied between members of the Council of 
Europe similarly also excluded the extradition of their own nationals see  Glerum V. and Roxemon K., 
Surrender of Nationals, in Keijzer N. and Sliedregt E. van (eds.), The European Arrest Warrant in 
Practice, The Hague, 2009 at p.73. 
210 Ibid.  
211 Example is taken from Supra note 209. 
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extradition only under certain conditions (Article 7 (2)). This can be seen 
similar to the abovementioned reservation that Member States could 
enter into under the ECE in respect of the non-extradition of their 
nationals.   
 
 
THE COMMISSION’S PROPOSAL ON THE EUROPEAN ARREST 
WARRANT 
 
On a further side of the spectrum was the Commission’s proposal for the 
Framework Decision as it did not include any possibility to refuse the 
extradition of nationals. The Commission clearly defines in its Proposal212 
that the exception made for nationals should no longer apply. The 
rationale brought forward by the Commission had two main axons; 
firstly, that the nationality exception should be negated on the basis of 
the principle of EU citizenship213 as it could be adduced from the principle 
per se that a “citizen of the Union should face being prosecuted and 
sentenced wherever he or she has committed an offence within the 
territory of the European Union, irrespective of his or her nationality”214 
and secondly, that it should be abolished so as to serve the advancement 
of the principle of reintegration.215 Particular gravity was given by the 
Commission to the latter as it proposed that the principle of integration 
                                         
212 Proposal  for  a Council Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender 
procedures between the Member States, OJ 27 November 2001, C 332 E/305 (COM (2001) 522 
final/2) (hereafter Proposal).  
213  See Para. 4(5)(5) of the Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for  a Council Framework 
Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender procedures between the Member States, 
OJ 27 November 2001, C 332 E/305 (COM 2001) 522 final/2 and Recital 12 of the Preamble to the 
Proposal. 
214 See Recital 12 at Ibid. 
215  See Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal at Supra note 213. 
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should be the basis of a ground for refusal to execute a European Arrest 
Warrant.216 The Commission indeed proposed that if a European Arrest 
Warrant is issued “pursuant to a final judgment, the judicial authority of 
the executing State may decide that it is preferable for the future social 
rehabilitation of the person in question to serve his sentence on the spot. 
The interest of the person is the only criterion which makes it possible to 
apply this provision, and his consent is necessary”217.   
 
 
FRAMEWORK DECISION 
 
In the final text of the Framework Decision this optional ground, on which 
the executing judicial authority may refuse to execute European Arrest 
Warrants, was broadened. In Article 4(6) of the Framework Decision it is 
stated that “the executing authority may refuse to execute the European 
Arrest Warrant if a European Arrest Warrant has been issued for the 
purposes of execution of a custodial sentence or detention order, where 
the requested person is staying in, or is a national or a resident of the 
executing Member State and that State undertakes to execute the 
sentence or detention order in accordance with its domestic law”. 
Evidently, the limitation of refusing to execute so as to serve the 
advancement of reintegration of the requested person was refrained and 
further the condition that the requested person consents to the execution 
of the imposed sentence was omitted in the text of the Framework 
Decision. 
                                         
216 Article 33 of the Proposal. 
217 See Article-by-Article Commentary of the Proposal at Ibid. 
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COMMENTARY 
 
The Commission’s reliance primarily on the principle of citizenship to 
suggest the nullity of the nationality exception in the execution of a 
European Arrest Warrant can be seen relevant to aspects akin to State 
Sovereignty, as the concept of European citizenship implies a decline 
from individual state sovereignty and territoriality to a unified pan-
European Schengen zone that relies on extraterritoriality or the 
horizontal transfer of sovereignty218 from one Member State to the other 
so as to operate. Indeed, the annulment of the exception made for 
nationals on this ground is clearly at odds with the thoughts of Hobbes, 
the predominant forerunner of absolute Sovereignty, who noted that 
“[b]ut he that is sent on a message, or hath leave to travell, is still 
Subject; but it is, by Contract between Soveraignes, not by vertue of the 
covenant of Subjection. For whosoever entreth into anothers' dominion, 
is Subject to all the Laws thereof, unlesse he have a privilege by the 
amity of the Soveraigns or by speciall licence."219 However, in the realms 
of a developed notion of State Sovereignty, as it has been discussed in 
Chapter 1, how challenging is this new proposition? 
 
To begin, as already seen in this thesis, the diagrammatic State 
Sovereignty description of the procedure of the European Arrest Warrant 
is found on the basis that a horizontal transfer of Sovereignty220 is 
created during the European Arrest Warrant procedure as state 
                                         
218 See Supra note 91.  
219 See Hobbes, T., Leviathan, Everyman's Library, London, Vol. XXI, 1973 at p.117. 
220 See Supra note 107 at p.767. 
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executives and judicial organs of the executing Member State must 
recognize and execute the sovereign act of another Member State which 
is expressed in the form of the European Arrest Warrant. However, as 
also seen in Chapter 2, discrepancies in the criminal laws of Member 
States mean that Member States may have to recognize a sovereign act 
and apply their sovereign powers for its enforcement although in some 
cases, namely for the list of offences for which the double criminality 
requirement is abolished, it may reflect norms that are contrary to their 
own conceptions of law.221  
 
It is submitted, that in this horizontal transfer of Sovereignty, the strain 
of ceding Sovereignty is at its highest when it relates to a State’s own 
nationals. The strong Sovereign bond of allegiance of a State towards its 
nationals can be highlighted through the theoretical groundings of the 
Social Contract theory which, in simple terms, underlines that the people 
of a State give up sovereignty to a government or other authority in 
order to receive or maintain social order through the rule of law.222 There 
is therefore a strong bond of allegiance between a State and one of its 
nationals. This bond, as discussed, was protected in traditional 
extradition as the ECE gave an express right to Member States to refuse 
extradition of nationals and by the 1996 European Convention that 
allowed refusal to extradite nationals by way of reservations. The 
severance of this bond is arguably effected by the Framework Decision as 
it nulls the exception to nationals presumably, on the basis that the 
                                         
221 See Supra note 108 at p.138. 
222 On the social contract theory and criminal law see Loof R., 54 CISA and the Principles of ne bis 
in idem, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (2007), 309–334 in particular 
at p.p.320–321. 
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creation of a Social Contract is transferred and enforced between a 
national of a Member State and the “European State” and is shielded 
through the notion of European citizenship. 
 
In practice, Member States have generally accepted to surrender a 
requested person even if he/she is their national.223 However as the 
allegiance of a State towards its nationals described above is not only a 
theoretical notion but has in fact been transcribed into the Member 
State’s constitutions, at the time of the Framework Decision’s proposal 
many of the Member States’ constitutions contained provisions 
prohibiting or at least limiting the extradition of nationals.224 The 
Framework Decision’s proposal and subsequent implementation, 
therefore, signified a radical change. Since then, various problems have 
arisen in regards to the implementation of the Framework Decision with 
some countries having to make legislative amendments so as to 
accommodate the obligation to surrender their nationals. Furthermore, 
some countries had to make amendments to their Constitution. For 
example, Portugal225 and Slovenia226 had to make Constitutional 
amendments. However, in doing so, they did not experience any major 
                                         
223 For example, in 2005 over 20% of those surrendered were nationals or residents of the 
executing Member State. See Report from the Commission on the implementation since 2005 of the 
Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States COM (2007) 407 final (herein after “Implementation Report”) 
p.4 
224 For a list of Member States that had this enshrined in their Constitutions before the 
implementation of the Framework Decision see Supra note 4 at p.109.  
225 For an analysis see Caeiro P. and Fidalgo S., The Portugese experience of mutual recognition in 
criminal matters: five years of European Arrest Warrant in Tiggelen G. van, Weyembergh A. and 
Surano L. (eds), The future of mutual recognition in criminal matters in the European Union, 
Belgium, IEE, 2009, 445–463.  
226 For an analysis see Gorski A., Stubbs K. S. and Plesnicar M. M., Mutual Recognition in the 
context of Slovenian criminal law, in Tiggelen G. van, Weyembergh A. and Surano L. (eds), The 
future of mutual recognition in criminal matters in the European Union, Belgium, IEE, 2009, 502-
522.  
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constitutional complaints. In Greece227 and the Czech Republic228, on the 
contrary, major constitutional complaints were introduced but were 
subsequently rejected. Countries in which constitutional complaints were 
made that led to a negative decision of the Constitutional Court against 
the national implementing legislation and are to be discussed in this 
thesis are Poland229, Germany230 and Cyprus231. It is noted, that an in 
depth analysis of these cases is not in the realms of this thesis and they 
are therefore discussed to the extent of issues they raise on matters of 
State Sovereignty.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
227 Συμβούλιο Εφετών Θεσσαλονίκης 1677/2005 ΠοινΔικ. 2005, Άριος Πάγος 2483/2005; For a 
discussion see Mitsilegas V., The reception of the principle of Mutual Recognition in the criminal 
justice systems of EU Member States. The Case of Greece in Tiggelen G. van, Weyembergh A. and 
Surano L. (eds), The future of mutual recognition in criminal matters in the European Union, 
Belgium, IEE, 2009, 177-187.  
228 Czech Constitutional Court ruling 3 May 2006 (PL. US 66/04), available in English at: 
http://angl.concourt.cz/angl_verze/doc/pl-66-04.php Re Constitutionality of Framework Decision on 
the European Arrest Warrant, [2007] 3 C.M.L.R. 24 For an analyses see Slasarcik I., Criminal law 
and mutual recognition in the Czech Republic, in van Tiggelen G., Weyembergh A. and Surano L. 
(eds), The future of mutual recognition in criminal matters in the European Union, Belgium, IEE, 
2009, 99-114. 
229 The Judgment of 27 April 2005, P 1/05 (Re Conformity of provisions on European Arrest Warrant 
with the Constitution, [2006] 1 CMLR 36 (hereinafter referred to as first European Arrest Warrant 
Case) also available at http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/wstep_gp.htm and the Judgment 
of 5 October 2010, Case SK 26/08 (Re European Arrest Warrant), not reported yet (hereinafter 
referred to as second European Arrest Warrant Case).   
230 Judgment of 18 July 2005, 2 BvR 2236/04 (English version) [2006] 1 CMLR 16. 
231 Attorney General of the Republic v Konstantinou, Decision of 7 November 2005, Council 
document 14281/05 Brussels. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS, LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS AND 
STATE SOVEREIGNTY: THE CASES OF POLAND, GERMANY AND 
CYPRUS 
 
 
POLAND 
 
The European Arrest Warrant was implemented in Poland through the 
amendment of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1997 by a 2004 Act 
amending several criminal statutes. In the first European Arrest Warrant 
Case232 the Polish Court was called to decide whether surrendering, in the 
context of executing a European Arrest Warrant, a Polish citizen to the 
Netherlands for the purpose of a criminal prosecution against her, under 
Article 607t(1) of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure, was compatible 
with Article 55(1) of the Polish Constitution. Article 55(1) of the Polish 
Constitution233 stipulated that extradition of Polish nationals is prohibited. 
Although, Article 55(1) specifically stated that the “extradition of 
nationals is prohibited” Article 607t(1) of the Polish Code of Criminal 
Procedure stipulated that the surrender of a Polish citizen could take 
place in certain conditions. In particular, Article 607t(1) stated that 
“[w]here a European Arrest Warrant had been issued for the purposes of 
prosecuting a person holding a Polish citizenship or enjoying the right of 
asylum in the Republic of Poland, the surrender of such a person may 
                                         
232 On an analysis on the second European Arrest Warrant Case see Lazowski A., Half Full and Half 
Empty: The Application of EU Law in Poland (2004-2010), Common Market Law Review, 48, 503-
553. 
233 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April, 1997 as published in Dziennik Ustaw No. 
78, item 483 from http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm. 
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only take place upon the condition that such  a person will be returned to 
the territory of the Republic of Poland following the valid finalisation of 
proceedings in the State where the warrant was issued”.  
 
The Constitutional Tribunal, in its ruling, interpreted that Article 55(1) 
gave an express right to Polish citizens to be held criminally accountable 
before Polish Courts and that surrender to another Member State in the 
context of a European Arrest Warrant would be an infringement of this 
right. The judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal has been the subject 
matter of scrutiny, primarily as a result of the superfluous discussion of 
the Constitutional Tribunal on Framework Decisions and the reasoning of 
the Constitutional Tribunal to reach its judgment.234 It is not however in 
the realms of this thesis to look at these in detail; the discussion that 
follows underlines the relevant connotations to State Sovereignty.   
 
The first point to note is that the reasoning of the Constitutional Tribunal 
highlights that under the Polish Constitution, Poland has to respect 
international law and consequently EU law that is binding upon it. 235 
However, the Constitutional Tribunal interpreted that this does not cover 
under its umbrella provisions of  EU secondary legislation and of 
                                         
234 For an analysis of the judgment see Nussberger A., “Poland: The Constitutional Tribunal on the 
implementation of the European Arrest Warrant”, JCL, 2008, 162; Lazowski A., “Constitutional 
Tribunal on the Surrender of Polish Citizens Under the European Arrest Warrant. Decision of 27 April 
2005”, EuConst., 2005, 569; Lazowski A., From EU with trust: the potential and limits of the mutual 
recognition in the Third Pillar from the Polish perspective, in Tiggelen G. van, Weyembergh A. and 
Surano L. (eds), The future of mutual recognition in criminal matters in the European Union, 
Belgium, IEE, 2009, 419–444; Leczykiewicz, “Tribunal Konstytucyjny (Polish Constitutional Tribunal), 
Judgment of 27 April 2005, No. P 1/05”, CMLRev., 2006, 1108 and in particular at p.p.1187-1190; 
Lazowski A., Half Full and Half Empty: The Application of EU Law in Poland (2004-2010), 48 
Common Market Law Review, 2011, 503-553; Pollicino O., European Arrest Warrant and 
Constitutional Principles of the Member States: A Case Law-Based Outline in the Attempt to Strike 
the Right Balance between Interacting Legal Systems,  GLR, Vol. 09 No. 10 (2008), 1313-1355; 
Komarek J., European Constitutionalism and the European Arrest Warrant – In Search of the 
Contrapunctual Principles’ Limits, 44  CML 9 (2007).  
235 Article 9. 
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legislative acts implementing them.236 It therefore, acclaimed State 
Sovereignty, by bestowing on itself the competency to assess the 
constitutionality of acts that serve the purpose of implementing EU law. 
However, in doing so, the Constitutional Tribunal saw  a “potential 
possibility of clearly recognizing the obligation to apply interpretation that 
is in conformity with the law of the third pillar”237 (the Pupino decision 
had not yet been delivered by the European Court of Justice238).  
 
The Constitutional Tribunal emphasized State Sovereign supremacy as it 
reasoned that European citizenship cannot result in the diminishment of 
the guarantee functions, concerning the rights and freedoms, that the 
provisions of the Polish Constitution gives to individuals. In this respect, 
it negated interpreting the Polish Constitution through a pro-EU way if it 
would result in such diminishment. It therefore based its reasoning on a 
limbo in the definition of the notion of “surrender” in Article 607t(1) and 
“extradition” in Article 55(1). It is contended by the Constitutional 
Tribunal that at the time of drafting of the Constitution the terms 
“extradition” and “surrender” were used interchangeably to describe an 
institution, consisting in the surrender of an indicted person at the 
request of a foreign state in order to enable the conduct of criminal 
proceedings against such person or such person’s serving punishment 
stated in a sentence and further, that the protection against extradition is 
absolute. In its conclusions, the Constitutional Tribunal submitted that 
                                         
236 On this see Nussburger A., at Supra note 233 at p.2.  
237 First European Arrest Warrant Case Part III, Para.3.3 The Constitutional Tribunal’s reasoning on 
this point was particularly “EU-friendly” (see Sadurski W., “Solange, Chapter 3: Constitutional Courts 
in Central Europe-Democracy-European Union”, European Law Journal, VOL 14, NO1, 2008, 22-23. 
However, its reasoning throughout the judgment is made up of a conflicting combination of “pro-
European” and “anti-European” attitude. For a discussion on this point and for an analysis of the 
judgment see Supra note 233. 
238 Case 105/03, Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285. 
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“surrendering of a person [...] must be viewed as a form of extradition 
within the meaning of Article 55(1) of the Constitution”240 and therefore, 
surrendering a Polish citizen in the context of a European Arrest Warrant 
would also be prohibited. This point was reaffirmed in the second 
European Arrest Warrant Case. As a conclusion to this reasoning, the 
Constitutional Tribunal ruled that Article 607t(1) was incompatible with 
the Polish Constitution and asked for an amendment to the Polish law to 
make it constitutionally compatible, or for an amendment of Article 55(1) 
of the Constitution. It ruled however, that the legal force of the 
challenged provision was extended for 18 months as the Constitutional 
Tribunal felt that that the highest priority should be given to the 
European Arrest Warrant. The extension was justified in light of the 
obligations of Poland towards the EU as the Constitutional Tribunal 
argued that it was “bound by the community of principles of the political 
system, assuring proper administration of justice and trial before an 
independent court of law”241. The Polish Code of Criminal Procedure was 
amended following the revision of the Constitution on 7 November 2006. 
Although, the amendments did not enter into force until 26 December 
2006, the new Article 55 of the Constitution was made directly applicable 
to Polish law from 7 November 2006 by decision of the Constitutional 
Tribunal.  
 
The decision and the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal has been 
described as EU friendly, with positive mentions on the European Arrest 
Warrant, for example, that it is “a measure of utmost importance” 
                                         
240 Part III, Para. 3. 
241 Part IV, Para. 5.2. 
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deserving “maximum priority by the Polish legislature” 242. To understand 
the reflections of the Constitutional Tribunal more clearer it is important 
to see them in context with other judgments of the Constitutional 
Tribunal that concern the European integration process. Illuminative is 
the judgment regarding the constitutionality of Poland’s accession to the 
EU, that was rendered shortly after the judgment on the European Arrest 
Warrant and was referred to in Chapter 1 of this thesis. The issue in 
concern in this case was the compatibility of the Accession Treaty with 
the Polish Constitution and especially with the principle of sovereignty 
and the supremacy of the Constitution. Although the outcome 
favors European law and the Accession Treaty was declared to be 
compatible with the Constitution, the judgment has “more Euroskeptical 
undertones than the judgment on the European Arrest Warrant”243.  As 
seen in Chapter 1, the Constitutional Tribunal emphasized that collisions 
between Polish law and EU law “cannot be solved by recognition of 
supremacy of the Community norm towards the national 
constitutional norm.” The Constitutional Tribunal further goes on to 
clarify that following Poland’s accession to the European Union, there 
exist two autonomous legal systems (i.e. those of Poland and the 
European Union) which are simultaneously in force. This does not 
preclude, on the one hand, their mutual interaction nor, on the other 
hand, the possibility of a conflict between European law and the 
Constitution. In the event of any such conflict occurring, it is for a 
sovereign decision of the Republic of Poland whether to introduce an 
appropriate constitutional amendment, or to initiate amending the 
                                         
242 See Part IV, quoted in Supra note 4 at p.110. 
243 Ibid. 
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Community legal regulations, or, ultimately, to withdraw from the 
European Union.  
 
The amendment of the Polish Constitution also introduced the 
endorsement of the double criminality requirement within the Polish 
Constitution even though, as discussed in the previous Chapter, it is 
contrary to the text of the Framework Decision. Article 55 of the Polish 
Constitution now reads that "the extradition of a Polish citizen shall be 
prohibited, except244 […] upon a request made by a foreign State or an 
international judicial body if such possibility stems from an international 
treaty ratified by Poland or a statute implementing a legal instrument 
enacted by an international organisation of which the Republic of Poland 
is a member, provided that the act covered by a request for 
extradition245 [was] committed  outside the territory of the Republic of 
Poland246 and [it] constituted an offence under the law in force in the 
Republic of Poland or would have constituted an offence under the law in 
force in the Republic of Poland if it had been committed within the 
territory of the Republic of Poland, both at the time of its commitment 
and at the time of making of the request” 247.  
 
The correlations between the double criminality requirement and the 
protection of ceding State Sovereignty have been discussed in the 
previous Chapter. In simple terms, the verification of the double 
criminality requirement, in the execution of the European Arrest Warrant, 
                                         
244 Article 55 (1) revised Polish Constitution. 
245 Article 55 (2) revised Polish Constitution. 
246 Article 55 (2) (1) revised Polish Constitution. 
247 Article 55 (2) (2) revised Polish Constitution. 
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ensures accordance with the set of standards reflected in the criminal law 
of the executing and issuing State and this confines the loss of 
Sovereignty when the executing State comes to use its criminal justice 
system to execute a European Arrest Warrant within its territory. The 
amendment of the Polish Constitution, to accept the surrender of own 
nationals provided the double criminality requirement is satisfied, 
arguably emphasizes the opinion of the Constitutional Tribunal that 
extradition of nationals is the most extreme limitation of State 
Sovereignty as, although the Constitution was amended and the bar was 
removed, a ground of refusal in conflict to the Framework Decision has 
been Constitutionally enshrined; surrender of Polish nationals can  take 
place provided the criminal offence for which he/she is requested is also 
a criminal offence in Poland.248 The introduction of the requirement of 
double criminality highlights the tensions between EU integration through 
cooperation in criminal matters via Mutual Recognition and the 
persevering need for Member States to behold their State Sovereignty. 
 
 
GERMANY  
 
The Framework Decision was implemented in to German law by the first 
German European Arrest Warrant Act (hereafter called the “European 
                                         
248 The endorsement of the double criminality requirement in the Polish Constitution can also be 
translated as a political movement and as Lazowski notes with the current political environment in 
Poland the revision of this provision is difficult in the foreseeable future. See Lazowski A., “ From EU 
with trust: the potential and limits of the mutual recognition in the Third Pillar from the Polish 
perspective” in Tiggelen G. van, Weyembergh A. and Surano L. (eds), The Future of Mutual 
Recognition in Criminal Matters The future of mutual recognition in criminal matters in the European 
Union, Belgium, IEE, 2009 at p.423. 
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Arrest Warrant Act”) of 23 August 2004.249 However, in less than a year, 
it was annulled by the Judgment of the Second Senate of the Federal 
Constitutional Court250 (hereafter called the “German Constitutional 
Court”). The case that discussed the compatibility of the German 
Implementation Act was in regards to a European Arrest Warrant that 
was issued by Spain in September 2004 against a person with dual – 
German and Syrian – citizenship, who was prosecuted in Spain for being 
actively involved in terrorist activities of the Al-Queda. Spain had already 
issued a traditional extradition request in September 2003, but Germany 
had refused to extradite the person because of his German citizenship. 
The Higher Regional Court declared the complainant’s extradition to 
Spain admissible on the condition that “after the imposition of a final and 
non-appealable prison sentence or other sanction, the complainant would 
be offered to be returned to Germany for the execution of the 
sentence”251. The defendant launched a constitutional complaint before 
the German Constitutional Court challenging this decision on a wide 
range of grounds; notably, that the abolition of dual criminality would 
result in the application of  foreign law within Germany and this would 
violate the order public; that German citizens would not be protected, as 
stipulated by German law, if the Federal Republic of Germany was “free 
to decide whether it accepted an offer made by a requesting State to 
return an offender” as returning to Germany was “a legal claim of the 
prosecuted person which arises from the precept of rehabilitation“252; 
                                         
249 First European Arrest Warrant Act BGBl. I (2004), 1748. 
250 BVerfGE v. 18.7.2005 – 2 BvR 2236/04 
251 Ibid at Para. 17. Interestingly, the Court makes its decision in reference to the word 
“extradition” rather than “surrender”.  
252 Ibid Para. 26. 
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that the European Arrest Warrant Act lacked democratic legitimacy; and, 
that the prosecuted person’s right for judicial review was breached. 
 
The German Constitutional Court suspended the surrender of the German 
citizen until the decision on the constitutional complaint was taken. 
Finally, on the 18th of July 2005, it ruled that “the European Arrest 
Warrant Act infringes fundamental rights and is unconstitutional and that 
the [European Arrest Warrant] Act is void”253. It based its ruling on 
essentially two considerations. Firstly, that the European Arrest Warrant 
Act infringes the first sentence of Article 16 (2) German Constitutional 
Law (hereafter the “GG”)254 because the legislature did not comply with 
the prerequisites of the qualified proviso of legality under the second 
sentence of Article 16 (2) GG when implementing the Framework 
Decision. The German Constitutional Court explained that “all citizens are 
supposed to be protected from the insecurities connected with being 
sentenced in a legal system that is unknown to them”255. Even though, 
the German Constitutional law permits the extradition of German citizens 
under certain conditions to a Member State or to an international court of 
Justice256 “the legislature had failed to take sufficient account of the 
especially protected interests of German citizens”257. The German 
                                         
253 Ibid Para. 62. Mitsilegas argues that the German Constitutional Court opted for declaring the 
European Arrest Warrant Act void, on the basis that it did not transpose all the safeguards included 
in the Framework Decision, instead of declaring the Framework itself in breach of the German 
Constitution as this would have in essence taken us back “to the Solange debate and explicitly apply 
this to third pillar-EU-law”, see Mitsilegas V., Supra note 61 at p.134.  Arnull A. also argues that the 
decision of the German Constitutional Court is inspired by the old Solange mistrust and is a reaction 
to the restriction on judicial control in the third pillar (the optional nature of proceedings for a 
preliminary ruling, the limitation of legal standing to bring actions for annulment, the absence of an 
action for failure to fulfill obligations), see Arnull A., “From Bit Part to Starring Role? The Court of 
Justice and Europe’s Constitutional Treaty” (2005) 24 YEL 1.   
254 The first sentence of Article 16 (2) [Citizenship; extradition] reads “No German may be 
extradited to a foreign country”. 
255 Para. 91. 
256 Since an amendment of the law in November 2000. 
257 Para. 91. 
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Constitutional Court felt that extradition would go against the principles 
of legality that were enshrined in the German Constitutional law, as 
German citizens would be handed over against their will to a legal system 
which is unknown to them and in which they do not have confidence.  
The German Constitutional Court further emphasised that the European 
Arrest Warrant Act had not, inter alia, incorporated the territoriality 
ground of refusal enshrined in Article 4(7) of the Framework Decision.  
The second main consideration of the German Constitutional Court was 
that the European Arrest Warrant Act infringed Article 19 (4) GG258 by 
excluding recourse to a court against the grant of extradition to a EU 
Member State.259   
 
In reaching its decision the German Constitutional Court focused on 
strands of the Sovereign challenges inherent in the execution of a 
European Arrest Warrant and elaborated its argument around the 
concept of citizenship, the principle of legality, the protection of 
fundamental rights and the protection of the principle of recourse to the 
courts against the grant of extradition. It further gave emphasis to a 
particular nexus between “the German people and their domestic law”260 
along with the need “of preserving national identity and statehood in a 
single European judicial area”261. Furthermore, the German Constitutional 
Court described “the cooperation that is put into practice in the ‘Third 
Pillar‘ of the European Union in the shape of limited mutual recognition“ 
                                         
258 Article 19 (4) GG reads “That should any person’s rights be violated by public authority, he may 
have recourse to the courts. If no other jurisdiction has been established, recourse shall be to the 
ordinary courts.”. 
259 Para. 102 to 116. 
260 Para. 67. 
261 Para. 77. 
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(instead of a general harmonisation of the Member State’s systems of 
criminal law)  as a way of “preserving national identity and statehood in 
a single European judicial area“262.  
 
In the context of protecting German nationals, the German Constitutional 
Court felt that “[w]hen permitting the extradition of Germans, the 
legislature must examine in this context whether the prerequisites of the 
rule of law are complied with by the requesting authorities. In this 
context, the legislature must verify when restricting fundamental rights 
that the observance of rule-of-law principles by the authority that claims 
punitive power over a German is guaranteed“263. The German 
Constitutional Court  acknowledged Article 6 TEU and Article 7 TEU, 
which enshrine the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms by all 
Member States and the principle of proportionality and recognised their 
basis for mutual confidence and trust in the legal systems of Member 
States.  Nevertheless, it felt that the mere existence of these provisions 
does not “justify the assumption that the rule-of-law structures are 
synchronised between the Member States of the European Union as 
regards substantive law and that a corresponding examination at the 
national level on a case-by-case basis is therefore superfluous“264.  In 
this respect, the German Constitutional Court arguably rejected the basis 
of Mutual Recognition that is stipulated in Recital 10 of the Preamble to 
the Framework Decision.265 It emphasised that “putting into effect a strict 
                                         
262 Para. 77. 
263 Para. 78. 
264 Para. 119. 
265 Recital 10 states that “The mechanism of the European Arrest Warrant is based on a high level 
of confidence between Member States. Its implementation may be suspended only in the event of a 
serious and persistent breach by one of the Member States of the principles set out in Article 6(1) of 
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principle of mutual recognition, and the extensive statement of mutual 
confidence among the states that is connected with it, cannot restrict the 
constitutional guarantee of the fundamental rights“266. The inclusion 
however of national constitutional guarantees, especially in areas that 
are already covered in Member States by obligations through EU law, is 
notably at odds with the European Court of Justice approach. Namely, in 
Pupino267, the European Court of Justice stessed that the principle of 
mutual trust is at the heart of the third pillar cooperation and, in Gozutok 
and Brugge268 the European Court of Justice, on ruling on the application 
of ne bis in idem, stressed that Member States should have mutual trust 
in other Member States criminal justice systems even when the outcome 
would be different if its own national law were applied. With the above 
main considerations, the German Constitutional Court decided that the 
European Arrest Warrant Act was void269 and that a German citizen could 
not be extradited as long as a new Act was not implemented. The second 
European Arrest Warrant Act was adopted on 20th of July 2006, and 
entered into force on the 2nd of August 2006. 
 
As seen in the first Chapter, the position of the German Constitutional 
Court was emphasized in relation to the recent case by the German 
Constitutional Court where it had to consider if the Act approving the 
Treaty of Lisbon was compatible with the Basic Law and whether the 
accompanying law was unconstitutional to the extent that legislative 
                                                                                                                   
the Treaty on European Union, determined by the Council pursuant to Article 7(1) of the said Treaty 
with the consequences set out in Article 7(2) thereof.”. 
266 Para. 119. 
267 Supra note 237. 
268 Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01. 
269 Para. 117. 
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bodies had not been accorded sufficient rights of participation. In a 
nutshell, using the words of the German Constitutional Court, “the Basic 
Law strives to integrate Germany into the legal community of peaceful 
and free states, but does not waive the sovereignty contained [...] in the 
German constitution as a right of the people to take constitutive 
decisions concerning fundamental questions as its own identity”270. It 
further “grants powers to take part in and develop a European Union 
designed as an association of sovereign states (Staatenverbund) [...] 
which remain sovereign, a treaty-based association which exercises 
public authority, but whose fundamental order is subject to the decision-
making power of the Member States and in which the peoples, i.e. the 
citizens, of the Member States remain the subjects of democratic 
legitimation.”271  
 
 
CYPRUS 
 
The European Arrest Warrant was implemented in Cypriot law by Law 
133 (I)/2004. The Cypriot Supreme Court was called to rule on the 
compatibility of this law with the Cypriot Constitution in the case of an 
application by the United Kingdom to the Cypriot authorities to hand over 
a person, having dual UK and Cypriot nationality, charged with conspiring 
to defraud the British government. The main argument was that the law 
introducing the Framework Decision was incompatible with Article 11.2(f) 
of the Cypriot Constitution that stipulated that “[n]obody is deprived of 
                                         
270 Para. 340. 
271 Para. 1 (Case Headnotes). 
 98 
 
their liberty except in those cases where the law so provided, namely […] 
for the arrest or detention of a person in order to prevent his entry into 
the Republic without a permit or in the case of an alien against whom 
procedures have been instituted to have him expelled or extradited”. The 
Supreme Court based its reasoning on the fact that no mention is made 
of surrendering nationals in the context of a European Arrest Warrant in 
Article 11 which provides an exhaustive list of reasons in which a person 
may be arrested. This is also reflected in case law, in the case Γεωργίου 
και Διευθυντή των Κεντρικών Φυλακών (1991) 1 ΑΑΔ 814, where it was 
decided that the extradition of a Cypriot citizen on the basis of Article 
11.2(f) of the Constitution is prohibited.  
 
The Supreme Court, therefore, ruled that it could “not find an appropriate 
legal basis in the Constitution justifying the arrest of a Cypriot national 
for the purpose of surrendering him/her to the competent judicial 
authorities of another Member State on the basis of a European Arrest 
Warrant”272. It further greatly based its reasoning on the legal nature of 
Framework Decisions. The main emphasis was that as Framework 
Decisions are adopted under the third pillar they do not have direct effect 
and can be transposed in Member States only with the proper legal 
procedure.  Another issue that was raised was whether Framework 
Decisions, as they are adopted under the third pillar and do not have 
direct effect, can be superior to the Cypriot Constitution.  As seen from 
above, the Supreme Court did not agree that the proper legal procedure 
was adhered to, as the implementing law was incompatible to the Cypriot 
                                         
272 Council Document No. 14281/05 at p.2. 
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Constitution. In reaching this conclusion the Supreme Court made a 
reference to Pupino273 where it was also decided that it should be left to 
the Court of every Member State to decide whether the interpretation of 
its national law is in accordance with the Framework Decision. The 
Supreme Court was of the opinion that “there is no suitable 
interpretation of the [Implementation Law] so that its provisions prevail 
and are put into effect in relation to a citizen of the Republic [of 
Cyprus].” Furthermore, in addressing the “superiority” point the Supreme 
Court ruled that the Framework Decision leaves the method and the 
means of how to achieve its aims up to the Member States and, to that 
effect evidently, the correct legal procedure should be used to ensure the 
introduction of the European Arrest Warrant.274 This, according to the 
Supreme Court, had not been done as the law concerned was 
incompatible with a specific provision of the Constitution.   
 
Following this decision, the Government of Cyprus proposed an 
amendment to the Constitution and a new Article 11 was adopted which 
came into force on 28 July 2006 (Law 127 (I)/2006). Article 11 now 
reads that the “arrest or withholding of a person with intent to 
obstructing the entrance without permit into the territory of the Republic 
[of Cyprus] or arrest or withholding of an alien against whom actions 
were taken with intent to deport or extradite or arrest or withholding a 
citizen of the Republic [of Cyprus] in order to extradite or surrender him, 
having in mind the reservations of the following provisions: […] the 
                                         
273 Supra note 237. 
274 Mitsilegas V. argues that although the Cyprus Court appears reluctant to explicitly state that the 
national Constitution has primacy over EU law the judgment implies that Framework Decision are in 
a weaker constitutional position due to their lack of direct effect see Supra note 61 at p.137. 
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arrest or withholding of a citizen of the Republic [of Cyprus] with the 
intention of surrendering him based on a European Arrest Warrant is 
possible only with regard to facts that supervened or actions committed 
after the date of accession of the Republic into the European Union.”. 
  
Evidently, although the Constitution was amended there are still points in 
the Constitution that reflect the control to safeguard ceding Sovereignty. 
The most prominent of these are275: Primarily, although the surrender of 
own nationals is now allowed under the European Arrest Warrant 
procedure, a limit was placed in regards to when the date of commission 
of the offence in regards to which surrender is sought, forbidding the 
retrospective application of the application of the implementing law of the 
European Arrest Warrant. Secondly, Article 14 of the Cypriot Constitution 
still states that “[n]o citizen shall be banished or excluded from the 
Republic under any circumstances”.  Surprisingly however, there has 
been no direct decision on the compatibility of Law 133 (I)/2004 (now 
Law 127 (I)/2006) with this decision. Thirdly, the requirement of double 
criminality based on constitutional grounds is considered an additional 
ground of refusal.276  
 
The existence of such clauses highlights the sovereign challenges that 
are posed to State Sovereignty from the removal of the bar to  surrender 
of own nationals. Furthermore, the above Constitutional cases of Poland, 
                                         
275 For an analysis of these and a discussion on                                                                                                             
the Cypriot Case see Christou T., Kouzoupi E. and Xanthaki H., Mutual Recognition in Criminal 
Matters in Cyprus, European Journal of Law Reform, Vol. XI, no. 1, 111-122. 
276 The analysis on the double criminality and State Sovereignty has been given in regards to the 
first European Arrest Warrant in Poland case. Its conclusions apply for the Cypriot case and are 
adopted. 
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Germany and Cyprus illustrate that there are inherent Constitutional 
problems with the application of the European Arrest Warrant and one of 
the main points stressed by the arguments brought forward in these 
constitutional decisions is the lack of certainty of law as an effect of the 
application of the European Arrest Warrant.277 This aftermath has been 
associated with being “a serious threat to the proper functioning of the 
European Arrest Warrant” 278.   
 
Moreover, as a redline running across all the judgments is the will of 
Member States to shield the ceding of their State Sovereignty and this 
could also be given as an explanation for the “readiness of national 
courts – in spite of their general willingness to comply to the extent 
possible with European Union law – to rule that implementing European 
Arrest Warrant legislation is unconstitutional in order to affirm the 
constitutional protection to their citizens”.279 Although, as seen, the 
judgments have been described in the scholarly arena as either having a 
more EU-friendly tone, in the cases of Poland and Cyprus, and a less EU-
friendly approach in the case of Germany, the position of the 
Constitutional courts has been further elaborated, as seen in Chapter 1 
and this Chapter, by the recent case law on the compatibility of the 
Lisbon Treaty with national constitutions. Through these judgments it has 
been illuminated that State Sovereignty is a principle that lies at the 
heart of a State and as discussed in this Chapter the removal of the bar 
to surrender own nationals challenges it; noteworthy are the attempts of 
                                         
277 On this point see Guild E., ‘Introduction’ in Guild. E., Constitutional Challenges to the European 
Arrest Warrant, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006. 
278 See Arnull A., “Arrested Development”, European Law Review, No. 5, 2005 at p.606.  
279 See Mitsilegas V., Supra note 61 at p.139.  
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Member States to include grounds of refusal, such as the verification of 
the double criminality principle, so to try and minimize the evoked 
challenges. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE “DEPOLITICISATION” OF THE EUROPEAN 
ARREST WARRANT AND SOVEREIGNTY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision280 it is stated that 
the “objective set for the Union to become an area of freedom, security 
and justice leads to abolishing extradition between Member States and 
replacing it by a system of surrender between judicial authorities”281. In 
addition, the Framework Decision stresses that “[t]he role of the central 
authorities in the execution of a European Arrest Warrant must be limited 
to practical and administrative assistance”282, i.e. they should not decide 
on the substance of the case. Further, it is stated that a central authority 
may only serve as organisational assistance283, not as a deciding 
institution, and in regards to the grounds for the mandatory non-
execution of the European Arrest Warrant, it is stated that it is a judicial 
authority which decides.284  Evidently, the main paragon in the execution 
of a European Arrest Warrant is a judicial authority in each Member 
State.285 This has introduced a radical change from traditional extradition 
as governmental approval286 is no longer necessary and the role of the 
central and administrative authorities is just limited to providing practical 
                                         
280 Supra note 2. 
281 Para. 5. 
282 Para. 9. 
283 Article 7. 
284 Article 3. 
285 Article 1(1). 
286 In extradition procedures a government minister takes the final decision on whether or not to 
extradite someone.  
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assistance.  This aspect is usually referred to as the “judicialisation” of 
extradition or the “depoliticisation” of the European Arrest Warrant.  
 
Arguably, as discussed in Chapter 1, the underlining rationale for 
introducing to the European fore, on the basis of the principle of Mutual 
Recognition, a “depoliticised” European Arrest Warrant, was the need to 
speed up and simplify the transmission and execution process by which 
Member States cooperate. Accordingly, with the implementation of the 
Framework Decision, a new status quo in the extradition practice was 
introduced and for a large number of Member States judicial authorities 
such as district courts, examining judges and public prosecutors, now 
decide on the execution of a European Arrest Warrant.287 The first part of 
this Chapter will look at the issues relating to the “depoliticisation” of the 
European Arrest Warrant and the challenges this may have to 
Sovereignty. The second part, will then look at the new status quo and 
examine whether State Sovereignty is maintained in the “judicialisation” 
of the European Arrest Warrant. The final section will include an overview 
of the main challenges to State Sovereignty.   
 
 
 
 
                                         
287 In deviation there are Member States were non-judicial central authorities continue to play a 
role in basic elements of the surrender procedure far beyond the administrative tasks assigned in the 
Framework Decision. See Final report on the fourth round of mutual evaluations - The practical 
application of the European Arrest Warrant and corresponding surrender procedures between 
Member States, 8302/4/09 REV 4 (herein after as “Mutual Evaluation Report”) at p.8 and Supra note 
67.  
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JUDICIAL V POLITICAL PARAGON: THE DILUTION OF SOVEREIGNTY 
IN THE “DEPOLITICISATION” OF THE EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT 
 
The discussion that follows focuses on the central role of the judicial 
paragon in the execution of a European Arrest Warrant. Primarily, it 
should be noted that contrary to the text of the Framework Decision in 
some Member States non-judicial central authorities continue to play a 
role in basic elements of the surrender procedure far beyond the 
administrative tasks assigned in the Framework Decision.288 For example, 
Estonia, Ireland and Cyprus have given an executive role to their central 
authority.289 In theory however, the Framework Decision introduced a 
shift for all Member States from “political to judicial surrender” on the 
basis of Mutual Recognition.290 In doing so, the application of Mutual 
Recognition in criminal cooperation has been described in the academic 
arena, to have given rise to a new mode of governance291 where the 
central paragon in this governance are Judges.292   
 
In general, there is little agreement by academics as to what is precisely 
implied by a “new mode of governance”293, however an identifiable 
                                         
288 Mutual Evaluation Report at p.8. 
289 Report from the Commission on the implementation since 2005 of the Council Framework 
Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures between 
Member States COM (2007) 407 final (herein after “Implementation Report”) at p.8 and Supra note 
67.  
290 In traditional extradition a request would have to be approved by a judge, and then executed or 
refused by the relevant political authority, usually the Ministry of Justice. 
291  For a discussion on the modes of governance within the EU see Ingeborg Tömmel, Modes of 
governance in the EU, Paper presented for the EUSA-Conference 2007: Montreal at 
http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2007/papers/toemmel-i-12g.pdf.  
292 For a discussion on the principle of Mutual Recognition as a new mode of governance in the 
single market see: Schmidt S. K., Mutual recognition as a new mode of governance, Journal of 
European Public Policy 14:5 August 2007, 667-681. For an analysis on the limits of the analogy of 
the principle in the Single Market and criminal cooperation see Lavenex S., in Supra note 107 
especially at p.p.764-767.  
293 Schmidt S.K. at Ibid at p.668. 
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characteristic “is the phenomenon that [a new mode of] governance can 
successfully be exercised without relying exclusively or predominantly on 
the authority of the state”294. As Lavenex argues, in the context of 
examining the transposition of the Mutual Recognition principle from the 
single market to criminal cooperation, Mutual Recognition in criminal 
cooperation strengthens the governmental sphere as it is “an instrument 
of governmentalisation”295 where it “boosts the transnational 
enforcement capacity of governmental actors”296. The governmental 
actors are of course the judicial authorities that have been assigned by 
each member state to deal with European Arrest Warrant requests. The 
chain of criminal cooperation, therefore, links direct contact from a 
judicial authority of the issuing Member State to the corresponding 
judicial authority of the executing Member State and a Foreign Ministry’s 
decision to respond to a surrender request, as with traditional 
extradition, is negated (i.e. there is no political involvement). In such a 
way, national judicial authorities (i.e. Judges) become “actors in their 
own right in the international system”297 leading to a “transgovernmental 
network of national judges”.298  In this respect, Slaughter argues, that 
the State is disaggregating; Judges (regulators and even legislators) are 
reaching out beyond national borders, ﬁnding that their once “domestic” 
jobs have a growing international dimension. Once the Judges encounter 
their foreign counterparts, horizontal networks are created with 
                                         
294 See Sievers J., Managing diversity: The European Arrest Warrant and the potential of mutual 
recognition as a mode of governance in EU Justice and Home Affairs, Paper to be presented at the 
EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference Montréal, Canada, 17–19 May 2007 at 
http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2007/papers/sievers-j-08i.pdf .  
295 Lavenex S. at Supra note 107 at p.767. 
296 Ibid. 
297 Supra note 293 at p.8.  
298 For a discussion on this see Slaughter A.M., (2004): A New World Order, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press (Online source: http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/i7712.pdf), in particular at 
p.p.1–34.  
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concluding memoranda of understanding299, which arguably even if not in 
writing, can be implied by the customary way in which judges execute 
between them European Arrest Warrants. This has as a result the 
creation of a legal system of cooperation which operates with more or 
less clear and binding rules.300  
 
As already explained, the execution of a European Arrest Warrant entails 
the horizontal transfer of sovereignty as the relative judicial organs of the 
executing Member State must recognize and execute sovereign acts301 of 
the issuing Member State. It is thus in this context, that the 
transgovernmental network of national judges of Member States 
operates and the role and power of Judges in this horizontal transfer of 
sovereignty is absolute. A Judge however, although an organ of a State, 
unlike political actors, is appointed and not elected in most Member 
States.302 A Judge’s relation with the State, therefore, is one of allegiance 
and not of direct political stance. In fact in exercising judgment, a Judge 
is directed by the rule of law to be independent, protecting the rights of 
all individuals including the rights of unpopular individuals, minorities and 
foreigners.303 On the other hand, a democratically elected politician, 
when deciding whether an individual should be surrendered, would take 
into consideration to represent in his/her decision the mass of the 
individuals within his/her territory and the will and the interests of the 
                                         
299 Ibid. 
300 See Supra note 292.  
301 The sovereign act is the judicial decision in the form of a European Arrest Warrant. 
302 Although the methods of appointment, powers and functions of judges vary across different 
jurisdictions.  
303 Pinto-Duschinsky M., Bringing Rights Back Home; Making human rights compatible with 
parliamentary democracy in the UK, ed. The Rt Hon Lord Hofmann, PC, Policy Exchange, 2011 Online 
Source: 
http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/pdfs/PX_Keeping_Human_Rights_at_Home_
WEB_07_02_11.pdf. 
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State. In this respect, it is contended that the interests of State 
Sovereignty are challenged and to the least not protected with the 
enthroning of Judges as central actors in the transgovernmental network 
created by the European Arrest Warrant procedure.  
 
The intrinsic difficulties underlying the new role given to judicial 
authorities are reflected by various scholars. After an overview of various 
Polish judicial decisions, Lazowski comments that there are “mixed 
signals as to the ability of Polish judges to serve as fully-fledged 
European Union judges. Clearly there is a group of judges who are au 
courant with EU law. Unfortunately, some of the examples presented […] 
reveal limited expertise, not only in lower courts but also in courts of 
appeal. The latter is a particular source of concern as for a considerable 
number of cases these courts are technically courts of last instance”.304 
Furthermore, Schmidt and Siever highlight that, as a consequence of the 
lack of heterogeneity of legal systems, Judges are faced with a variety of 
different legal systems (e.g. difference in common law and civil law 
systems, difference in the language of legal systems) most of which they 
are not familiar with and given this lack of knowledge and often the lack 
of trust, they may act as gatekeepers of their national legal system and 
show uncooperative behavior.305 The lack of trust is arguably 
exacerbated in light of the fact that there are Member States, such as 
Bulgaria and Romania that have predominantly been gloomed within the 
EU in respect of their criminal justice system and particularly in regards 
                                         
304 See Supra note 231 at p.551. 
305 See Supra 292 and Supra note 293.  
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to problems of corrupted judiciary.306 In acting though as gatekeepers, it 
is suggested that, judges are passing in the realms of the executive and 
this fusion of power can be democratically detrimental. As highlighted by 
Pinto-Duschinsky “[i]t is dangerous for democracy to permit judges to 
become politicians in robes and to substitute their moral judgments for 
those of elected representatives on issues outside their essential but 
circumscribed ﬁeld.”307 In the context of the challenges to State 
Sovereignty, it is argued that if judges do so and express the political 
preference of their government, the horizontal transfer of Sovereignty 
that occurs in executing a European Arrest Warrant, would pose less 
challenges to State Sovereignty. However, the judiciary is a body that 
should be characterized by professionalism and loyalty to the rule of law. 
Therefore, acting with political motivation contrary to the best interest of 
justice shatters the very foundations on which justice and democracy is 
built. Furthermore, even in the unfortunate case where  Judges act with 
political motivations, it may be the case that they have different political 
ideologies to their State, on the national political arena and on the 
European political arena.308 Therefore, although prima facie a Judge 
acting as a “politician in a robe” could arguably shield the ceding of 
Sovereignty, if the Judge acted with the interests of their state’s political 
agenda in mind, it could, if the Judge’s political line is not aligned with 
their State’s, pose intense challenges to State Sovereignty, as Judges are 
                                         
306 See Judicial Corruption Report from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Doc. 
12058, 6 November 2009 available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/22806421/Judicial-Corruption-
Report-from-the-Parliamentary-Assembly-of-the-Council-of-Europe. 
307 Supra note 302 at p.5. 
308 Siegel S., Courts and Compliance in the European Union: The European Arrest Warrant in 
National Constitutional Courts, Jean Monnet Working Paper 05/08. 
 [http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/08/080501.pdf] at p.11. 
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the pivotal organ in the horizontal transfer of Sovereignty that, as 
explained, occurs in executing a European Arrest Warrant  
 
Furthermore, the shift from the political to the judicial paragon has also 
resulted in a loss of a diplomatic mechanism as it is now impossible to 
exert political or diplomatic pressure through decisions of surrender.309 
To demonstrate the loss of this diplomatic tool and political pressure, in 
the realm of the new regime the European Arrest Warrant procedure has 
introduced in surrender procedures, it is helpful to look at an example 
given by Blekxtoon in relation to a number of cases involving drug 
related crimes leading to extradition requests in France. In that instance 
France had charged the suspected individuals with different crimes 
relating to violation of customs regulation, than the crimes for which  the 
suspected individuals were extradited for. Consequently, a Dutch court 
declared these additional charges inadmissible. Blekxtoon connotes that 
“[t]he BRD99 ha[d] properly observed this ruling. France [did] not, 
however. Diplomatic pressure was then exerted on France to change this, 
and this was eventually achieved. The ultimate instrument of power of 
the Minister of Justice is to refuse extradition in case of genuine concern 
for such cases. A typical political instrument of pressure”.310 However 
under the current European Arrest Warrant procedure the Minister is 
removed from the picture and thus the diplomatic mechanism is also lost. 
In order to further comprehend the realms in which a Judge has 
authority in the European Arrest Warrant procedure, and thus the 
                                         
309 See Diede D. J., The Academic Assessment of the European Arrest Warrant- A Review of the 
Literuture, [ed] Guild E., Constitutional Challenges to the European Arrest Warrant. Netherlands: 
Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006, 215-266. 
310 Blekxtoon R., Checks and balances van het Kaderbesluit Europees aanhoudingsbevel, 575. 
Example and quotes taken from Ibid at p.241.  
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context in which State Sovereign may be affected, it is necessary to look 
closer at the Framework Decision so as to identify the parameters in 
which judicial authorities cooperate in the European Arrest Warrant 
procedure.  
 
 
THE MAINTENANCE OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE “JUDICIALISATION” 
OF THE EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT  
 
As already discussed, one of the main innovations introduced by the 
application of the Mutual Recognition through the European Arrest 
Warrant is that the main organ  is a judicial authority in each Member 
State.311 An insight as to how the application of the principle of Mutual 
Recognition in criminal matters is understood by the Commission is found 
in the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament. As seen in Chapter 1, the Commission understands 
Mutual Recognition to mean “that once a certain measure, such as a 
decision taken by a judge in exercising his or her official powers in one 
Member State, has been taken, that measure – in so far as it has 
extranational implications – would automatically be accepted in all other 
Member States, and have the same or at least similar effects there”312.  
From this understanding, it can be adduced that once a judicial decision 
in one Member State has extranational implications it would then have a) 
automatic acceptance in all other Member States and, b) the same or at 
                                         
311 Article 1(1). 
312 Supra note 1 at p.2. 
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least similar effects in the territory of other Member States as it would 
have in its own. It is submitted that the combination of these two 
characteristics is arguably at the root of the challenges for State 
Sovereignty as it is a Sovereign prerogative of a State to have legal 
authority over all the individuals within its territory and it is not obliged 
to adhere to any demands from other States, especially within the 
indicated aura of the prescribed automaticity in which it is stated that 
this should happen. However, in assessing the challenges to Sovereignty, 
that arise with the novel shift to the judicial paragon, it is important first 
to examine the Framework Decision, to see whether and if so, to what 
extent, it reflects the above i.e. that once a European Arrest Warrant, in 
the form of a judicial decision is issued by one Member State it is 
automatically accepted in all other Member States and has the same or 
similar effects in all Member States as it would have in its territory.    
 
To begin with, in the text of the Framework Decision it is stated that the 
execution of the European Arrest Warrant should be on the basis of 
Mutual Recognition. There is however no further reference as to any of 
the characteristics of the principle of Mutual Recognition and more 
significantly as to what mechanisms will be enforced in the context of a 
European Arrest Warrant so as to reflect them. In the same sentence the 
text of the Framework Decision also identifies that a European Arrest 
Warrant should be executed in accordance with the provisions included in 
the Framework Decision. It is submitted that an examination of those 
provisions reveals that the text of the Framework Decision comes at odds 
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with the notion of the principle of Mutual Recognition as described in the 
Commission’s Proposal.  
 
To begin with, the text of the Framework Decision evidently does not 
depict automatic acceptance and enforcement of a judicial decision taken 
from another Member State as there is a list of three grounds for 
mandatory non-execution of a European Arrest Warrant. Namely, the 
granting of amnesty in the executing Member State, the existence of a 
final judgment in a Member State for the same acts and the suspect 
being a minor.313 Additionally, there are two more mandatory grounds of 
refusal that are not expressly stated in the text of the Framework 
Decision. Firstly, Article 1(3) implies that the violation of fundamental 
rights and fundamental legal principles, as enshrined in Article 6 of the 
TEU, would amount to a mandatory ground of refusing to execute a 
European Arrest Warrant.314 Secondly, Article 20 implies that the 
immunity of the requested person as a diplomat of a third state or as an 
international civil servant would also amount to a mandatory ground of 
refusal unless that immunity has been waived. 
 
The text also includes a number of grounds for optional non-execution of 
the European Arrest Warrant namely, the option to refuse surrender, 
regarding an offence that does not fall in one or more of the categories of 
                                         
313 Article 3. 
314 Article 1 (3) of the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision reads as follows: “This 
Framework Decision shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental 
rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union.”. 
This means that through the Preamble of the Framework Decision and its explicit connection with 
Article 6 (1) of the Treaty on the European Union, Member States are obliged to guarantee the 
safeguards of the fundamental rights as set forth in the European Convention on Human Rights (for 
a discussion see Garlick P., The Arrest Warrant and the ECHR, in Blekxtoon (Ed.), Handbook on the 
European Arrest Warrant, TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2005, 167–181). 
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offences listed in Article 2(2), if the double criminality requirement is not 
satisfied315; the option to refuse surrender if there are pending 
procedures in the requested State for the same act316; the option to 
refuse surrender if, in respect of the same acts that the European Arrest 
Warrant is based, the judicial authorities of the requested State have 
decided not to prosecute or have decided to halt proceedings317; the 
option to refuse surrender if a final judgment that prevents further 
proceedings has been passed upon the requested person in any other 
Member State318; the option to refuse surrender if there is a violation of 
statutory time limitation of the requested state provided the act falls 
within the jurisdiction of the requested Member State319; the  option to 
refuse surrender if the requested person has been finally judged by 
courts of a non-Member State and  if there is a sentence it has been 
served or is currently being served or may no longer be served under the 
law of the sentencing country320; the option to refuse surrender if the 
requested person is a national or resident of the executing Member State 
and the State undertakes to execute the sentence or detention order in 
accordance with its domestic law321;  option to refuse surrender if the 
offence for which a European Arrest Warrant is issued is regarded by the 
law of the executing Member State as having been committed in whole or 
in part in its territory or in a place treated as such322; the option to refuse 
surrender if an offence has been committed outside the territory of the 
issuing Member State and the law of the executing Member State does 
                                         
315 Article 4(1). Article 4(1) also excludes the fiscal character of an offence as a ground for refusal. 
316 Article 4(2). 
317 Article 4(3). 
318 Ibid. 
319 Article 4(4). 
320 Article 4(5). 
321 Article 4(6). 
322 Article 4(7). 
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not allow prosecution for the same offences when committed outside its 
territory. 
 
Moreover, there are three situations in which surrender may be subject 
to a certain condition. Namely, the Framework Decision contains the 
option of making surrender for execution of a judgment that was 
defectively rendered in absentia conditional to a guaranteed possibility to 
apply for retrial323; it contains the option of subjecting surrender for the 
purpose of prosecution of a national or resident to the condition that this 
person, after having been tried in the issuing Member State, be returned 
for serving sentence in the executing Member State324; and, it contains 
the option to refuse surrender if under the law of the issuing Member 
State the offence is punishable by a life sentence without review of the 
sentence provided.325 
 
In addition to the grounds of refusal contained in the Framework Decision 
it could be argued that the Preamble that precedes the text of the 
Framework Decision, which would normally only contain explanatory 
background information to and the purpose of a treaty, also contains 
some recitals that can be read as containing general grounds of refusal 
which are not found in the Framework Decision as specific grounds of 
refusal.   In particular, it is implied that there is the option to refuse to 
                                         
323 Article 5(1). It should be noted that this has now been amended by Framework Decision 
2009/299 (implementation deadline 28/03/11) that set out conditions under which the recognition 
and execution of a decision rendered following a trial at which the person concerned did not appear 
in person should not be refused. In brief, these conditions are met where the defendant was properly 
informed about the original trial or had an appointed lawyer to represent him or has a right to a 
retrial or an appeal.  For a general discussion on new measures in the third pillar see Mitsilegas V., 
at Supra note 132. 
324 Article 5(3). 
325 Article 5(2). 
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surrender a person where there are reasons to believe, based on 
objective elements, that a European Arrest Warrant has been issued for 
the purposes of prosecuting or punishing a person on discriminatory 
grounds or may result in doing so on discriminatory grounds.326 The 
recital further states, that a judicial authority can apply its national 
constitutional rules relating to due process, freedom of association, 
freedom of press and freedom of expression, and can be interpreted as a 
ground of refusal.327 As seen above, Article 1(3) of the Framework 
Decision reinforces this ground as a mandatory ground of refusal as it 
implies that the violation of recognised rights and legal principles could 
lead to refusing surrender. Furthermore, the Preamble includes another 
situation in which a Member State may refuse to execute a European 
Arrest Warrant. This situation arises if the requested person will be 
removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk 
that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.328  
 
Evidently, the inclusion of the plethora of grounds of refusal in the 
Framework Decision does not allow automaticity in the acceptance of a 
judicial decision of one Member State by all other Member States as the 
executing State on receipt of a European Arrest Warrant may examine it 
to see if it should be refused on any of the abovementioned grounds. 
Furthermore, the existence of so many grounds of refusal arguably 
makes the proceedings of a European Arrest Warrant “more comparable 
to a form of intergovernmental cooperation than to the execution of a 
                                         
326 Recital 12.  
327 Ibid. 
328 Recital 13. 
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decision by another court in the same State”329. It has been further 
asserted that the large number of grounds of refusal is reminiscing of the 
grounds of refusal in the traditional extradition system330, to the extent 
that some scholars have characterised the European Arrest Warrant as 
“extradition in disguise”331. It has even been argued by Zeder, that the 
term “Mutual Recognition” is primarily a “marketing measure” because 
there is no significant difference between Mutual Recognition and 
traditional judicial cooperation.332 He bases his reasoning on two main 
points: 1) on the plethora of grounds of refusal provided for in the  
Framework Decision 2) that the grounds of refusal can only be claimed 
by the competent authorities in the executing State but not by the 
requested person. This, he argues, is similar to the Mutual Legal 
Assistance where the rights of the individual are barely regulated whilst 
the relationship between the requesting and requested State is.  It is 
contended that the idea of the principle of Mutual Recognition, as 
reflected in the European Arrest Warrant, as being “extradition in 
disguise” is weak as the Framework Decision introduced a cooperation 
system that shifted the decision to surrender a person from the executive 
sphere to the judicial sphere. Furthermore, putting the plethora of 
grounds or refusal aside, it detangled the heavy bureaucracy of 
traditional extradition and introduced a procedure marked with a degree 
of automatisation and speed. This automatisation and speed is reflected 
in that the text of the Framework Decision indicates for the issuing State 
                                         
329 Kert R., “The implementation and application of mutual recognition instruments in Austria in 
Future of Mutual Recognition” in Tiggelen G. van, Surano L., and Weyemberg A. (Eds), The future of 
mutual recognition in criminal matters in the European Union, Belgium, IEE, 2009 at p.19. 
330 See analysis in Supra note 14. 
331 Ibid at p.35. 
332 Zeder F., in “Europastrafrecht-Aktueller Stand” in Bundesministerium fur Justz (ed.), 
Vorarlberger Tage, 2007 at p.88 quoted in Supra note 328 at p.19. 
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to complete, a pro-forma form for the European Arrest Warrant that 
takes the form of a Certificate, and should include a series of relatively 
straight-forward information on the requested person and the offence 
committed.334 Furthermore, the text of the Framework Decision 
emphasises that the European Arrest Warrant should be dealt with and 
executed as a matter of urgency335 and sets time limits in which this has 
to be done; the final decision on the execution of a European Arrest 
Warrant must be taken within a period of 60 days – or exceptionally – 90 
days – from the arrest of the requested person336  and with some 
exceptions, the arrested person must be surrendered no later than 10 
days after the final decision on the execution of the European Arrest 
Warrant.337  
 
Finally, it is asserted that the text of the Framework Decision is reflective 
of a political compromise between applying the principle of Mutual 
Recognition in criminal matters and protecting the ceding of State 
Sovereignty.338 It reflects the principle of Mutual Recognition as the 
judicial authority of a Member State has to give effect to a decision by a 
similar authority in another Member State on the basis of a procedure 
that is characterised by the automaticity of a completed form and the 
speed of the relatively short time limits set in the Framework Decision. It 
is however also reflective, of safeguarding aspects of the Sovereignty of 
Member States as the grounds of refusal and certain conditions included 
                                         
334 Article 8(1). 
335 Article 17(1). 
336 Article 17(3) and (4). 
337 Article 23(2), (3) and (4). 
338 See Groot S., “Mutual trust in (European) Extradition Law, in Blekxtoon (Ed.), Handbook on the 
European Arrest Warrant, TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2005 at p.96. 
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in the text of the Framework Decision provide the executing State with 
some leeway of questioning and not automatically accepting and 
executing the decision of another Member State within its territory. 
Additionally, it allows the executing authority – within certain limits – to 
demand for additional information in order to decide whether the decision 
of the other Member State can be executed.  However, as mentioned in 
the above section, the decisive organ  is not the State per se but Judicial 
authorities, and, as discussed, it is arguable whether they can or should 
act as guardians of State Sovereignty. Moreover, as seen in Chapter 2, a 
recent study done by ECLAN that examined the legal culture of Judges 
illuminated that it is considered by most Member States necessary to 
check the facts against the selected category before proceeding to 
execute a European Arrest Warrant in their territory.339 The scope of the 
judicial check, as Stubbs and Gorkic note, differs greatly as some 
Member States “place complete trust in the issuing authorities, but some 
of them go even so far as to check whether the grounds of suspicion are 
reasonable, and thus taking on for themselves their own assessment of 
the evidence”340. It is contended, that the judicial check, or the “process 
of subsumation” 341, that occurs when assessing whether an issuing State 
reasonably decided that a European Arrest Warrant should be executed 
and the subsequent decision whether to execute it, is a disguised shield 
towards protecting (or screening) the horizontal transfer of Sovereignty 
that occurs when executing a European Arrest Warrant.  
                                         
339 For example in Belgium, Italy, Lithuania, Denmark, Portugal, Ireland, Malta, Sweden.  See 
Surano G., Tiggelen and Surano L., Study: Analysis of the future of mutual recognition in criminal 
matters in the European Union - Final Report, Institute for European Studies, Université Libre de 
Bruxelles, 20 November 2008 at p.9. 
340 Supra note 153.  
341 Supra note 154.  
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CONCLUSION  
 
The removal of the political paragon from surrender procedures on the 
basis of a European Arrest Warrant has introduced a new era in criminal 
cooperation. In the second section of this Chapter, a closer inspection of 
the Framework Decision revealed, that the inclusion of a plethora of 
grounds of refusal in the Framework Decision does not allow 
automaticity, which lies at the heart of the principle of Mutual 
Recognition, in the acceptance of a judicial decision of one Member State 
by other Member States.  This arguably reflects the safeguarding of 
aspects of the Sovereignty of Member States as the grounds of refusal 
and certain conditions included in the text of the Framework Decision 
provide the executing State with some leeway of questioning and not 
automatically accepting and executing the decision of another Member 
State within its territory. Further, as discussed, the judicial checks that 
occur in practice when assessing whether an issuing State reasonably 
decided that a European Arrest Warrant should be executed and the 
subsequent decision whether to execute it, is arguably a disguised shield 
towards shielding the ceding of State Sovereignty, during the horizontal 
transfer of Sovereignty that takes place in executing a European Arrest 
Warrant. As was highlighted, some Member states engage in an intense 
judicial check and this is arguably evidence of those Member States’ 
reluctance, fear and endeavored effort to not risk ceding Sovereignty to 
the issuing State .  
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The first section of this Chapter examined the political versus the judicial 
paragon in the European Arrest Warrant procedure. Primarily, this shift 
introduced a new mode of governance where national judicial authorities 
(i.e. Judges) become actors in their own right in the international system 
leading to a transgovernmental network of national judges where the 
execution of European Arrest Warrants signifies a horizontal transfer of 
Sovereignty from the issuing to the executing State. In this context, the 
role and power of Judges in the horizontal transfer of sovereignty is 
absolute (subject to the grounds of refusal) and the Sovereignty of the 
executing State is challenged. As further discussed, a Judge has no 
political gravity, theoretically acts to the interests of justice, following the 
rule of law in exercising judgment and should be, in theory, independent, 
not promoting the political interests of a State in executing decisions. In 
this respect State Sovereignty is further challenged and to the least not 
protected. Additionally, the exercise of Sovereignty in the political arena 
has been compromised for Member States as the shift from the political 
to the judicial paragon has also resulted in a loss of a diplomatic tool; it 
is now not possible to exert political or diplomatic pressure through 
decisions of surrender. 
 
Furthermore, there are exacerbated difficulties due to the lack of 
homogeneity  of legal systems and as a consequence there has been an 
emergence of Judges acting as gatekeepers of their national legal 
system. As discussed, in acting as gatekeepers, Judges are passing in the 
realms of the executive and if in doing so they express the political 
preference of their government, the horizontal transfer of Sovereignty 
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that occurs in executing a European Arrest Warrant, does not challenge 
State Sovereignty. On the contrary however, if the Judge’s political line is 
not aligned with their government’s political agenda a great challenge is 
posed to State Sovereignty. Concluding, the discussion in this Chapter 
illuminated that the depoliticisation of the European Arrest Warrant, has 
sprung inherent challenges to State Sovereignty, the effect of which has 
been discussed. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
RESEARCH FINDING 
 
As highlighted in the Introduction to this thesis, the driving force for my 
research has been to examine whether the application of the principle of 
Mutual Recognition poses challenges to State Sovereignty. In brief, 
following the analysis in this thesis, the answer is Yes. The first concrete 
measure applying the principle of Mutual Recognition in Criminal matters, 
the European Arrest Warrant, was taken as a Case Study and the 
analysis in this thesis that evolved around narrower research questions342 
illuminated that there are inherent challenges to State Sovereignty.  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1 the application of the principle of Mutual 
Recognition creates a transnational or European law343 as it replaces all 
the measures based on international law between the Member States 
with a legal instrument of the European Union.344 It therefore can be 
seen as a “Supranational legal order that has constitutional quality and 
claim[s] supremacy and jurisdictional reach that penetrates the black box 
                                         
342 As stated in the Introduction to this thesis these were: Are there challenges to State 
Sovereignty from the application of the European Arrest Warrant? Does the partial abolishment of 
the double criminality requirement challenge State Sovereignty? Does the removal of the bar of 
surrender of own nationals challenge State Sovereignty? Does the “depolitisation” of the surrender 
procedure challenge State Sovereignty? 
343 Supra note 39.  
344 Supra note 90. 
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of the territorial state”345. The notion of State Sovereignty, as explained 
by Cohen, is a legal as well as a political concept, but it is not reducible 
to bundles of rights or prerogatives.346 Instead, Sovereignty is the 
unifying and self-identifying claim of a polity regarding the supremacy 
and autonomy of its legal order, the self determination of its political 
system, and its status as the ultimate authority in its respective domain 
of jurisdiction and as an equal under international law.”  As seen in 
Chapter 2, criminal cooperation through the principle of Mutual 
Recognition in the case of extradition through the European Arrest 
Warrant procedure, facilitates the cross border movement of sovereign 
acts. The sovereign act is the judicial decision in the form of a European 
Arrest Warrant that is exercised by Member State’s executives and 
judicial organs. The recognition of this sovereign act by another Member 
State creates extraterritoriality347 or a horizontal transfer of 
sovereignty348 as the relative state executives and judicial organs of the 
executing Member State must recognize and execute the sovereign act of 
another Member State. In this way the executing Member State’s 
Sovereignty is challenged and in traditional extradition there were 
mechanisms that shielded this; the double criminality requirement, the 
bar of surrender to own nationals and the politicisation of the procedure 
are those mechanisms that were examined in this thesis. 
 
In Chapter 2 the challenges that are posed to State Sovereignty from the 
partial abolition of the double criminality requirement for the list offences 
                                         
345 Supra note 91.  
346 Ibid. 
347 Supra note 106. 
348 Supra note 107. 
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were discussed. The lack of clarity in the definition of the categories of 
crimes, the lack of certainty in criminal law, and discrepancies in wording 
and/or translation and/or in the meaning of offences in Member States all 
contribute towards making the abolishment of the verification of the 
double criminality requirement challenging for State Sovereignty. As 
seen, in reflect of this, although the majority of Member States have 
implemented the list of thirty-two categories of offences in conformity 
with the wording of Article 2(2), there have nonetheless been Member 
States that have omitted some categories of offences and others that 
have transposed the list using different wording that sometimes widened 
or narrowed the meaning of offences. Even more so, there have been 
Member States that have minimized the scope of the abolition of the 
double criminality requirement and as seen in Chapter 3, the double 
criminality requirement was even constitutionally enshrined in Poland 
after an amendment to its Constitution and there are also Member States 
like Belgium, Slovenia and the UK where the double criminality 
requirement is partially checked, where part of the offence is committed 
on their national territory. This reintroduction of the double criminality 
requirement through the back door emphasizes the challenges that are 
engraved in its partial abolition.  
 
A solution towards addressing the problems in regards to the list offences 
is the proposition to introduce a list of agreed definitions of crimes in one 
single authentic language.349 In light of the absence of such a set system, 
the execution of the horizontal transfer of Sovereign power from one 
                                         
349 See Supra note 82.  
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State to another, without the verification of the double criminality 
requirement through the European Arrest Warrant procedure, challenges 
State Sovereignty. 
 
Chapter 3 engaged with the challenges raised from the removal of the 
bar to surrender own nationals. The first part of the Chapter discussed 
the expression of State Sovereignty in the bar to surrender of own 
nationals, commenting on the strong bond of allegiance between a State 
and its own nationals; a bond, as seen, also transcribed into Member 
State’s constitutions. This, as discussed, resulted in various problems in 
regards to the implementation of the Framework Decision with some 
countries having to make legislative amendments so as to accommodate 
the obligation to surrender their nationals. The cases of Poland, Germany 
and Cyprus were discussed. In the discussion, it was illuminated that 
there were inherent Constitutional problems with the application of the 
European Arrest Warrant. In the analysis of the judgments it was shown 
that, as a redline running across all the judgments, State Sovereignty is 
a principle that lies at the heart Member States and the removal of the 
bar to surrender own nationals, challenges it. Notable are Poland’s efforts 
to constitutionally enshrine, as a ground of refusal, the verification of the 
double criminality requirement principle, so to try and minimize the 
evoked challenges. 
 
Chapter 4 examined the issues relating to the “depoliticisation” of the 
European Arrest Warrant. This shift is argued to have introduced a new 
mode of governance where national judicial authorities become actors in 
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their own right in the international system, leading to a 
transgovernmental network of national judges where, the execution of 
European Arrest Warrants signifies a horizontal transfer of Sovereignty 
from the issuing to the executing State. In this context, the role and 
power of Judges, in the horizontal transfer of sovereignty, is absolute 
(subject to grounds of refusal) and the Sovereignty of the executing 
State is highly challenged. As further discussed, a Judge has no political 
gravity, acts to the interests of justice, following the rule of law in 
exercising judgment and is, in theory, independent, not promoting the 
political interests of a State, in executing decisions. In this respect State 
Sovereignty is further challenged and to the least not protected. 
Additionally, the exercise of Sovereignty in the political arena has been 
compromised for Member States as, the shift from a political to a judicial 
organ has also resulted in a loss of a diplomatic tool; it is now not 
possible to exert political or diplomatic pressure through decisions of 
surrender. 
 
Furthermore, the examination in Chapter 4 showed that there are 
exacerbated difficulties due to the lack of homogeneity of legal systems 
and as a consequence there has been an emergence of Judges acting as 
gatekeepers of their national legal systems. As discussed, in acting as 
gatekeepers, Judges are passing in the realms of the executive and if in 
doing so they express the underlying political agenda of their 
government, the horizontal transfer of Sovereignty that occurs in 
executing a European Arrest Warrant, does not challenge State 
Sovereignty. On the contrary however, if a Judge’s political line is not 
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aligned with their government’s political objectives challenges are posed 
to State Sovereignty.  
 
In the second section of Chapter 4, a closer inspection of the Framework 
Decision revealed that the inclusion of a plethora of grounds of refusal in 
the Framework Decision does not allow automaticity, which lies at the 
heart of the principle of Mutual Recognition, in the acceptance of a 
judicial decision of one Member State by other Member States.  This 
arguably reflects the safeguarding of aspects of the Sovereignty of 
Member States as, the grounds of refusal and certain conditions included 
in the text of the Framework Decision provide the executing State with 
some leeway of questioning and not automatically accepting and 
executing the decision of another Member State within its territory. 
Further, it was seen that the judicial checks that occur in practice when 
assessing whether an issuing State reasonably decided that a European 
Arrest Warrant should be executed and the subsequent decision whether 
to execute it, are arguably disguised shields towards protecting, or 
screening, the horizontal transfer of Sovereignty that takes place in 
executing a European Arrest Warrant. As was highlighted, some Member 
States engage in an intense judicial check and this is arguably evidence 
of those Member States’ reluctance, fear and endeavored effort to not 
risk ceding Sovereignty, which has been increasingly challenged by the 
depoliticisation of the European Arrest Warrant procedure. 
 
Concluding, my research revealed that the application of the first 
concrete measure in the field of criminal law implementing the principle 
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of Mutual Recognition raises considerable challenges to the State 
Sovereignty of Member States. Furthermore, throughout my research, it 
is illuminated that Member States consider as one of their priorities to 
shield any possible ceding of their Sovereignty, especially in matters of 
criminal law that, as has been argued, is a manifestation of State 
Sovereignty. In the words of Corstens, “[a]dministering justice, 
particularly criminal justice, is an attribute of sovereignty, as is 
management of foreign policy. It is an extension of the way in which 
European nations consider any attempt at European unification as an 
affront to their own culture. It is this aspect that forces European 
decision-makers to take refuge in unquestionable values such as the rule 
of law, democracy or human rights. Behind this initial obstacle may be 
found the concept of nationhood or, perhaps more precisely, the 
(particularly strong and quite legitimate) notion of a Europe of 
Nations”350.  
 
Closing, it is submitted that not enough emphasis has been given in the 
EU to analyzing and understanding EU integration in criminal matters 
through the lens of the impact it has on State Sovereignty. To this 
respect, it is submitted that only if Member States understand the 
inherent and real challenges from integration to their State Sovereignty, 
and ways are found to soothe the ceding of such Sovereignty, whilst 
promoting EU cooperation, will EU integration in criminal matters proceed 
on solid ground. 
 
                                         
350 Corstens, G., European Criminal Law, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2002 at p.3 
 130 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Abramson W., Extradition in the United States, in Keijzer N. and Sliedregt 
E. van, The European Arrest Warrant in Practice, T. M. C. Asser Press,  
2009 
Anderson P., Lineages of the Absolute State. London: New Left Books, 
1974 
Arnull A., ‘From Bit Part to Starring Role? The Court of Justice and 
Europe’s Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 24 YEL 1 
Bantekas I. and Nash S., International Criminal Law, Routledege –
Cavendish Press, 2003, 3rd edition 
Bartelson J., A Genealogy of Sovereignty, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995 
Biersteker T.J. and Weber C., State Sovereignty as Social Construct, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996 
Camillieri J. and Falk J. The End of Sovereignty?, Aldershot: Edward 
Elgar, 1992 
Chayes A.H., The New Sovereignty, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1995 
Christou T., Kouzoupi E. and Xanthaki H., Mutual Recognition in Criminal 
Matters in Cyprus, European Journal of Law Reform, Vol. XI, no. 1, 111-
122 
Clarkson C. M. V, Keating H. M. and Cunnigham S. R., Clarkson and 
Keating Criminal Law: Text and Materials. 6th ed. London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2007 
Corstens, G., European Criminal Law, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law 
International, 2002 
Deen-Racsmany Z., ‘The European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender of 
Nationals Revisited: The Lessons of Constitutional Challenges’, (2006) 14 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 271 
_________, ‘A New Passport to Impunity? Non-Extradition of Naturalized 
Citizens versus Criminal Justice’, 2 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2004) 761 
Diede D.J., The Academic Assessment of the European Arrest Warrant – 
A Review of the Literature, [ed] Guild E., Constitutional Challenges to the 
 131 
 
European Arrest Warrant, Netherlands: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006, 
215–266  
Dworkin R., Law's Empire, Fontana, 1986 
Gallagher P., Future developments in judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters, ERA Forum (2009), 495–517  
Garlick P., The Arrest Warrant and the ECHR, in Blekxtoon (Ed.), 
Handbook on the European Arrest Warrant, TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 
2005, 167–181 
Geyer F., European Arrest Warrant, Court of Justice of the European 
Communities, 4 EUConst (2008)  
Glerum E. and Roxemon J., Surrender of Nationals, in Keijzer and 
Sliedregt E. van (eds.), Keijzer N. and Sliedregt E. van (eds.), The 
European Arrest Warrant in Practice, The Hague, 2009, 70–88  
Grimm D., Comments on the German Constitutional Court’s Decision on 
the Lisbon Treaty; Defending Sovereign Statehood against Transforming 
the European Union into a State, 5 European Constitutional Law Review 
(2009), 353–373  
Groot S., Mutual trust in (European) Extradition Law, in Blekxtoon (Ed.), 
Handbook on the European Arrest Warrant, TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 
2005 
Guild E. and Geyer F., Security versus Justice?: Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in the European Union, Ashgate Publishing, 2008  
Herlin-Karnell E., In the wake of Pupino: Advocaten voor der Wereld and 
Dell’Orto, German Law Journal, Vol. 08, No. 12, 1153–1157   
Hobbes T., (1973), Leviathan, Everyman's Library, London Vol. XXI 
Husabø J. and Strandbakken A., Harmonization of criminal law in Europe, 
Intersentia (2005) 
Ingeborg Tömmel, Modes of governance in the EU, Paper presented for 
the EUSA-Conference 2007: Montreal at 
http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2007/papers/toemmel-i-12g.pdf  
Kapardis A. and Stephanou E. A., The First Two Years of Fiddling around 
with the Implementation of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) in 
Cyprus. [book auth.] Elspeth Guild. Constitutional Challenges to the 
European Arrest Warrant. s.l: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006 
 132 
 
Kaunert C., (2007), ‘Without the Power of Purse or Sword’: The European 
Arrest Warrant and the Role of the Commission, Journal of European 
Integration, vol. 29, no.4, 387–404    
Keijzer N., and Sliedregt E. van, The Dual Criminality Requirement in 
EAW practice in Blekxtoon (Ed.), Handbook on the European Arrest, 
T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, 2005 
Keijzer N., Locus Deliti Exceptions, Keijzer N. and Sliedregt E. van (eds.), 
The European Arrest Warrant in Practice, The Hague, 2009, 89–109  
_________, The European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision between 
Past and Future. [ed.] Guild E., Constitutional Challenges to the 
European Arrest Warrant. Netherlands: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006 
_________, The Fate of the Dual Incrimination Requirement in Guild E. 
and Martin L. (ed.), Still not resolved? Constitutional Issues of the 
European Arrest Warrant, Nijmegen, WLP 2009 
Kert R., ‘The implementation and application of mutual recognition 
instruments in Austria in Future of Mutual Recognition’ in  Vernimmen-
Van Tiggelen G., Surano L. and Weyemberg A. (Eds), The future of 
mutual recognition in criminal matters in the European Union, Belgium, 
IEE, 2009, 17–46  
Komarek J., European Constitutionalism and the European Arrest 
Warrant – In Search of the Contrapunctual Principles’ Limits, 44 CML 9 
(2007)  
Krasner S.D., Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1999 
Kuhn Z., The European Arrest Warrant, Third Pillar Law and National 
Constitutional Resistance/Acceptance. The EAW Saga as Narrated by the 
Constitutional Judiciary in Poland, Germany, and the Czech Republic, 
CYELP 3 [2007], 99–133  
Lagodny O., Expert Opinion for the Council of Europe on Questions 
concerning double criminality, PC-OC/WP, Strasbourg 24 June 2004. 
Lavenex S., (2007) ‘Mutual recognition and the monopoly of force: limits 
of the single market analogy’, Journal of European Public Policy 14(5), 
762–79 
Lazowski A., ‘Constitutional Tribunal on the Surrender of Polish Citizens 
Under the European Arrest Warrant. Decision of 27 April 2005’, EuConst., 
2005 
 133 
 
_________, From EU with trust: the potential and limits of the mutual 
recognition in the Third Pillar from the Polish perspective, in van Tiggelen 
G., Weyembergh A. and Surano L. (eds), The future of mutual 
recognition in criminal matters in the European Union, Belgium, IEE, 
2009, 419–444 
Ligeti K., The principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters in 
Hungary, Tiggelen G., Weyembergh A. and Surano L. (eds), The future of 
mutual recognition in criminal matters in the European Union, Belgium, 
IEE, 2009, 259–281 
Loof R., 54 CISA and the Principles of ne bis in idem, European Journal of 
Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (2007), 309–334 
Mackarel M. and Nash S., Extradition and the European Union, 46 ICLQ 
(1997) 
Maduro M. P., ‘So close and yet so far: the paradoxes of Mutual 
Recognition’, Journal of European Public Policy 14:5 August 2007, 814–
825   
Maior M. S., The Principle of Proportionality: Alternative measures to the 
European Arrest Warrant in The European Arrest Warrant in Practice, The 
Hague, 2009, 213–229  
Merriam C., History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1900 
Mitsilegas V., ‘The External Dimension of EU Action in Criminal Matters’, 
European Foreign Affairs Review 12: 457–497, 2007 
_________, EU Criminal Law, Hart Publishing, 2009 
_________, The reception of the principle of Mutual Recognition in the 
criminal justice systems of EU Member States. The Case of Greece in 
Tiggelen G. van, Weyembergh A. and Surano L. (eds), The future of 
mutual recognition in criminal matters in the European Union, Belgium, 
IEE, 2009, 177–187  
_________, The third wave of third pillar law. Which direction for EU 
criminal justice?, European Law Review, E. L. Rev. 2009, 34(4), 523–560  
Nicolaidis K. and Schmidt S.K., (2007) ‘Mutual recognition “on trial”: the 
long road to services liberalization’, Journal of European Public Policy 
14(5), 717–734  
Nicolaidis K. and Shaffer G., Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: 
Governance without Global Government, Law and Contemporary 
Problems, vol 68, 2005, 263–317  
 134 
 
Nicolaidis K., ‘Trusting the Poles? Constructing Europe through mutual 
recognition’, Journal of European Public Policy 14(5), 2007, 682–698  
Nilsson H.G., ‘Mutual Trust or Mutual Mistrust?’, in de Kerchove and 
Weyembergh A. (Eds.), La Confiance Mutuelle dans I'Espace Penal 
Europeen/Mutual Trust in the European Criminal Area, Editions de 
I'Universite de Bruxelles, 2005  
Nussberger A., ‘Poland: The Constitutional Tribunal on the 
implementation of the European Arrest Warrant’, JCL (2008) 162 
Peers S., EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, Oxford University Press, 2006 
_________, Mutual Recognition and Criminal Law in the European Union: 
Has the Council got it wrong?, 41 CML Rev., 2004 
Pinto-Duschinsky M., Bringing Rights Back Home; Making human rights 
compatible with parliamentary democracy in the UK, ed. The Rt Hon Lord 
Hoﬀmann, PC, Policy Exchange, 2011 Online Source: 
http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/pdfs/PX_Keeping
_Human_Rights_at_Home_WEB_07_02_11.pdf 
Plachta M., (Non-) Extradition of Nationals: Neverending Story? 13 
Emory Intl L Rev (1999) 77 
Pollicino O., European Arrest Warrant and Constitutional Principles of the 
Member States: a Case Law-Based Outline in the Attempt to Strike the 
Right Balance between Interacting Legal Systems, GLR, Vol. 09 No. 10 
(2008), 1313–1355  
Pound R., Social Control Through Law. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1942 
Quinney R. and Trevino A. J., The Social Reality of Crime, 2nd edition, 
New York: Transaction Publishers, 2001 
Rajan M.S., UN and Domestic Jurisdiction, Orient Longmans, Bombay, 
1958 
Ramgage S., The inadequecies of the European Arrest Warrant: its 
application to Assange, C.C. Law 2011, 3(3), 7–8  
Sadurski W., ‘Solange, Chapter 3: Constitutional Courts in Central 
Europe-Democracy-European Union’, European Law Journal, VOL 14, 
NO1, 2008 
Schmidt S.K., Mutual recognition as a new mode of governance, Journal 
of European Public Policy 14:5 August 2007, 667–681  
 135 
 
Shearer I.A., Extradition in International Law, Manchester, Manchester 
University Press, 1971 
Siegel S., Courts and Compliance in the European Union: The European 
Arrest Warrant in National Constitutional Courts, JEAN MONNET 
WORKING PAPER 05/08 available at 
http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/08/080501.pdf 
Sievers J., Managing diversity: The European Arrest Warrant and the 
potential of mutual recognition as a mode of governance in EU Justice 
and Home Affairs, Paper to be presented at the EUSA Tenth Biennial 
International Conference Montréal, Canada, 17–19 May 2007 at 
http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2007/papers/sievers-j-08i.pdf  
Slaughter A. M., (2004): A New World Order, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press Online source:  
http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/i7712.pdf 
 
Sliedregt E. van, The Dual Criminality Requirment, in Keijzer N. and 
Sliedregt E. van (eds.), The European Arrest Warrant in Practice, The 
Hague 2009, 51–70  
Slosarcik I., Criminal law and Mutual Recognition in the Czech Republic, 
in G. van Tiggelen, Weyembergh A. and Surano L. (eds), The future of 
mutual recognition in criminal matters in the European Union, Belgium, 
IEE, 2009, 99–114  
Spencer R., The Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies. 2003. 
p. 201-217. Vol. 6 
Stankiewicz W.J., (Ed), In Defence of Sovereignty, London: Oxford 
University Press, 1969  
Strandbakken A., ‘Extradition between Nordic countries, and the new 
Nordic Arrest Warrant’ in Keijzer N., and Sliedregt E. van, The European 
Arrest Warrant in Practice, T. M. C. Asser Press,  2009, 363–376  
Stubbs K. S. and Gorkiz P., Abuse of the European Arrest Warrant 
System in Keijzer N. and Sliedregt E. van (eds.), The European Arrest 
Warrant in Practice, The Hague 2009, 245–264 
Suominen O., The Finnish approach to mutual recognition in criminal 
matter and its implementation,  G. van Tiggelen, Weyembergh A. and 
Surano L. (eds), The future of mutual recognition in criminal matters in 
the European Union, Belgium, IEE, 2009, 219–238  
Suran L. and Tiggelen G. van, Study: Analysis of the future of mutual 
recognition in criminal matters in the European Union - Final Report, 
 136 
 
Institute for European Studies, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 20 
November 2008 
Thym D., In the name of the Sovereign Statehood: A critical Introduction 
to the Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court, Common 
Market Law Review 46 (2009), 1795–1822  
Tiggelen G. van and Surano L., Study: Analysis of the future of mutual 
recognition in criminal matters in the European Union - Final Report, 
Institute for European Studies, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 20 
November 2008 
_________, Half Full and Half Empty: The Application of EU Law in 
Poland (2004-2010), 48 Common Market Law Review, 2011, 503–553  
_________, ‘Tribunal Konstytucyjny (Polish Constitutional Tribunal), 
Judgment of 27 April 2005, No. P 1/05’, CML Rev., 2006  
Ballegooij W. van, The Netherlands and mutual recognition: between 
proportionality and the rule of law, in G. van Tiggelen, Weyembergh A. 
and Surano L. (eds), The future of mutual recognition in criminal matters 
in the European Union, Belgium, IEE, 2009, 401–416 
Vogel J., (2001), Abschaffung der Auslieferung? Kritische Anmerkungen 
zur Reform des Auslieferungsrechts in der Europäischen Union, 
Juristenzeitung, vol. 56, no. 19, 937–943    
Wagner W., (2003a), ‘Building an Internal Security Community: The 
Democratic Peace and the Politics of Extradition in Western Europe’, 
Journal of Peace Research, vol. 40, no. 6, 2003, 695–712  
Walter P., Perspectives of the Harmonisation of Criminal Law and 
Criminal Procedure in the European Union. [book auth.] , Husabø E. J. 
and Strandbakken A., Harmonization of Criminal Law in Europe: Series 
Supranational Criminal Law: Capita Selecta. s.l.: Intersentia, 2005 
Weyembergh A., The functions of approximation of penal legislation 
within the European Union, Maastricht J., 12 MJ (2005), 155–163 
Williams A., ‘Nationality, Double Jeopardy, Prescription and the Death 
Sentence as Bases for Refusing Extradition’, 62 International Review of 
Penal Law (1991) 259  
Wilt H., Some critical reflections on the process of harmonisation of 
criminal law within the European Union, in Klip A. and Wilt H. van der 
(eds), Harmonisation and Harmonising Measures in Criminal Law, Royal 
Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2002  
 137 
 
Wyngaert C. van den, Double Criminality as a requirement to extradition, 
in: Jareborg N. (ed.), Double Criminality, Studies in International 
Criminal Law, Uppsala, 1989. . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
